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Introduction 
 
 
 
This thesis consists of five chapters that investigate decision-making under different kinds of 
uncertainty and how behavior under uncertainty interacts with the social context. The 
foundation of each study is either a laboratory or a field experiment. They further have an 
interdisciplinary approach in common: each chapter makes use of manipulation techniques 
adopted from social psychology or proposes also psychological explanations to structure 
observed effects (or both). Specifically, the studies presented here provide various examples 
on how cognition research can be integrated into economic reasoning. 
Three kinds of uncertainty are considered in this thesis: natural, strategic and contextual 
uncertainty. The first two chapters deal with ‘natural uncertainty’. Under natural uncertainty, 
the uncertainty decision makers face results from random draws of nature with the ex-ante 
distribution often being known. In particular, in Chapter 1, we make use of an information 
cascade game to test whether a shared social identity may help experimental participants learn 
about an uncertain true state of the world from observing others’ behavior. In Chapter 2, we 
investigate whether and how outcome and procedural fairness affect risk taking in a social 
context and how this compares to individual decision-making under risk. The next two 
chapters deal with ‘strategic uncertainty’. Under strategic uncertainty, the uncertainty is not 
due to a random draw of nature but due to the behavior of other human decision makers. 
Therefore, under strategic uncertainty, the probability distribution with regard to the actions 
one might face is not known; instead, one has to form a belief about it. Chapter 3 presents the 
results of an experiment that investigates anchoring and focality in minimum effort games and 
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tests how the corresponding effects interact with the degree of strategic uncertainty. Chapter 4 
makes use of a stag hunt game to observe whether a strategic setting with aligned interests 
triggers per se more cooperation compared to an otherwise identical setting involving natural 
risks. The final chapter deals with ‘contextual uncertainty’ which is, e.g., caused by context-
specific norms or rules. Specifically, in Chapter 5, we discuss the results of a field experiment 
where we induce indirect information with regard to the norm in a voluntary payment setting 
while observing the behavior of customers.  
In the following, I provide a short summary of each chapter of the thesis, focusing on the 
research ideas, the experimental designs and the main findings. 
Chapter 1. This chapter is entitled “Group identity as a lubricant for social learning” and it 
is joint work with Sebastian Berger and Axel Ockenfels. All authors contributed equally to the 
project.
1
 In this research, we combine an information cascade game with the recent literature 
emphasizing the importance of group identity in economic interaction. In the information 
cascade game, decision makers have to guess an uncertain state of the world and receive a 
positive payoff if correct. In order to make their guess, they receive a private but noisy signal 
about the true state and also learn about the guesses of prior decision makers. Importantly, 
under specific circumstances, it is rational not to choose the private signal but to follow the 
behavior of others. However, much of the previous literature indicates that experimental 
participants follow too little and stick to their private signal too often. We aim at testing 
whether this reluctance to follow others can be mitigated by a shared group identity.  
We conduct a laboratory experiment inducing different identities and vary whether 
participants choose right after someone who has the same identity or after someone who has a 
different one. We find strong support for the idea that people are more willing to follow others 
                                                          
1
 All authors were equally involved in generating the ideas regarding research question, experimental design, 
paper design and statistical analyses. The experiment was planned and conducted by Sebastian Berger receiving 
feedback from Christoph Feldhaus. Statistical analyses were carried out by Christoph Feldhaus with help from 
Sebastian Berger. All authors were equally involved in writing this draft. 
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with whom they share an identity. We put forward a cognitive reasoning behind this finding 
which cannot be explained by theories suggesting different degrees of social preferences 
towards in- and outgroup members. 
Chapter 2. The title of this chapter is “Social risk taking: Unequal outcomes and fair 
procedures”. It is joint work with Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels. All authors contributed 
equally to the project.
2
 It investigates the effects of outcome and procedural fairness in social 
risk taking and tests whether the reluctance to choose social risks that cause unequal outcomes 
can be mitigated by a fair decision procedure. 
We set up a laboratory experiment where participants decide between a sure payoff and a 
lottery either only for themselves or on behalf of their group. In case of taking the decision on 
behalf of the group two factors are varied: first, risks are either correlated or uncorrelated and 
second, the mechanism that aggregates the will of the group is either more or less 
(procedurally) fair. The first variation alters whether outcomes are equal or unequal ex-post 
whereas the second variation alters the extent to which all members of a group can equally 
participate in arriving at a joint decision. The experimental data provide no evidence that a 
fair procedure may substitute for a fair outcome. In contrast, we observe evidence that both a 
fair outcome and a fair procedure are required to foster social risk taking and to make 
decision makers choose according to their private risk preferences when deciding for their 
group. This suggests that outcome and procedural fairness are complements rather than 
substitutes in social risk taking. 
Chapter 3. This chapter is entitled “Anchoring vs focality in coordination: Evidence from 
minimum effort games”. It is single-authored. In this paper, I investigate the extent to which 
private vs public anchors affect decision-making in social interaction and discuss how this is 
                                                          
2
 All authors were equally involved in generating the ideas regarding research question, experimental design, 
paper design and statistical analyses. The experiment was planned and conducted by Christoph Feldhaus. 
Statistical analyses were carried out by Christoph Feldhaus. The current draft was mainly written by Christoph 
Feldhaus. 
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related to focality. I further test whether the scale of such anchoring effects interacts with the 
degree of strategic uncertainty. Thereby, I am able to observe (1) whether also cognition plays 
a role in the effects of focal points and (2) whether the extent of the respective reactions 
increases in the degree of strategic uncertainty. 
I set up a minimum effort game experiment varying whether subjects are provided with a 
private or a public anchor, the height of the anchor and the gains from coordination and the 
losses from miscoordination. I find that decision makers react to both mere private but even 
more to public anchors. This suggests that cognition as well as strategic reasoning play 
relevant roles when decision makers are confronted with focal points. I further find that the 
extent to which subjects react to anchors depends on the gains and losses from 
(mis)coordination, indicating the importance of the degree of strategic uncertainty for the 
efficacy of anchoring effects in social interaction.  
Chapter 4. The title of the fourth chapter is “Social interaction promotes risk taking in a stag 
hunt game”3 and it is joint work with Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels. All authors 
contributed equally to the project.
4
 The aim of this paper is to investigate whether and how 
risk taking in a stag hunt game differs from an otherwise identical setting where the risk is due 
to nature. Previous literature suggests that people are more reluctant to choose the risky option 
in a trust game when the decision to reward trust is taken by a human player rather than by 
nature, an effect often referred to as “Betrayal aversion”. However, importantly, the trust and 
the stag hunt game differ in how the involved players have conflicting or aligned interests 
from choosing to cooperate. 
In fact, in an experimental stag hunt game, we find just the opposite of what has previously 
been observed in the trust game, i.e., that subjects are more willing to take a risk in case it is 
                                                          
3
 This chapter is published as Bolton, G., C. Feldhaus, and A. Ockenfels (forthcoming). Social interaction 
promotes risk taking in a stag hunt game. German Economic Review. 
4
 All authors were equally involved in generating the ideas regarding research question, experimental design, 
paper design and statistical analyses. The experiment was planned and conducted by Christoph Feldhaus. 
Statistical analyses were carried out by Christoph Feldhaus. All authors contributed equally to writing the paper. 
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caused by another human player rather than by nature. Our joint explanation for these two 
findings (less risk taking in the trust game and more risk taking in the stag hunt game) is that 
the stag hunt game triggers a different mode of information processing in the sense that 
cooperative games make the interpretation of a situation more optimistic compared to games 
that involve a conflict of interest which make the interpretation more pessimistic. We argue 
that this is evidence suggesting that the way decision makers process information can be 
affected by the mere structure of a game. 
Chapter 5. This chapter is entitled “Norm uncertainty and voluntary payments in the field” 
and it is joint work with Tassilo Sobotta and Peter Werner. All authors contributed equally to 
the project.
5
 In this research, we conduct a field experiment investigating the effect of indirect 
information about a norm in an environment where people are likely uncertain about the 
relevant norm. Specifically, in a voluntary payment setting, we vary the scales shown to 
customers in a publicly announced survey asking them about their opinion with regard to the 
appropriate payment for a service – the values in one scale are rather low whereas the values 
in the other scale are rather high.  
We find a strong effect of this variation in the sense that customers pay substantially more for 
the service when confronted with a scale suggesting high values. In order to test whether this 
effect is indeed driven by uncertainty about the norm, we set up a second experiment 
providing customers with an additional piece of explicit norm-relevant information. We find 
that the effect of the scale is mitigated when the explicit information is provided. In addition, 
we find that the effect of the scale-variation tends to be amplified in a social environment. Our 
study hence suggests that uncertainty about norms can make decisions very volatile and easily 
affected by minor variations in the context. 
                                                          
5
 Christoph Feldhaus and Peter Werner generated the research question. The location was organized and the 
experiment implemented and conducted by Christoph Feldhaus and Tassilo Sobotta. Statistical analyses were 
carried out by Christoph Feldhaus and Peter Werner. Christoph Feldhaus and Peter Werner wrote the current 
draft receiving feedback from Tassilo Sobotta. 
- 6 - 
In sum, these five studies emphasize the relevance of the social context for behavior under 
uncertainty. Importantly, while some of the observed effects are not in line with standard 
economic theory, various examples are provided where cognition research can help structure 
empirical findings. Thereby, this thesis highlights the role of interdisciplinary approaches for 
the progress of behavioral economics.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Group identity as a lubricant for  
social learning* 
 
Co-authors: Sebastian Berger and Axel Ockenfels 
 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the impact of group identity on social learning in a laboratory information 
cascade game. We find that subjects are more likely to follow choices made by ingroup 
decision makers than choices made by outgroup decision makers. This can be explained with 
the help of recent social cognition research, which suggests that group identity may serve as a 
lubricant for social learning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________ 
*
Sebastian Berger, University of Bern, Department of Organization and Human Resource Management, 
Engehaldenstrasse 4, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland, E-mail: sebastian.berger@iop.unibe.ch. Christoph Feldhaus 
and Axel Ockenfels, Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, 
Germany, E-mail: feldhaus@wiso.uni-koeln.de/ockenfels@uni-koeln.de. We thank Kevin Breuer for help in 
programing and running the experiment, Mattia Nardotto and Peter Werner, participants of the workshop of the 
Research Unit “Design & Behavior” 2012 and 2013, and seminar participants at the University of Cologne for 
helpful comments. Financial support by the German Research Foundation is gratefully acknowledged by all 
authors through support of the Research Unit “Design & Behavior: Economic Engineering of Firms and 
Markets” (FOR 1371), by Berger through the research scholarship program (LO 1826/1-1), and by Ockenfels 
through the Leibniz-Program. 
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1. Introduction 
Individual decisions rarely take place in a social vacuum: instead they are most often 
influenced by others’ advice and behavior. In many situations decision makers therefore face 
a trade-off between sticking to their own assessment of the state of the world and following 
the advice or behavior of others. A well-known vehicle to study this conflict in a laboratory 
environment is the information cascade game pioneered by Anderson and Holt (1997). In this 
game players must guess the true state of the world based on a noisy private signal and, 
additionally, on what they know about others’ prior behavior, which in turn may be based on 
their respective private signals.  
In the present research, closely adopting the experimental design by Anderson and Holt 
(1997; see Fahr and Irlenbusch 2011, for a similar setting), we consider a situation with two 
possible states of the world, which are either a RED urn or a BLACK urn, both being drawn 
with equal probability. Each member of a six-player group sequentially receives a private and 
stochastic signal about the true state of the world. The signal is either a red ball or a black 
ball, with the probability of RED (BLACK) conditional on drawing a red (black) ball being 
equal to 2/3. After receiving her private signal, each player bets on one of the two states of the 
world, which gives her a fixed payoff if correct. Apart from their private signals, players 
know the history of choices of all prior decision makers. 
Standard economic theory assumes that players update their beliefs about the true state of the 
world according to Bayes’ rule, further assuming that this is common knowledge among all 
players. However, empirical research on information cascade decision-making shows that 
learning from others’ behavior (what might be called “social learning”) and from one’s 
private signal often deviates from Bayesian predictions. 1 Furthermore, studying a meta-
                                                          
1
 See Bannerjee (1992) and Bikchandani et al. (1992) for theory, and Huck and Oechssler (2000), Hung and Plott 
(2001), Çelen and Kariv (2004), Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004), Drehmann, Oechssler and Roider (2005), 
Kübler and Weizsäcker (2005), Dominitz and Hung (2009), and Fahr and Irlenbusch (2011) for laboratory 
evidence. 
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dataset consisting of the results of 13 similar experiments on information cascade decision-
making, Weizsäcker (2010) finds that subjects do not only fail to do Bayesian updating but 
that they are also too reluctant to discard their private signal empirically. That is, they err in 
sticking to their private signal when it actually would have been empirically optimal (in terms 
of expected utility) to follow their predecessor’s choice (see also Ziegelmeyer et al. 2013). 
Similarly, Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004) find that many decision makers purchase private 
signals even when these are uninformative in Bayesian terms. Such findings are in line with 
Nöth and Weber’s (2003) notion of overconfidence in cascade games, as well as with Goeree 
et al.’s (2007) quantal response equilibrium analysis, with all these studies implying that 
people overweight their private signals compared to publicly provided information. 
This kind of evidence raises the question which factors facilitate social learning: that is, which 
factors increase people’s inclination to rely more on information provided by others? In this 
paper, we hypothesize that the social context in which a decision is taken influences the 
effectiveness of social learning. In particular, recent economic and psychological research 
suggests that group identity can play a crucial role for actual behavior in social contexts 
(Tajfel and Turner 1979; Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Chen and Li 2009; Mussweiler and 
Ockenfels 2013).  
In our information cascade game, there are two different channels through which group 
identity can work, resulting in two different hypotheses. The first is based on Chen and Li’s 
(2009) observation that group identity affects people’s preferences and in particular promotes 
altruism towards ingroup members (see also Brewer 1979; McLeish and Oxoby 2007; Chen 
and Chen 2011; Ockenfels and Werner 2014). In the information cascade game, the only way 
by which a player can be altruistic is by revealing her private information, which is valuable 
to other group members, even when it may be profit-maximizing to do otherwise. This 
suggests that uniquely dealing with ingroup members in this game leads to more decisions in 
line with one’s private signal than when also dealing with outgroup members (Hypothesis 1). 
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Our second hypothesis is based on the idea that group identity affects information processing. 
Experiments in social cognition research have shown that information processing depends on 
the degree to which others are perceived to be similar, which in turn translates into systematic 
differences of judgment and behavior (Mussweiler and Ockenfels 2013, and the references 
therein). One reason is that similarity induces less judgmental uncertainty and a more ‘trusting 
mindset’ (e.g., Gino et al. 2009; Mussweiler and Posten 2012; Bolton et al. forthcoming). 
Because a common group identity is an important source of interpersonal similarity (Brewer 
1979), this line of research suggests that information generated by ingroup members is more 
strongly relied upon than information provided by outgroup members in our context of an 
information cascade game. That is, subjects are expected to be more likely to follow an 
ingroup member’s choice than an outgroup member’s choice (Hypothesis 2).  
Our null hypothesis is that group identity does not affect the weights put on private and 
others’ information, and thus suggests no difference between treatments that vary only in the 
degree of shared identity. In fact, neither standard theory, nor quantal response equilibrium or 
overconfidence would predict a difference with regard to identity, although the latter models 
would in principle allow for different degrees of overweighting one’s private signal in 
different social contexts.  
Our data show that subjects are significantly more likely to follow an ingroup member’s 
choice than an outgroup member’s choice. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 but 
inconsistent with our other hypotheses. We conclude that group identity may thus serve as a 
lubricant for social learning as decision makers generally tend to follow too little (as, e.g., 
suggested by Weizsäcker 2010).  
 
2. Experimental design and procedure 
144 subjects (6 sessions of 24) participated in a two-treatment between-subjects experiment 
on the effect of group identity on social learning. The experiment consisted of three stages: a 
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group-formation task, an identity-enhancement task, and an information cascade game. The 
group-formation and identity-enhancement tasks were adopted from previous research on 
group identity (Tajfel et al. 1971; Chen and Li 2009; Chen and Chen 2011). The information 
cascade game was adopted from Anderson and Holt (1997).  
Group formation and identity enhancement. The group formation task involved the review 
of five pairs of paintings by the artists Klee and Kandinsky, with one piece in each pair by 
Klee and the other by Kandinsky. Under uncertainty about the painter of the pictures, subjects 
were asked to indicate their preferred painting in each pair. Based on this preference, they 
were assigned to one of two groups: the Klee group or the Kandinsky group, with each group 
consisting of the 12 subjects who had a relatively stronger preference for the respective 
painter. 
Subsequently, all 12 members from the same group engaged in a ten-minute chat to increase 
identity concerns (as in Chen and Li 2009). Their task was to discuss an additional painting 
and to assess who the painter of this artwork might be. Subjects could exchange information 
via a computerized chat-program, but in the end, had to make a private guess. If correct, they 
received another 1.00€ as additional compensation but were only notified about the 
correctness of their guess after the experiment.  
Information cascade game. In the third stage, subjects were re-assigned to groups of six. 
Groups were either formed by members of the same identity group only (i.e., all sharing the 
preference for the same artist and having been in the same chat), called same-identity groups, 
or by three members from either group, called mixed-identity groups. In mixed-identity 
groups, a member of the Klee group was always followed by a member of the Kandinsky 
group in the information cascade game, and vice versa. Thus, each decision maker was placed 
right after an outgroup decision maker. In contrast, in same-identity groups, all decisions in a 
group were taken by ingroup members, sharing the same induced identity. Subjects were 
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informed about the group composition and the positioning of ingroup and outgroup members 
in the base game. 
Our base game closely replicated the laboratory information cascade game presented in 
Anderson and Holt (1997). At the start of the base game, the experimenters secretly rolled a 
die to determine which of two urns would be used for the respective period. Urn RED 
contained two red balls and one black ball, urn BLACK contained two black balls and one red 
ball. Urns and balls were uniform in size, color, and weight. Urn RED was used if the role of 
the die displayed an even number, urn BLACK if it displayed an odd number. Subjects in 
each group were approached individually, one after the other, to observe one private draw 
from the urn, with replacement. After drawing, subjects could privately record what they saw 
on sheets of paper and had to make a decision on which urn to bet. Unobserved by the 
experimenter, subjects entered their decisions into a computer. This information was shared 
with the other five subjects in the group. Thus, each subject knew her own private signal and 
everyone knew the decisions of all prior decision makers. However, the private signals of 
prior subjects were not disclosed.  
As in Anderson and Holt (1997), the base game was repeated for 15 periods. The order of 
positions was counterbalanced across periods so that subjects made decisions in all positions. 
In each period, after all six subjects had made their decision, the true urn was publicly 
revealed and subjects received 1.50€ into their account if they had guessed the true state of the 
world in the corresponding period.  
Procedure. The experiment was conducted in May of 2012 in the Cologne Laboratory for 
Economic Research (CLER). Participants were invited via ORSEE (Greiner 2015) from the 
student body of the University of Cologne and the experiment was programmed with zTree 
(Fischbacher 2007). The experiment took approximately 90 minutes; the average payoff from 
the game was 14.63€ plus a show-up fee of 2.50€ and an additional 1.00€ if the picture after 
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the chat was attributed to correct artist. Participants (33% males, average age 23) were 
recruited from all fields of study.  
 
3. Results 
For our analyses, we closely follow Anderson and Holt’s (1997) and Fahr and Irlenbusch’s 
(2011) definitions and assumptions regarding rational behavior. In the information cascade 
game, a cascade can occur when it is optimal for a decision maker to discard her own signal 
and to follow the decision of her predecessor. Therefore, observations caused by rationally 
starting or continuing information cascades are not included into Bayesian updating. 
Importantly, we follow Anderson and Holt (1997) in assuming that (irrationally) breaking a 
cascade, however, yields an informative signal. That is, we assume that subjects expect 
cascade breakers to report their true signal. It is finally assumed that decision makers follow 
their own signal if they are indifferent in Bayesian terms.  
A first look at the data. In total, we conducted 3 sessions per treatment with 4 independent 
groups each, which makes 12 independent groups per treatment. This yields a total of 2,160 
bets on either the RED (R) or the BLACK (B) urn, 1,877 (86.9%) of which are in line with 
Bayesian updating. While bets in line with Bayesian updating are very common when it is 
rational to stick to one’s own signal (89.9%), rationality is substantially lower when it is 
optimal to discard it (70.2%).2 This difference is highly significant using a Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test (WSR) on the level of independent groups (pWSR < 0.01, two-tailed). It further 
supports the observation that subjects are more likely to behave rationally when the rational 
decision coincides with their privately observed signal, as emphasized by Weizsäcker (2010), 
Nöth and Weber (2003) and Goeree et al. (2007). 
                                                          
2
 These values are close to those found in previous experiments on information cascade decision-making, e.g., in 
Anderson and Holt (1997), Alevy et al. (2007), and Fahr and Irlenbusch (2011). 
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According to Hypothesis 1 subjects should be more likely to stick to their own signal when 
being in a same-identity group, as this altruistically provides useful information to their group. 
Overall, we observe that in 80.7% of all 2,160 decisions subjects stick to their private signal.
3 
This share is slightly and insignificantly smaller in the same-identity groups than in mixed-
identity groups (80.1% vs. 81.4%; pMWU = 0.58, two-tailed, based on independent groups). 
Moreover, altruistic motives should be most relevant for behavior of those decision makers in 
the second position, who observe a different signal compared to the first decision. The reason 
is that here a purely selfish decision maker would be indifferent, so that altruism has its best 
chance to emerge. However, the share of these choices that is consistent with one’s own 
signal is with 84.3% slightly and insignificantly smaller in same-identity groups than the 
88.6% that we observe in mixed identity groups (pMWU = 0.67, two-tailed, based on 
independent groups). We conclude that there is no support for Hypothesis 1 in our data. 
According to Hypothesis 2, the overweighting of one’s own private signal is moderated by the 
social context and elevated in mixed-identity groups. Overall, participants in same-identity 
groups follow their predecessors’ decisions significantly more often (74.1%) than participants 
in mixed-identity groups (64.7%; pMWU = 0.02, two-tailed, based on independent groups).
4 
These findings are in line with Hypothesis 2, supporting the view that subjects in our two 
treatments process the information about the behavior of prior decision makers in different 
ways. 
Parametric analyses. Parametric statistics confirm these findings. As suggested by 
Weizsäcker (2010), we make use of linear probability models (LPM) that provide an easier 
                                                          
3
 When testing for Hypothesis 1 only the first five decision makers have an incentive to stick to their signal as the 
last decision maker cannot provide useful information to subsequent ones. Similarly, when it comes to 
Hypothesis 2, only decision makers from the second position onwards should be affected by the treatment 
variation. For simplicity, however, we will conduct our analyses with the whole sample. Our results do not 
change when restricting the sample to the relevant decision makers.  
4
 The difference can be separated into two observations. First, decision makers show a lower propensity to 
choose private signals in same-identity groups in those cases in which their signal differs from the decision of 
the predecessor (53.9% vs. 66.8%; pMWU = 0.01, two-tailed). Second, they tend to be more likely to choose their 
signal if it is in line with the decision of the predecessor, though this effect is only weakly significant (92.8% vs. 
89.6%, pMWU = 0.08, two-tailed). 
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interpretation of interactions. Table 1 shows the results of two models estimating the 
probability that decision makers choose the same color as their direct predecessor. In Model 
1, we find that subjects in same-identity groups are more likely to choose the same color as 
their predecessor. Model 2 controls linearly for the period a decision is taken in as subjects 
might learn to follow, includes dummies for the position of the respective decision maker 
within the group in the sequential game and a variable indicating whether a decision maker’s 
private signal is identical to the choice of the direct predecessor (Signal-choice congruence). 
We find that the controls do not change the main result that the social context affects people’s 
propensity to follow. The estimated probability to follow is 7.2 percentage points higher in 
same-identity groups compared to mixed-identity groups.  
TABLE 1. LPM MODELS PREDICTING THE PROBABILITY THAT DECISION MAKERS CHOOSE THE 
SAME COLOR AS THEIR PREDECESSOR. 
Dependent var.: Follow (1) (2) 
Same identity  0.094*** 
(0.036) 
0.072** 
(0.030) 
Signal-choice congruence -- 0.519*** 
(0.025) 
Position dummies -- Yes 
Period control -- Yes 
Subjects 144 144 
Observations 1800 1800 
R-squared overall 0.011 0.034 
Notes: Results obtained from random effects LPM models, Same choice as predecessor (Follow, 1 = yes, 0 = no) 
serves as the dependent variable, Same identity (1 = yes, 0 = no), Signal-choice congruence (1 = Signal is equal 
to choice of predecessor, 0 = Signal is different from choice of predecessor), Position dummies, and Period 
(from 1 to 15) serve as independent variables; standard errors clustered on group level are presented in 
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
Table 2 shows the results of further LPM models estimating the probability that the BLACK 
urn is chosen. In both models, a subject’s private signal, the choice of the direct predecessor, 
the group-composition (dummy ‘Same-identity’) and the interaction between the choice of the 
direct predecessor and the group-composition are included as explanatory variables. In Model 
1, we additionally control for the rational posterior belief up until the direct predecessor (as 
this choice is added to the model as the ‘predecessor’s decision’), assuming that subjects 
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applied Bayesian updating as defined above. Model 2 instead controls for the color chosen in 
the first position, as this decision might play an important role for a simpler decision heuristic.  
In both models, our main variables of interest are the group-composition (Same identity) and 
the interaction of the predecessor’s choice and the group-composition. If subjects differed in 
their propensity to use the publicly provided information by their predecessor conditional on a 
shared group identity (Hypothesis 2), we should expect a significant effect of both variables. 
While we expect a negative effect of ‘Same identity’ on the probability to choose BLACK (as 
this implies cases where the predecessor has the same identity and chose RED), we expect a 
positive effect of ‘Predecessor decision BLACK x Same identity’ (as this implies cases where 
the predecessor has the same identity and chose BLACK). In addition, the joint effect of both 
is expected to be significant. 
TABLE 2. LPM MODELS PREDICTING THE PROBABILITY THAT BLACK IS CHOSEN. 
Dependent var.: BLACK (1) (2) 
Signal black 0.495*** 
(0.026) 
0.508*** 
(0.029) 
Predecessor decision BLACK 0.123*** 
(0.033) 
0.161*** 
(0.046) 
Same identity -0.084*** 
(0.028) 
-0.100*** 
(0.035) 
Predecessor decision BLACK x Same 
identity 
0.098** 
(0.045) 
0.123** 
(0.057) 
Posterior T-2 0.803*** 
(0.038) 
-- 
First choice BLACK -- 0.177*** 
(0.026) 
Joint p-value 0.008 0.016 
Subjects 144 144 
Observations 1800 1800 
R-squared overall 0.506 0.443 
Notes: Results obtained from random effects LPM models, choice (1 = black, 0 = red) serves as the dependent 
variable, private signal (1 = black, 0 = red), the choice of the predecessor (1 = black, 0 = red), Same identity (1 = 
yes, 0 = no), the interaction between the prior decision and the same identity variable (1 = yes, 0 = no) and first 
choice (1 = black, 0 = red) as independent variables. Posterior T-2 denotes the information set available for the 
predecessors’ decisions. Joint p-value is Wald test measuring the joint significance of ‘Same identity’ and 
‘Predecessor decision BLACK x Same identity’; standard errors clustered on group level are presented in 
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
Model 1 shows, not surprisingly, that a subject who receives the black signal is more likely to 
choose the BLACK urn and vice versa. The posterior regarding BLACK, which summarizes 
  
- 17 - 
the public information until the second to the last position, also positively affects the 
likelihood to choose the BLACK urn (p < 0.01, two-tailed).  
Moreover, the predecessor choosing BLACK (p < 0.01, two-tailed) also increases the 
respective probability. Importantly, both the variable ‘Same identity’ (p < 0.01, two-tailed) 
and the variable ‘Predecessor decision BLACK x Same identity’ (p < 0.05, two-tailed) show 
that the effect of the predecessor’s choice differs conditional on the group-composition. We 
find the same results when replacing the posterior by the choice of the first decision maker in 
Model 2.
5
 This implies that a decision maker in the same-identity treatment is less likely to 
choose BLACK when her predecessor chose RED and more likely to choose BLACK when 
her predecessor chose BLACK, both compared to the mixed-identity treatment. Similar to our 
initial findings on the propensity to follow, the difference in the likelihood to choose a 
respective color conditional on the identity of the predecessor is between 8.4 and 12.3 
percentage points. Overall, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, the influence of others’ decisions 
depends crucially on the social context in terms of a shared group identity.  
Does a same-identity context promote smarter decisions? The previous analyses show that 
sharing the same identity facilitates following other’s choices in the information cascade 
game. Because earlier studies can be summarized as collectively showing that subjects tend to 
overly stick to their private signal compared to what would have been empirically optimal 
(e.g., Weizsäcker 2010), our study hence suggests that a shared group identity may improve 
decision-making.  
That said, we caution that we did not find evidence in our data that a shared group identity 
makes decision makers more rational in the sense that the increase in the propensity to follow 
is stronger in those cases where it is actually ex ante or ex post beneficial to follow. Taking all 
2,160 decisions into account, and following Anderson and Holt’s (1997) prescription for 
                                                          
5
 The result generally translates into models where information revealed not only by one’s direct predecessor but 
also by earlier predecessors is considered (see Table A.1 in Appendix A for details). 
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rational behavior, discarding one’s private signal to follow a rational cascade is recommended 
in 329 situations, 178 times in same-identity groups and 151 times in mixed-identity groups. 
If we restrict our analysis to these situations, we replicate the previous finding that decision 
makers discard their signal (and thus follow their predecessor) more often in same-identity 
groups (74.2%) than in mixed-identity groups (65.6%). However, decision makers in same-
identity groups also more often discard their signal and follow their predecessor when they 
should rationally stick to their own signal (18.7% of 182 cases in same-identity groups vs. 
13.4% of 247 cases in mixed identity groups). Similarly, in situations in which it is optimal to 
follow the predecessor’s choice based on the ex post actual state of the world (as opposed to 
ex ante Bayesian decision-making), we find that decision makers are more likely to follow in 
same-identity groups (79.5% of 596) than in mixed-identity groups (72.7% of 575). While the 
difference seems larger when it is ex post optimal to not follow (63.5% of 304 in same-
identity groups vs. 50.5% of 325 in mixed-identity groups), LPM models investigating the 
propensity to follow do not reveal a significant interaction of group identity and the ex ante or 
ex post rationality of following (see Appendix A Table A.2). This suggests that, while group 
identity generally promotes following others, it does not necessarily help decision makers to 
better identify situations where following is actually a good choice.  
 
FIGURE 1. SHARE OF PERIODS WHERE 0, 1, … , 6 DECISION MAKERS CHOOSE THE RIGHT URN (IN 
PERCENT). 
0%
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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There is also no evidence that same-identity groups collectively reveal more private 
information and in this sense are more efficient (see our tests regarding Hypothesis 1 that 
show no general difference in the frequency of private information revelation). The different 
degrees of following that we observe rather translate into treatment-specific variations of 
herding. Figure 1 illustrates this. The numbers on the horizontal axis denote the share of 
periods where 0, 1…, 6 decision makers choose the ex post right urn. We find that same-
identity groups herd substantially more as indicated by the high share of periods in which all 
group members choose the same color (41.1% in same-identity groups vs. 26.1% in mixed-
identity group; pMWU = 0.05, two-tailed). Yet, this substantial increase of herding is observed 
for both the right and the wrong color (as suggested by a non-significant interaction between 
choosing the right urn and the treatment condition in Model 4 in Table A.2; p = 0.12, two-
tailed).
6
  
 
4. Conclusion 
Motivated by recent social cognition research and the previously observed failure of subjects 
to sufficiently rely on others, we investigate the hypothesis that group identity promotes social 
learning. We find strong support for our hypothesis. The propensity to rely on one’s own 
information compared to information provided by others is significantly reduced among 
ingroup members. In that sense, in the context of information cascade games, a shared group 
identity facilitates social learning and might thus help to de-bias individual decision-making 
in contexts where excessive reliance on one’s own signal is often observed.  
Our findings also extend the social identity literature by emphasizing that salient identity 
concerns do not only affect subjects’ preferences, but may also influence their information 
                                                          
6
 Accordingly, we find that the variance of choices is much higher in the mixed-identity treatment, where 
variance is measured by a variable with four values: 0 = all chose the same color, 1 = one chooses the one and 
five the other color, 2 = two choose the one and four the other color, 3 = each color is chosen by three decision 
makers (pMWU = 0.03, two-tailed).  
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processing. The latter seems particularly important for decision-making under uncertainty 
where the credibility of social information is a key determinant of subsequent behavior. This 
holds not only for financial decision-making among ingroup or outgroup members, as 
captured by our information cascade experiment, but also for other economic contexts such as 
online market places and social networks with recommender or feedback systems.
7
 This 
observation connects the economic group identity literature to the recent research that 
highlights the relevance of social cognition research for economic decision-making (e.g., 
Mussweiler and Ockenfels 2013; Bolton et al. forthcoming). 
                                                          
7
 EBay, for instance, attempts to emphasize the “community” aspect of their marketplace, which may not only 
increase trust and trustworthiness as suggested by the work of Chen and Li (2009), but also promote stronger 
reliance on the feedback provided by others.  
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Appendix 
 
A. Additional analyses 
More public information. In the main body of the manuscript, we focused on the impact of 
the direct predecessor on a decision maker’s behavior as this represents the most salient 
identity-relevant decision. However, public information in the information cascade game does 
not only come from the last but from all prior decisions. In Table A.1, we present LPM 
models that include more public information. 
TABLE A.1. LPM MODELS PREDICTING THE PROBABILITY THAT BLACK IS CHOSEN. 
Dependent var.: BLACK (1) (2) 
Signal black 0.502*** 
(0.029) 
0.555*** 
(0.025) 
Share of BLACK choices 0.395*** 
(0.043) 
-- 
Posterior -- 0.749*** 
(0.079) 
Same identity -0.108*** 
(0.033) 
-0.134** 
(0.052) 
Share of BLACK choices x Same 
identity 
0.137** 
(0.057) 
-- 
Posterior x Same identity -- 0.211** 
(0.103) 
Subjects 144 144 
Observations 1800 1800 
R-squared overall 0.460 0.513 
Notes: Results obtained from random effects LPM models, choice (1 = black, 0 = red), Share of BLACK choices 
and Posterior are continuous variables, Same identity (1 = yes, 0 = no); standard errors clustered on group level 
are presented in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level.  
In Model 1 the share of prior choices for the black urn as well as the group composition and 
the interaction of both are included. Again, a positive effect of the interaction is found. This 
suggests that the positive effect of a higher share of choices for the black urn on subjects’ 
propensity to choose BLACK is stronger in the same-identities treatment. This, in turn, 
supports the idea that public information is used less when it is (also) due to outgroup 
members. We find the same when we replace the share of choices by the expected probability, 
applying Bayesian updating. This is shown in Model 2.  
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Better decisions. Model 1 below takes Model 2 from Table 1 and adds a variable that 
indicates whether it is rational in Bayesian terms (ex ante) to follow the predecessor in a 
specific situation – with the effect being highly significant. However, we find no significant 
effect of the interaction with our treatment manipulation, indicating that the higher 
willingness to follow does not interact with the rationality of following. Similarly, looking at 
cases where it is rational to follow ex post, we neither find an effect on the likelihood of 
following conditional on this being optimal ex post or not. 
TABLE A.2. LPM MODELS PREDICTING THE PROBABILITY THAT DECISION MAKERS CHOOSE THE 
SAME COLOR AS THEIR PREDECESSOR. 
Dependent var.: Follow (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Same identity 0.047* 
(0.025) 
0.062* 
(0.033) 
0.071** 
(0.028) 
0.114*** 
(0.042) 
Rational to follow 0.533*** 
(0.025) 
0.541*** 
(0.051) 
-- -- 
Same identity x Rational 
to follow 
-- -0.020 
(0.051) 
-- -- 
Ex-post rational -- -- 0.069*** 
(0.023) 
0.101*** 
(0.040) 
Same identity x Rational 
to follow 
-- -- -- -0.065 
(0.042) 
Signal-choice congruence 0.218*** 
(0.034) 
0.218*** 
(0.034) 
0.504*** 
(0.026) 
0.504*** 
(0.026) 
Position dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Subjects 144 144 144 144 
Observations 1800 1800 1800 1800 
R-squared overall 0.461 0.461 0.343 0.344 
Notes: Results obtained from random effects LPM models, Same choice as predecessor (Follow, 1 = yes, 0 = no) 
serves as the dependent variable, Same identity (1 = yes, 0 = no), Rational to follow (1 = yes, 0 = no), Ex-post 
rational (1 = yes, 0 = no), Signal-choice congruence (1 = Signal is equal to choice of predecessor, 0 = Signal is 
different from choice of predecessor), Position dummies (2 to 6), and Period (from 1 to 15) serve as independent 
variables; standard errors clustered on group level are presented in parentheses.*** Significant at the 1 percent 
level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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B. Instructions given to subjects in the experiment 
A: Group identity task
8
 
Welcome and thank you very much for participating in our experiment. Please do not 
communicate with any of the other participants from now on until the end of the experiment. 
Please keep your cubicle free of any materials that have nothing to do with current experiment 
and switch of your mobile phones. If you do not stick to these rules, we have to exclude you 
from the experiment and any payoffs. 
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have questions after reading the instructions or 
during the experiment, please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will then come to 
you in order to answer your question in private. You can earn money in this experiment. How 
much you earn depends on your decisions and on chance. Additionally, you receive a show-
up fee of 2.50€. You do not have to tell anyone how much you have earned in the experiment. 
All participants received identical instructions.  
In the first part of the experiment you are shown 5 pairs of paintings. Each time, one of the 
two paintings is by Wassily Kandinsky while the other is by Paul Klee. For each pair you are 
asked which of the two paintings you prefer. Based on your preferences for the paintings 
compared to the other participants of the experiment you will become a member of one of two 
groups. 
Subsequently, you are asked whether another painting is either by Wassily Kandinsky or by 
Paul Klee. If you attribute the painting to the right painter you receive an additional payment 
of 1€. You will learn after the end of the experiment whether you attributed the painting to the 
right painter. While making your decision, you can discuss the issue with the members of 
your group with whom you will be matched based on your picture preference. You will only 
chat with members of your group. 
Please obey the following rules while participating in the chat: 
1. Do not disclose your identity (Name, age, gender, studies etc.). 
2. Please abstain from abusive and aggressive language. 
 
                                                          
8
 Instructions for the group identity task were the same for all subjects. 
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B: Information Cascade Game
9
 
These are the instructions for the second part of the experiment. Please read the instructions 
carefully. In the following, you interact with five participants in a group of six. All members 
of your group receive the same instructions. You interact only with participants who belong to 
the same group as you do, which is either Klee or Kandinsky. The second part of the 
experiment consists of 15 periods in total. In each period you are asked to guess from which 
of two randomly drawn urns a ball stems.  
Content of urn RED Content of urn BLACK 
two red balls one red ball 
one black ball two black balls 
 
Course of each of the 15 periods: 
At the beginning of each period a die is thrown which is not seen by the participants. When 
the result of the throw is 1, 2 or 3, the RED urn is chosen. If the result if 4, 5 or 6, the BLACK 
urn is chosen. Hence, the probability with which each of the two urns is chosen is identical. 
Your task is to bet on one of two urns you believe to be the chosen one.  
After the roll of the die, the content of the urn is decanted to another container. This container 
is used for both urns. Thus, you will draw from the same container no matter which urn is 
actually chosen. Subsequently, we will come to each participant subsequently. Each of you 
has the chance to draw one ball from the container and to look at it. Then the ball is replaced 
in the urn. The information about the color you have drawn should not be shared with other 
members of your group of six. 
Your decision (not your private information) for one of the two urns however, is shown to all 
other members of your group of six. This information is distributed via the computer. When 
all members of a group have drawn a ball and taken their decision, a period is over. Those 
participants, who have bet on the right urn, receive a payment of 15 ECU for the respective 
period. An ECU is worth 0.10€. 
                                                          
9
 Instructions differed between treatments; these instructions are from the INGROUP treatment, the 
OUTGROUP treatment was analogous but differed in the group-formation as explained. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Social risk taking: 
Unequal outcomes and fair procedures* 
 
Co-authors: Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels 
 
 
Abstract 
Many collective decisions entail risks. We conduct a set of experiments where subjects 
choose between a sure payoff and a lottery either for self or on behalf of their group. We vary 
first the extent to which the social risk potentially creates (in-)equality and second the fairness 
of the choice aggregation mechanism to elicit the will of the group to take the risk or not. We 
hypothesize that a fair procedure may substitute for fair outcomes in collective risk taking. 
This is not supported in our experiment. In contrast, we observe that outcome and procedural 
fairness are complements rather than substitutes: while social does not differ from individual 
decision-making when outcomes and procedures are fair, social risk taking gets more 
conservative when either of them is unfair. 
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1. Introduction 
Many collective decisions entail risks, e.g., circumstances where taking a chance might have 
positive or negative implications for the welfare of the society as a whole. This, in turn, might 
also have important implications for the distribution of the welfare within a society ex-post. 
Examples include whether or not to build nuclear power plants, to risk economic or military 
conflicts, to engage in prevention politics, to avoid natural disasters, crime or diseases, etc. 
While some of these risks affect all members of a society in the same way, others affect them 
differently conditional on their individual realization of the respective risk. 
In this paper, we examine the influence of outcome and procedural fairness on social risk 
taking in controlled experiments. This is compared to individual decision-making under risk. 
We expect that social is similar to individual risk taking when all are equally affected by the 
risk whereas group members should get more conservative when the risk causes unequal 
outcomes. We hypothesize that this reluctance to choose social risks that cause inequality can 
be mitigated by a fair decision procedure as a fair procedure may substitute for fair outcomes. 
However, this is not supported in our experiment. In contrast, we will see that there is less risk 
taking if either the group members can be differently affected by the risk or when the choice 
aggregation mechanism is unfair. In turn, social is found to be similar to individual risk taking 
when outcomes and procedures are fair. These results suggest that the two types of fairness 
are complements rather than substitutes in social risk taking. 
The baseline of our study is a standard individual problem in choice under uncertainty. Here, 
each individual faces a choice between a sure thing and a lottery that pays either higher or 
lower than the sure thing. Thereby, we investigate how people decide only for themselves, in 
absence of any social context.  
We then examine the baseline game in a group choice setting. Models of inequality aversion 
(such as Fehr and Schmidt 1999 and Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) imply that relative payoffs 
can work their way into an individual’s decision to take the chance or not depending on the 
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expected inequality the risk may cause. While we have some treatments where risks are 
correlated across the group, others resolve the risk individually even though the decision to 
take the risk or not is taken on behalf of the group as a whole. This implies no potential for 
inequality in the former cases while inequality is likely to be caused in the latter ones. 
Inequality aversion therefore predicts that risks that are correlated across risk takers should be 
more attractive than risks that are resolved independently.
1
 To implement this, in some of the 
treatments in our experiment, decision makers express their option preference knowing that a 
separate, independent draw resolves the risk for each decision maker. Hence, risks are socially 
uncorrelated. In the other treatments, one common draw resolves the risk for all. Hence, risks 
are socially correlated. 
The corresponding hypotheses, which follow from the mentioned models of inequality 
aversion, are that there will be less risk taking of group members in the uncorrelated 
treatments compared to the individual decisions (Hypothesis 1) and compared to the 
correlated treatments (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, we expect that risk taking in groups under 
correlated risks does not differ from individual decision-making which is also in line with 
these models. 
Besides the correlation of risk, the second factor we manipulate is the social choice 
mechanism that determines whether all members of a group take the risk or all do not. We 
aim at varying the (procedural) fairness of the mechanism. The first mechanism is a majority 
vote where each player casts her vote either for the safe or the risky option. In this case, the 
majority determines the relevant option for all. The second mechanism is a dictator 
mechanism where each player decides for the whole group conditional on being the dictator. 
While the former aggregation mechanism gives each group member “voice” and should hence 
be perceived as fair (e.g., Tyler et al. 1985), the latter determines one player who alone takes 
                                                          
1
 While the expected payoff of the lottery is the same in both treatments, expected inequality differs conditional 
on the resolution of the risk. Hence, assuming inequality averse preferences, expected utility differs only due to 
differences in expected inequality, making risks less attractive when they are resolved individually. 
  
- 30 - 
the decision for the whole group, neglecting the choices of all others who hence have no voice 
in the decision. This might be perceived as less fair. However, we observe no difference in 
social risk taking between these two mechanisms in our initial experiments. One potential 
reason for the lack thereof is that this random dictator mechanism might also be perceived as 
fair as all players are treated equally in having the same low chance of being chosen as the 
dictator. We therefore introduce a third mechanism that treats group members differently. In 
the unfair dictator mechanism players also decide conditional on being the dictator. However, 
in the respective treatments, the probabilities of being chosen as the dictator are different 
across group members. In the corresponding experiment, we observe that social risk taking 
indeed differs between the majority vote and the unfair dictator mechanism which seems to 
imply that the latter is actually perceived as less fair. 
The corresponding hypothesis is that the fairness of a decision procedure matters in particular 
when a decision can cause unfair outcomes. We hence expect that decision makers are more 
willing to choose a risky option and to accept future inequality when the decision for the 
group is implemented by a fair procedure. The conjecture is that they are less likely to shy 
away from outcome inequality when individually preferring the risk in case the aggregation 
mechanism is equal and fair. Another way of putting this is that a fair procedure may 
substitute for a fair outcome. E.g., Bolton et al. (2005) show in allocation decisions that a fair 
lottery can overcome the objections of those who are, in relative terms, hurt by an outcome. 
This suggests for our setting that, when the risk causes unfair outcomes, decision makers 
might be more willing to choose in line with their private risk preferences, and thus more risk 
seeking, in case the aggregation mechanism is fair (Hypothesis 3). 
On the other hand, if decision makers are not affected by the social context, as suggested by 
standard economic theory, neither the correlation of risks nor the aggregation mechanism 
should influence decision-making in this setting. Thus, we would not expect any difference 
across treatments which will serve as our null hypothesis in the following. 
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Our results indicate that individual and social risk taking are similar when social risks are 
correlated and a fair aggregation mechanism is applied. However, as soon as group members 
are differently affected by the risk or when the mechanism is unfair, choices get more 
conservative. Our research does hence not imply that a fair decision procedure mitigates the 
effect of outcome inequality. Instead, the results show that both fair outcomes and fair 
procedures are needed to foster social risk taking and to make individuals choose according to 
their private risk preferences when taking a risky decision for their group. This suggests that 
outcome and procedural fairness are complements rather substitutes in collective risk taking. 
To our best knowledge, this study is the first to investigate (1) how risk taking in large groups 
is affected by possibly unequal outcomes within the group, (2) how this compares to 
individual decision-making and (3) how fair outcomes and fair procedures interact in social 
risk taking. Our experiments show that both outcome fairness and procedural fairness are 
important parameters in collective decision-making under risk: if either outcomes or 
procedures are not fair, private risk preferences seem distorted in social contexts as choices 
get more conservative. This potentially reduces the efficiency of public decision-making 
under risk as people might be less willing to choose a risky but efficient option when 
outcomes differ among group members ex-post or when the aggregation mechanism is unfair. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we discuss the 
related literature from economics, social psychology and political science. In the third section 
the experimental design of our first experiment is presented and the respective results are 
discussed. Sections four and five present the second and third experiment and their results. 
Section six concludes.  
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2. Related literature 
Our research is closely related to previous literature that studies the role of outcome fairness, 
besides selfishness, in majority decision-making.2 Sauermann and Kaiser (2010) find in a 
laboratory experiment that applying the social preference model suggested by Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) to behavioral laboratory data significantly adds explanatory power to the 
standard rational choice model in majority decision-making. Similarly, Tyran and Sausgruber 
(2006) show that a preference for fairness in collective decision-making tends to promote 
equality. We build on these findings and show that also expected inequality affects behavior 
in a group choice context. Our study thereby extends and confirms the role of outcome 
fairness in collective decision-making.  
We further investigate whether a decision procedure that should be perceived as fair makes 
expected inequality more acceptable compared to an unfair aggregation mechanism. In this 
sense, we study whether a fair procedure substitutes for a fair outcome. The idea behind this 
variation relates to the literature on procedural fairness in social psychology and economics 
(e.g., Thibaut and Walker 1975; Tyler and Cain 1981; Tyler et al. 1985; Barrett-Howard and 
Tyler 1986; Bolton et al. 2005)
3
 which emphasizes the importance of two distinct fairness 
dimensions: outcome fairness and procedural fairness. Examples from this literature include 
Tyler and Cain (1981) who show that procedures have a strong effect on leader-evaluations 
that is independent of outcome fairness and Tyler et al. (1985) who find that also voice, the 
possibility to express one’s view about a decision, is closely related to the perceived fairness. 
Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) directly compare the importance of procedural and outcome 
fairness in allocation decisions. Their results suggest that both fairness dimensions are equally 
important. While the aforementioned studies investigate how different procedures and 
outcomes are perceived in terms of fairness, Bolton et al. (2005) test whether the fairness of a 
                                                          
2
 See Wilson (2007) for a general overview on majority decision-making in experiments. 
3
 Much of the psychological literature on procedural fairness is summarized in Lind and Tyler (1988) and Tyler 
and Lind (2000). 
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procedure also affects behavior. They find that procedural fairness, in their case a fair rather 
than an unfair lottery, substitutes to some extent for outcome fairness when it comes to 
allocation decisions. In sum, these studies show that not only outcome fairness is important in 
social contexts but also the fairness of how these outcomes came to be. This supports the idea 
that also social risk taking may be affected by the fairness of the aggregation mechanism.  
The effects of different mechanisms in collective decision-making have also been studied in 
political science and political economy. The respective literature finds that a system and its 
decisions are perceived as more legitimate when people can actively participate in the process 
of arriving at a decision (Weatherford 1992; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2001; Gangl 2003; 
Frey and Stutzer 2005; Birch 2010; Olken 2010; Doherty and Wolak 2012). Our research is in 
particular related to studies investigating the effects of majority decision-making. Here, Dal 
Bó et al. (2010) show in a laboratory experiment that a policy to increase cooperation is more 
successful when it is decided on democratically rather than being exogenously imposed. 
Baldassarri and Grossman (2011) show that the legitimation of sanctioning mechanisms via 
majority vote leads to a more successful promotion of cooperation in public good settings as 
compared to a random choice mechanism. Finally, majority decisions are also found to 
increase welfare by installing institutions that commit societies to efficient sanctioning 
devices (Hilbe et al. 2013). This literature suggests that different aggregation mechanisms can 
have substantial effects on both fairness perceptions and outcomes. The current research 
extends it in investigating whether the fairness of a procedure also affects choices in social 
risk taking and how this interacts with outcome fairness. 
Our study is further related to the literature comparing group decision-making under 
uncertainty to individual choices (Charness and Sutter 2012) and to the literature investigating 
how risk taking is affected by the social environment the decision is taken in (e.g., Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2010). Importantly, so far, research comparing individual and group willingness to 
take risks has mainly focused either on a collective or on an individual resolution of the risk 
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and on only one or another social choice mechanism. Hence, what has been largely neglected 
is how the behavior of group members depends on the way they may be differently affected 
by a decision and on the way the will of the group is aggregated.  
Notable exceptions from the former statement can be found in the literature on decision-
making in social contexts, where ‘groups’ usually consist of two players or where decisions 
are just taken in the explicit presence of others. Here, some studies observe that correlated are 
preferred to uncorrelated risks. Friedl et al. (2014) find that individuals invest more in 
insurance when risks are uncorrelated rather than correlated while Adam et al. (2014) find that 
positively correlated risks are preferred to negatively correlated risks, with the individual 
decision lying in between. In both studies also correlated risks result in inequality as in Friedl 
et al. (2014) the decisions are taken only for self while in Adam et al. (2014) two types of 
players are involved who receive different outcomes in the good and the bad state. López-
Vargas (2014) and Gaudeul (2015) show, in studies where only the expected inequality is 
varied between conditions, that social risks are indeed the more preferred the less inequality 
they cause. 
To our best knowledge, the fairness of aggregation mechanisms in social risk taking has not 
been studied systematically. Still, several mechanisms have been used in the literature. 
Studies relying on one group member to make the decision come to varying conclusions, 
ranging from individual and group decisions are similar (Brennan et al. 2008) to social risk 
taking being more conservative (Bolton et al. 2015) to finding an influence that we would 
anticipate from social preference models (Bolton and Ockenfels 2010) to finding an influence 
that appears different from what social preference models would imply (Rohde and Rohde 
20114). When decided by consensus, group risk taking tends to be more risk averse than 
                                                          
4
 Specifically, Rohde and Rohde (2011) observe that their results are consistent with social preferences that are 
lexicographic, with the self-interest of the decider being served first. 
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individual risk taking5 (Baker et al. 2008; Shupp and Williams 2008; Masclet et al. 2009; He 
et al. 2012). What drives this result is unclear, although inequality aversion and the social 
context per se are mentioned as candidates. When decisions are taken by majority vote, 
individuals and groups are found similar in risk taking proclivity (Harrison et al. 2013). In 
Reynolds et al. (2009), group decisions are taken by a third party with no material stake in the 
outcome. The results are similar to the consensus studies.  
In sum, these two literatures show that correlated risks are preferred to uncorrelated risks and 
investigate how individual and group decisions under one particular aggregation mechanism 
compare. In the present study, we test whether the reluctance to choose risks that cause 
inequality extends to decision-making in larger groups and whether choices are also affected 
by the fairness of the decision procedure. 
 
3. Experiment I 
Experimental design. The first experiment consists of a 2*2 between-subjects design and a 
baseline treatment (see Table 1). In each variation, participants indicate whether they prefer a 
sure payoff of 6€ or a lottery that either pays 0€ or 13€ with equal probability.  
In the first two treatments (VoteCorr and VoteUncorr) a majority vote determines which of 
the two options is realized for all participants (Voting) while in two further treatments 
(DicCorr and DicUncorr) the decision of one player is randomly chosen to determine the 
relevant option for the whole group (Dictator). If the safe option is chosen, each participant 
gets 6€ and if the lottery is chosen, the payoffs are determined by chance. 
In the VoteCorr and the DicCorr treatments, participants are told that the lottery (if it is 
chosen) is conducted publicly for all participants at once (socially correlated). In the 
VoteUncorr and the DicUncorr treatments however, they are told that the lottery is conducted 
                                                          
5
 At least when the risk is high, i.e., groups are more risk averse when the probability of the good outcome is 
low. 
  
- 36 - 
independently for each participant (socially uncorrelated). We implement the lottery by 
throwing a six-sided die. If it shows 1, 2, or 3, all members of the group/the respective 
participant get(s) the high payoff and if it shows 4, 5, or 6, they/she get(s) the low one.  
TABLE 1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN CONSISTING OF A 2*2 DESIGN VARYING THE CHOICE 
MECHANISM AND THE SOCIAL CORRELATION OF RISKS AND A BASELINE TREATMENT.
 
 
In the Baseline treatment, participants have to choose only for themselves between the sure 
payoff and the lottery. After taking their decision, those who prefer the lottery have to state 
for which three numbers (either 1, 2, and 3 or 4, 5, and 6) they want to receive 13€ while they 
would get a payoff of 0€ if one of the other numbers was realized. Subsequently, an 
experimenter approaches each participant in her booth in order to determine the result of the 
lottery and to enter the respective number into the computer. The payoff for those who 
preferred the sure payoff is independent of their number while participants who chose the 
lottery either receive the low or the high payoff conditional on the result of their lottery and 
their initial choice.
6
  
The experiment took place between April of 2012 and September of 2014 in the Cologne 
Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER). Participants were invited using ORSEE (Greiner 
                                                          
6
 We decided to roll the die for all participants, regardless of them taking the risk or not, so that they would know 
that others could not observe whether they chose the lottery or the fix payoff, making the decision more private.  
Baseline
Experimental treatments
Voting Dictator
Correlated
Uncorrelated VoteUncorr
VoteCorr
DicUncorr
DicCorr Individual 
decision 
without 
social context
Baseline
Choice mechanismCorrelation 
of risks
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2015) and the experiment was programmed with zTree (Fischbacher 2007). We conducted 12 
sessions with 21 participants each, two sessions for treatments VoteCorr, DicCorr and 
Baseline and three for treatments VoteUncorr and DicUncorr. Thus, we have 252 
observations in total. Before taking their decision, participants were to pass a quiz to make 
sure that they understood the rules of the experiment. After the experiment, they answered a 
short questionnaire on demographics. Each session lasted about 20 minutes. The average 
payoff was 7.85€ including a show-up fee of 2.50€. 
Results. Across all treatments, 148 participants choose the sure thing (59%) while 104 (41%) 
prefer the lottery. Importantly, and contrary to what would be implied by standard theory, the 
share of participants that chooses the risky option differs significantly across treatments (p = 
0.002, chi-squared test). 
In the Baseline treatment, subjects take a private decision. In this case, we find that about half 
of them go for the risky option (52%). In the other four treatments, participants make their 
choices in a social context. While in the VoteCorr treatment 57% choose the risky option, in 
the DicCorr treatment 50% do so. In the VoteUncorr and the DicUncorr treatments the shares 
of decisions for the lottery are, with 35% and 24% respectively, substantially lower.  
These descriptive results indicate that an individual’s risk taking behavior is similar to the 
behavior in social contexts when risks are socially correlated while it seems to differ from 
behavior under socially uncorrelated risks. In fact, in the Baseline 52% of all decision makers 
go for the risky option, compared to 54% pooled across both treatments with socially 
correlated risks and to 29% pooled across both treatments with socially uncorrelated risks. 
The share of participants choosing the risky option in Baseline does not differ from the two 
treatments with socially correlated risks (p = 0.661 for VoteCorr vs. Baseline; p = 0.827 for 
DicCorr vs. Baseline; and p = 0.900 for a pooled set of VoteCorr and DicCorr vs. Baseline, 
two-tailed two sample tests of proportions) while it differs from the share of decisions for the 
lottery in the treatments with socially uncorrelated risks (p = 0.076 for VoteUncorr vs. 
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Baseline; p = 0.003 for DicUncorr vs. Baseline; and p = 0.007 for VoteUncorr and DicUncorr 
vs. Baseline, two-tailed two sample tests of proportions). These results suggest that, 
independent of the choice mechanism, behavior does not differ between an individual 
decision and a decision in a social context with socially correlated risks while decision makers 
are substantially more risk averse when risks are uncorrelated as this allows for unequal 
outcomes. This is evidence supporting Hypothesis 1. 
We now go on to investigate how the two factors that we vary in the social treatments, the 
correlation of risks and the fairness of the choice mechanism, influence behavior across 
treatments in the 2*2 design. While the lottery is chosen by 57% of the participants in the 
VoteCorr treatment, it is chosen by only 35% in the VoteUncorr treatment. This is an increase 
of 63% due to correlated instead of uncorrelated risks. When the dictator mechanism is 
applied, 50% of the participants choose the risky option in the DicCorr treatment and 24% in 
the DicUncorr treatment. This equates to an increase of 108%, again, only due to correlated 
instead of uncorrelated risks. Both differences are significant (p = 0.025 for VoteCorr vs. 
VoteUncorr, and p = 0.006 for DicCorr vs. DicUncorr, two-tailed two sample tests of 
proportions). These results strongly support the idea that social risks get less attractive when 
they affect the members of a group differently (in line with Hypothesis 2). 
Finally, we also find some descriptive evidence suggesting that the influence of social 
preferences may not be independent of the social choice mechanism: comparing the two 
mechanisms, we find an increase of 46% in risk taking in VoteUncorr compared to DicUncorr 
while we only find an increase of 14% in VoteCorr in relation to DicCorr. Still, neither of the 
two differences is significant on conventional levels (p = 0.171 for VoteUncorr vs. DicUncorr 
and p = 0.512 for VoteCorr vs. DicCorr, two-tailed two sample tests of proportions). This 
lends no conclusive support to Hypothesis 3. 
Discussion. Summarizing, we find that decision makers behave similar when making an 
individual decision or when taking social risks that are correlated. When risks are socially 
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uncorrelated however, they choose more conservative. Both findings are independent of the 
choice mechanism. No conclusive evidence is found suggesting that the reluctance to take 
social risks that cause inequality differs between the two aggregation mechanisms. In the 
following, we conduct a second experiment to get a clearer picture with regard to the 
respective effect. 
 
4. Experiment II 
Experimental design. The second experiment consists of two treatments which are variations 
of VoteUncorr and DicUncorr. It is conducted as the dependent variable of the first 
experiment requires very large differences between treatments and/or a very large set of data 
to identify an effect. Importantly, given the results of the first experiment, we can neither 
convincingly argue that there is no effect of the procedure nor that there is an effect, as the 
difference is not significant (but close to weak significance) but quite large. Therefore, we set 
up an experiment that is similar to the first one but makes use of a risky choice variable that 
allows for more variation in subjects’ choices.7 
Specifically, in this second experiment, subjects do not choose between one lottery and one 
sure thing but take 15 decisions in total. The sure payoff is different in each of these 
decisions: while it is 10€ in Decision 1, it decreases in 50-cent-steps down to 3€ in Decision 
15. The lottery is the same in each decision: it pays 0€ with 50% probability and 13€ with 
50% probability (hence, this design similar to the choice-list introduced in Holt and Laury 
2002). This design makes sure that the expected inequality of the uncorrelated lottery does not 
change across decisions while it still provides a measure of a participant’s willingness to take 
social risks. 
                                                          
7
 We could have conducted more data using the design of the first experiment to clarify this issue. However, 
assuming that we observe the true difference between treatments, we would need at least four more sessions per 
treatment VoteUncorr and DicUncorr to observe a significant effect. Therefore, we decided to make use of a 
more efficient design in a second experiment. 
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In the beginning of the experiment the rules are explained on the computer screen and read 
out loud to the participants. Subjects learn in the instructions about the decisions they are 
going to make, about the mechanism that decides on the option for all and how the payoffs are 
determined. After giving them enough time to familiarize with the rules and to ask questions, 
the experiment is started. When all decisions are made, subjects are presented all their 
decisions on one screen: on this screen, they can either confirm their choices or make final 
changes before entering them. Only then, one of the 15 decisions is randomly chosen for 
payoff by publicly drawing a number (1-15) from a box. For the respective decision, it is 
checked whether the majority chooses the safe option or the lottery (VoteUncorr) or which 
option the random dictator chooses (DicUncorr). If the sure thing is chosen, each subject 
receives the same payoff which is the sure amount of the respective decision. If the lottery is 
chosen, an experimenter approaches each subject, throws a die and enters the number which 
determines the payoff of the respective participant. Subsequently, all subjects fill out a 
questionnaire asking for demographics and are then paid out privately in cash. 
This second experiment took place in December of 2015 in the CLER. Participants were 
invited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and the experiment was programmed with zTree 
(Fischbacher 2007). We conducted four sessions with 21 participants each, two per treatment. 
Thus, we have 84 observations in total, 42 per cell. Each session lasted about 30 minutes. 
Average payoff was 11.86€, including a show-up fee of 4€. 
Results. If they behaved consistently, subjects would either switch only once from the safe to 
the risky option or always choose the one or the other. This is the case for 79 out of 84 
observations. Three participants behave inconsistently in VoteUncorr and two in DicUncorr. 
In the following, we only use data from participants who behave consistently.
8
 
                                                          
8
 If we use the sum of risky decisions rather than the threshold, the results are similar to what we report in this 
section. 
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On average subjects take 9.92 safe decisions which implies that the mean subject prefers the 
risky option as soon as the sure payoff is only 5€ whereas a risk-neutral decision maker is 
indifferent between the two options when she receives 6.50€. However, we find no difference 
between treatments: in treatment VoteUncorr subjects take on average 10.13 safe options, 
with the corresponding value being 9.72 in treatment DicUncorr (p = 0.395, two-tailed Mann-
Whitney U test). Descriptively, this difference even points in the opposite direction of what 
we would have expected. Considering only the amount of the sure thing that was used in the 
first experiment (6€ - Decision 9), we neither find evidence for differences between 
treatments (26% in VoteUncorr vs 28% in DicUncorr, p = 0.852, two-tailed two sample test 
of proportions). 
Discussion. The results of the second experiment do neither suggest that there is a difference 
between VoteUncorr and DicUncorr in subjects’ willingness to take risks that cause unequal 
outcomes. This could either be due to the fairness of the procedure not affecting behavior in 
this context or our ‘unfair’ mechanism may not be perceived as such. One potential reason for 
the latter is the following: in a random dictator mechanism, all members of the group are 
treated equally as they all have the same low probability of being chosen as the dictator. This 
might also be perceived as fair. Following this reasoning, it may not be the lack of voice in 
the final decision that causes perceived unfairness but different treatments of the group 
members.
9
 
 
5. Experiment III 
Experimental design. In the third experiment, we therefore test whether a mechanism that 
might actually be perceived as unfair, as subjects are not treated equally, affects social risk 
taking. To do so, we set up an experiment that is identical to the dictator treatments of the first 
                                                          
9
 One could also argue that subjects in the random dictator mechanism actually do have voice as all submit their 
preference to the system which then randomly chooses a decision maker. 
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experiment with the difference being that one participant per session has an 80% probability 
of being chosen as the dictator whereas all others have only a 1% probability.
10
 We call these 
treatments UnfairdicCorr and UnfairdicUncorr. The hypotheses are still that people are more 
willing to take risks when outcomes are equal ex-post and that a fair aggregation mechanism 
mitigates this effect of outcome inequality on choices. To test the latter hypothesis, the results 
of the third experiment are also compared to the results of the first.  
We conducted 42 observations for both treatments in April of 2016 in the CLER. Subjects 
were invited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and the experiment was programmed with zTree 
(Fischbacher 2007). Average payoff was 11.75€ which includes a show-up fee of 4.00€. 
Results. In both treatments, we find that 33% of the subjects go for the risky option, 
indicating no difference conditional on the correlation of risks when this unfair procedure is 
applied (p = 1.000 for UnfairdicCorr vs. UnfairdicUncorr, two-tailed two sample test of 
proportions). Comparing these values also to the data of the fair majority vote treatments from 
the first experiment further provides no support for Hypothesis 3 while instead suggesting 
another form of interaction between outcome and procedural fairness in social risk taking (see 
Figure 1).  
First, choices in UnfairdicUncorr do not differ from VoteUncorr (p = 0.867 for VoteUncorr 
vs. UnfairdicUncorr, two-tailed two sample test of proportions) which provides no evidence 
that the fair procedure substitutes for fair outcomes. Second, the unfair mechanism makes 
subjects less likely to choose the risk compared to the fair mechanism when risks are 
correlated (p = 0.028 for VoteCorr vs. UnfairdicCorr, two-tailed two sample test of 
proportions). Third, social risk taking is more pronounced under correlated than under 
uncorrelated risks when decided on via majority vote (p = 0.025 for VoteCorr vs. VoteUncorr, 
two-tailed two sample test of proportions). Taken together, these findings seem to suggest that 
                                                          
10
 We have no hypothesis regarding the two probabilities of being chosen as the dictator. Therefore, the two 
types of subjects are not treated differently in the analysis. If we only make use of those subjects who have the 
low probability of being chosen as the dictator, the results remain similar. 
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both kinds of fairness are required to foster risk taking in a social context as more 
conservatism is introduced if either outcomes or procedures are unfair.  
 
FIGURE 1. SHARE OF RISKY CHOICES ACROSS TREATMENTS WITH THE BASELINE IN LIGHT GREY, 
THE VOTING TREATMENTS IN MEDIUM GREY AND THE UNFAIR DICTATOR TREATMENTS IN DARK 
GREY. 
 
Comparing these results also to the Baseline further provides some evidence that decision 
makers in social contexts actually only choose according to their private risk preferences 
when outcomes and procedures are fair. While we observe no difference between Baseline 
and VoteUncorr (p = 0.661, two-tailed two sample test of proportions), we observe evidence 
for differences between social and individual risk taking both due to the unfair mechanism (p 
= 0.078 for UnfairdicCorr vs. Baseline; p = 0.078 for UnfairdicUncorr vs. Baseline, and p = 
0.039 for UnfairdicCorr and UnfairdicUncorr vs. Baseline, two-tailed two sample tests of 
proportions) and due to unfair outcomes (p = 0.076 for VoteUncorr vs. Baseline; p = 0.078 for 
UnfairdicUncorr vs. Baseline, and p = 0.043 for VoteUncorr and UnfairdicUncorr vs. 
Baseline, two-tailed two sample tests of proportions). These results indicate that outcome and 
procedural fairness may in fact be complements rather than substitutes in making people 
choose according to their private risk preferences when taking a decision on behalf of their 
group.  
57% 
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- 44 - 
From the test analysis we surmise that social and individual risk taking are similar when 
outcomes and procedures are fair whereas more conservatism is introduced if either 
dimension is unfair. To substantiate this idea, we make use of linear probability models 
(LPM) to estimate a participant’s propensity to choose the risky option. A pooled set of 
Baseline and VoteCorr serves as the reference group. The respective results are presented in 
Table 2.  
TABLE 2. LPM MODELS ESTIMATING THE PROBABILITY THAT THE RISKY OPTION IS CHOSEN. 
Dependent var.: Risky choice (1) (2) 
Unfair outcomes (UO) -0.198** 
(0.082) 
-- 
Unfair procedure (UP) -0.214** 
(0.092) 
-- 
UO x UP 0.198 
(0.132) 
-- 
At least one type of unfairness -- -0.205*** 
(0.072) 
Two types of unfairness -- -0.010 
(0.087) 
Observations 231 231 
R-squared 0.041 0.041 
Notes: LPM models; dependent variable: risky choice (1 being the risky option and 0 the sure thing); robust 
standard errors in parentheses; Levels of significance: **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Model 1 shows the effects of outcome unfairness, of procedural unfairness and of their 
interaction on the probability that a subject chooses the risky option. We find that both kinds 
of unfairness have significant effects on risk taking, making decisions more conservative. 
Their respective coefficients do not differ (p = 0.868, Wald test) which indicates that both 
fairness dimensions are somewhat equally important. We also observe that the two types of 
unfairness being present at once does not further change behavior as the effect of the 
interaction is opposite and similar in size when compared to the respective unfairness 
coefficients. In Model 2, we estimate the corresponding effects of either at least one or two 
types of unfairness being present. When at least one is present, decision makers are 
substantially less likely to choose the risky option – in fact, the difference is about 20.5 
percentage points – whereas when two are present behavior seems not further affected. 
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Discussion. In sum, these results are not in line with the idea that fair procedures substitute 
for fair outcomes. In contrast, they suggest that outcome and procedural fairness are 
complements rather than substitutes in fostering social risk taking as both kinds of fairness 
seem required to make decision makers choose according to their private risk preferences, and 
hence more risk seeking, in a social context.
11
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the present paper, we investigate how outcome and procedural fairness influence social risk 
taking and how this compares to individual decision-making under risk. To do so, we set up a 
laboratory experiment collecting individual and group decisions while varying the correlation 
of risks within a group and the choice aggregation mechanism to determine the relevant 
option for its members. We expect that social is similar to individual risk taking when 
outcomes are equally distributed within a group ex-post while group members should get 
more conservative when the risk causes inequality. We hypothesize that a fair decision 
procedure mitigates this effect of expected inequality on social risk taking. 
We indeed find an interaction between outcome and procedural fairness. However, it is 
different from what we hypothesize. In fact, our results suggest that a fair procedure does not 
substitute for fair outcomes but that both fair outcomes and fair procedures are required to 
foster social risk taking and to make decision makers choose according to their private risk 
preferences when taking a decision on behalf of their group. If either of the two kinds of 
fairness is missing, individual preferences seem distorted in a social context, making choices 
more conservative. Even though these findings do not support our hypotheses entirely, they 
seem somewhat in line with previous results. While some prior studies where one 
predetermined decision maker decides for the whole group, which might also be perceived as 
                                                          
11
 These findings further limit the evidence supporting Hypothesis 2 from the first experiment as subjects seem 
not further affected by outcome unfairness in case the aggregation mechanism is unfair. 
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unfair, show that the respective decisions are more conservative compared to individual 
decisions (Bolton et al. 2015), majority decision-making with correlated risks seems similar to 
individual risk taking (Harrison et al. 2013). In addition, correlated risks were found to be 
preferred to uncorrelated risks (e.g., López-Vargas 2014 and Gaudeul 2015). These prior 
findings indicate that both fairness dimensions may be important in social risk taking. In the 
present study, we show how the two dimensions interact while also confirming that both 
affect behavior. In particular, our results suggest that subjects react to unfairness in general, 
regardless of the dimension, in taking less risk. We conclude that the two fairness dimensions 
are complements rather than substitutes in social risk taking. 
Our research provides important implications for the study of collective decision-making 
under risk. It shows that both fair outcomes and fair procedures are required to make people 
choose according to their private risk preferences in social contexts and suggests that, as soon 
as outcomes or procedures are unfair, far less risk is taken. This potentially reduces the 
efficiency of collective decision-making under risk as people might be less willing to choose a 
risky but efficient option when confronted with either kind of unfairness.  
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Appendix 
 
A. Instructions given to subjects in Experiments I and III  
Treatment Baseline 
Welcome and thanks for your participation in our experiment. You are participating in a study 
in which you can earn some money. At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be added 
to a show-up fee of 2.50 Euros, and you will be paid in cash. 
Experiment. The study is conducted anonymously. No one gets to know the identities of the 
other participants, their decisions or their payoffs. Communication between participants is not 
permitted throughout the experiment. If you have any question after reading these 
instructions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will then come to you to answer your 
question. 
Decision pattern. Each participant is to choose between two options. These options are Option 
1 and Option 2. Your payoffs are affected by your decision as follows: 
Option 1: You get 6 Euros. 
Option 2: A die determines your payoff. 
 With 50% probability, you get 13 Euros. 
 With 50% probability, you get 0 Euro. 
The experiment is conducted in three steps. 
Step 1: The participants choose one of both options. 
Step 2: If you have chosen Option 1, you do not have to take a decision in this step. If you 
have chosen Option 2, you decide in this step whether you want to get the high payoff (13 
Euro) for the numbers 1, 2, and 3 or for the numbers 4, 5, and 6 of the six-sided die. If another 
number is realized you receive the low payoff (0 Euro). In both cases the probability for both 
results is 50%.  
Step 3: The payoffs are determined. Therefore, an experimenter will come to each participant 
to throw a die and to enter the result. This is independent of your choice in the first step as the 
experimenter will not know at this stage which Option was chosen. 
 If you have chosen Option 1, you get 6 Euros independent of the results of you die 
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 If you have chosen Option 2, your payoff is determined by chance. Conditional on 
your decision in step 2 and the result of your die, you receive 13 Euro or 0 Euro. 
Before the experiment begins, you get some questions in order to test whether you understood 
the instructions. When the experiment is finished we ask you to fill out a short questionnaire. 
Subsequently, you get your payoffs.  
Treatment VoteCorr 
Welcome and thanks for your participation in our experiment. You are participating in a study 
in which you can earn some money. At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be added 
to a show-up fee of 2.50 Euros, and you will be paid in cash. 
Experiment. The study is conducted anonymously. No one gets to know the identities of the 
other participants, their decisions or their payoffs. Communication between participants is not 
permitted throughout the experiment. If you have any question after reading these 
instructions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will then come to you to answer your 
question. 
Decision pattern. You and all other participants of the experiment are one group. This group 
consists of 21 persons. Each participant is to choose between Option 1 and Option 2. The 
majority rule is implemented: The option that is chosen more frequently within the group is 
relevant for each member of the group. 
Option 1: All participants get 6 Euros. 
Option 2: A die determines the payoffs of all participants. 
 If it shows 1, 2, or 3 (with 50% probability), all participants get 13 Euros. 
 If it shows 4, 5, or 6 (with 50% probability), all participants get 0 Euro. 
The experiment is conducted in three steps. 
Step 1: The participants choose one of both options. 
Step 2: The result of the election is announced. 
Step 3: The payoffs are determined. 
 If a majority has chosen Option 1, all participants get 6 Euros. 
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   If a majority has chosen Option 2, the payoffs are determined by chance. A die is 
thrown publicly so that anyone can see it. The result determines the payoffs of all 
participants. This means, that all participants get the same payoff (either 13 Euro, if it 
shows 1, 2, or 3 or 0 Euro, if it shows 4, 5, or 6). 
Before the experiment begins, you get some questions in order to test whether you understood 
the instructions. When the experiment is finished we ask you to fill out a short questionnaire. 
Subsequently, you get your payoffs.  
Treatment DicUncorr 
Welcome and thanks for your participation in our experiment. You are participating in a study 
in which you can earn some money. At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be added 
to a show-up fee of 2.50 Euros, and you will be paid in cash. 
Experiment. The study is conducted anonymously. No one gets to know the identities of the 
other participants, their decisions or their payoffs. Communication between participants is not 
permitted throughout the experiment. If you have any question after reading these 
instructions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will then come to you to answer your 
question. 
Decision pattern. You and all other participants of the experiment are one group. This group 
consists of 21 persons. Each participant is to choose between Option 1 and Option 2. 
Subsequently, one participant is randomly chosen whose decision is relevant for each 
participant; the decision of each other participant is irrelevant for the payoffs of this 
experiment. 
Option 1: All participants get 6 Euros. 
Option 2: Dice determine the payoffs. 
 If your die shows 1, 2, or 3 (with 50% probability), you get 13 Euros. 
 If your die shows 4, 5, or 6 (with 50% probability), you get 0 Euro. 
The experiment is conducted in three steps. 
Step 1: The participants choose one of both options. 
Step 2: One participant is chosen whose choice is relevant for all participants. 
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Step 3: The payoffs are determined. 
 If the participant has chosen Option 1, all participants get 6 Euros. 
   If the participant has chosen Option 2, the payoffs are determined by chance. For 
each participant a die is thrown independently. This means, that all participants can get 
different payoffs depending on the result of their personal die (either 13 Euro, if it 
shows 1, 2, or 3 or 0 Euro, if it shows 4, 5, or 6). 
Before the experiment begins, you get some questions in order to test whether you understood 
the instructions. When the experiment is finished we ask you to fill out a short questionnaire. 
Subsequently, you get your payoffs.  
Treatment UnfairdicUncorr 
Welcome and thanks for your participation in our experiment. You are participating in a study 
in which you can earn some money. At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be added 
to a show-up fee of 4.00 Euros, and you will be paid in cash. 
Experiment. The study is conducted anonymously. No one gets to know the identities of the 
other participants, their decisions or their payoffs. Communication between participants is not 
permitted throughout the experiment. If you have any question after reading these 
instructions, please raise your hand. An experimenter will then come to you to answer your 
question. 
Decision pattern. You and all other participants of the experiment are one group. This group 
consists of 21 persons. Each participant is to choose between Option 1 and Option 2. 
Subsequently, one participant is randomly chosen whose decision is relevant for each 
participant; the decision of each other participant is irrelevant for the payoffs of this 
experiment. 
The probability of being chosen is different for the involved participants. One participant is 
chosen, whose probability of taking the decision for the whole group is 80% whereas all other 
participants have a probability of 1% of taking the decision for the whole group. Your 
personal probability of being chosen is 1%/80%. 
Option 1: All participants get 6 Euros. 
Option 2: Dice determine the payoffs. 
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 If your die shows 1, 2, or 3 (with 50% probability), you get 13 Euros. 
 If your die shows 4, 5, or 6 (with 50% probability), you get 0 Euro. 
The experiment is conducted in three steps. 
Step 1: The participants choose one of both options. 
Step 2: One participant is chosen by chance. Her choice is relevant for all participants. The 
members of the group have different probabilities of being chosen. 
Step 3: The payoffs are determined. 
 If the participant has chosen Option 1, all participants get 6 Euros. 
  If the participant has chosen Option 2, the payoffs are determined by chance. For 
each participant a die is thrown independently. This means, that all participants can get 
different payoffs depending on the result of their personal die (either 13 Euro, if it 
shows 1, 2, or 3 or 0 Euro, if it shows 4, 5, or 6). 
Before the experiment begins, you get some questions in order to test whether you understood 
the instructions. When the experiment is finished we ask you to fill out a short questionnaire. 
Subsequently, you get your payoffs.  
Treatments VoteUncorr, DicCorr and UnfairdicCorr 
Re-combining the upper instructions yields the instructions of the other treatments. One only 
has to rearrange the parts on the resolution of risk and on the aggregation mechanism.  
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B. Instructions and screenshots of Experiment II 
Screenshot 1. Instructions of the experiment. 
 
Translation for treatment DicUncorr [VoteUncorr in brackets]: 
In this experiment you and all other participants in this room form a group. This group 
consists of 21 members. 
You take in total 15 decisions for your group [The members of the group take in total 15 
decisions together]. Only one of these decisions will actually be paid out. In order to 
determine the respective decision, a sheet of paper is randomly drawn from an urn by the end 
of the experiment (with the numbers 1-15 on them). The result of this decision is paid out to 
all participants. Please do not forget throughout the experiment that each decision may be 
relevant for the payoffs. 
You take each of the 15 decision alone for the whole group. To do so, you choose for each 
decision one of two options for all members of your group. At the end of the experiment one 
member is randomly chosen whose decision is actually relevant for all. You only get to know 
then whether you are this member. In this case, the option you choose is implemented for all 
members of the group. 
[You and the other members of your group take each of the 15 decisions together. To do so, 
you always cast your vote for one of two options. The majority rule is used: this means that 
the option which is preferred by the majority is implemented for each member of the group.] 
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In each of the 15 decisions, you [the members of the group] choose between a safe and equal 
payoff for all members of the group in Option X and individual, independent lotteries in 
Option Y. The safe and equal payoff changes in each decision but it is always between 3€ 
and 10€. You get to know in each decision how much the safe and equal payoff is in the 
corresponding decision. The individual, independent lotteries are the same in each decision: 
conditional on one’s individual result of the lottery, a member of the group gets 0€ (in case a 
six-sided die shows 1, 2 or 3, with 50% probability) or 13€ (in case a six-sided die shows 4, 5 
or 6, with 50% probability). 
Thus, the members of the group receive equal and safe payoffs in case you [the majority] 
choose[s] Option X (in this case no lotteries are conducted) or different payoffs conditional 
on the result of the individual lottery in case you [the majority] choose[s] Option Y (in this 
case the individual payoff is determined by individually throwing a die.) 
When all decisions are made, one screen summarizes all your decisions. On this screen you 
can check your choices and make corrections of required. 
 
Screenshot 2. Decision stage. 
 
This is a screen-shot of the decision screen that shows and describes the options that can be 
chosen in this experiment. 
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Screenshot 3. Overview of decisions. 
 
Summary screen where all decisions can be checked and corrected if required. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Anchoring vs focality in coordination: 
Evidence from minimum effort games* 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
I compare the effect of private vs public anchors on decision-making in minimum effort 
games. While private anchors are strategically irrelevant as they should not rationally affect a 
decision maker’s beliefs, public anchors are strategically relevant as they constitute a focal 
point. I find that subjects’ choices are affected by both irrelevant and relevant anchors with 
the extent being amplified when anchors are public. Some evidence is found suggesting that 
the respective effects interact with the degree of strategic uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________ 
*
Christoph Feldhaus, Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, 
Germany, E-mail: feldhaus@wiso.uni-koeln.de. Financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) 
through the research unit “Design & Behavior” (FOR 1371) is gratefully acknowledged. The basic idea for this 
research was proposed as part of the unit’s funding proposal. I thank Sebastian Berger, Thomas Mussweiler, 
Axel Ockenfels, and Peter Werner for helpful comments. 
  
- 60 - 
1. Introduction 
The current research investigates the effects of private vs public anchors in strategic 
interaction. Thereby, I examine whether both cognitive and strategic considerations are 
relevant when it comes to the effects of focal points in coordination. In addition, I test how the 
reactions towards anchors interact with the degree of strategic uncertainty. 
I utilize a set of minimum effort games (MEG) to study behavior under strategic uncertainty. 
The MEG is a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria where decision makers face a 
trade-off between payoff and risk (Van Huyck et al. 1990; Goeree and Holt 2005). In the 
MEG, the members of a group choose from their set of ‘effort levels’ with everyone’s payoffs 
increasing in the minimum of the group while decreasing in their individual deviation from 
that minimum. It is hence in all players’ interests to have a high minimum while they are also 
individually trying not to choose more than the minimum. The risk is caused by the fact that 
choosing more than the minimum is costly as the additional effort is in vain. Even though the 
MEG includes a Pareto-efficient social optimum where all choose the highest effort, it is often 
found in empirical investigations that groups tend converge towards the secure and least-
efficient equilibrium over the course of time (Van Huyck et al. 1990; Devetag and Ortmann 
2007).
1
 
In the literature, the minimum effort game is used to resemble a variety of coordination 
scenarios such as global public good games (Harrison and Hirshleifer 1989), team production 
(Brandts and Cooper 2006), bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig 1983) and many more. What all 
these scenarios have in common is that the involved decision makers know what would be 
best for all but at the same time they have to be convinced that all act accordingly. 
Experimental evidence suggests that this conviction is very sensitive to variations in the 
context which implies that the beliefs players form crucially depend on the details of a 
decision situation.  
                                                          
1
 Most experimental evidence on the minimum effort game stems from repeated interactions. See Ochs (1995) 
and Devetag and Ortmann (2007) for surveys on the minimum effort and the closely related stag hunt game. 
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There are many structural details that have been identified to affect behavior in the MEG in 
particular and in coordination in general. Closely related to this research is the literature on 
suggestions, cheap talk and sunspots in (minimum effort) coordination. Both Chaudhuri and 
Paichayontvijit (2010) and Devetag et al. (2012) find that an explicit (public) suggestion to 
play the maximum can help groups overcome coordination failures. Chaudhuri et al. (2009) 
further observe that intergenerational recommendations improve coordination while Devetag 
(2005) and Cason et al. (2012) show that also successfully coordinated precedents do so. Also 
related is the literature on cheap talk in the MEG (Charness 2000; Duffy and Feltovich 2002; 
Blume and Ortmann 2007) which finds that communication helps groups to coordinate on the 
Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Similarly, in other coordination games, Van Huyck et al. (1992) 
and Brandts and Macleod (1995) show that coordination on the respective equilibrium 
increases in case it is externally suggested while Beugnot et al. (2012) find that sunspots, a 
public random announcement of one strategy, can cause coordination failure in a game where 
efficient coordination is designed to be very simple. Finally, also explicit recommendations to 
introduce correlated equilibria (Cason and Sharma 2007; Kuang et al. 2007; Duffy and 
Feltovich 2010) tend to shape behavior.  
This study is further related to research emphasizing the context-dependence of choices in the 
MEG. Manzini et al. (2009) find that even minor cues such as ‘smiles’ are sufficient for 
affecting behavior. They argue that such cues make decision makers more trusting concerning 
the behavior of their opponent(s) and hence more willing to take a risky option. The 
underlying model implies that choosing the highest effort is perceived as the natural standard 
with decision makers only deviating due to a ‘lack of trust’. Dugar (2010) and Galbiati et al. 
(2013) show that (also non-monetary) rewards and sanctions can foster coordination. In 
addition to such cues, group decision-making and (social) preferences affect behavior in the 
MEG. Feri et al. (2010) find that groups coordinate more successfully than individual decision 
makers while Chen and Chen (2011) show that also group identity shapes equilibrium 
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selection as a shared identity makes subjects choose higher effort levels.
2
 Feldhaus et al. 
(2015) provide evidence concerning the importance of equal payoffs for equilibrium selection 
in the MEG, further emphasizing the relevance of social preferences. Goeree and Holt (2001, 
2005) show that higher costs of miscoordination make participants choose lower effort levels, 
with this finding support also in larger groups in Brandts and Cooper (2006).
3
 
In sum, the empirical literature on the MEG suggests that the behavior of subjects strongly 
depends on the specific context and that even minor variations can have substantial effects on 
choices. However, the psychological mechanisms behind these effects often remain unclear. 
In fact, it is basically always shown that behavior reacts in response to possibly strategically 
justified changes in the beliefs as the variations are usually public knowledge and the game is 
mostly played repeatedly. Also, to the best of my knowledge, no attempt has been made to 
investigate how the effects of external cues or recommendations vary conditional on the gains 
and losses from (mis)coordination in the MEG. In the current paper, I hence broaden the 
literature in (1) investigating whether also cognition affects behavior in the presence of focal 
points and in (2) testing whether the reaction towards external ‘cues’ depends on the degree of 
strategic uncertainty.  
Specifically, I investigate whether behavior in the MEG is influenced by anchors and by the 
degree of public knowledge about these anchors. Anchors have been studied extensively in 
both social psychology and economics starting with the seminal paper of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974).
4
 Anchoring suggests that even random but highly accessible and related 
‘values’ can affect behavior. I test whether anchors may also shape the beliefs and the 
corresponding choices in social interaction. Importantly, if this was the case, anchoring might 
                                                          
2
 The finding that group identity influences effort choices is not successfully replicated in Camerer et al. (2016). 
3 Also, some mechanisms have been identified that improve coordination even in large groups: while Weber 
(2006) shows that slowly increasing group-size can help to promote stable coordination on the Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium, Riedl et al. (forthcoming) observe that groups coordinate more successfully when all group 
members can freely choose with whom they want to play the game with. 
4
 In the economics literature, anchoring was mainly investigated in terms of how it shapes valuations in 
purchasing decisions (e.g., Ariely et al. 2003) and how it affects outcomes in auctions (e.g., Beggs and Graddy 
2009) and bargaining (e.g., Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001). See Furnham and Boo (2011) for a recent literature 
review on anchoring effects. 
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also (partly) explain the effects of focal points as these points are also more accessible due to 
their prominence. In order to disentangle cognitive and strategic reasons for reactions towards 
focality, I make use of treatments with private (Individual) and public (Common) anchors. 
While cognition research predicts changes in behavior also in case of private anchors, an 
economic rationale is only available for public anchors. 
In a first set of treatments, I hence provide participants with a private anchor in asking them to 
state whether they think that their opponent chooses at least some random value as her effort 
level. This random value is individually determined. From the psychological literature, I 
conjecture that the beliefs about the opponent’s behavior and the corresponding choices might 
be affected by such a ‘private anchor’. In fact, the mechanism suggested in Strack and 
Mussweiler (1997) and Mussweiler and Strack (1999, 2001) as a now well-established 
explanation for anchoring effects seems also applicable to this strategic setting. They argue 
that decision makers confronted with an anchor engage in hypothesis-consistent testing and 
assume that the anchor, as it and its associations are highly available due to being present, 
triggers more arguments in line with the respective anchor as compared to other feasible 
values. In the MEG, this means that relatively more arguments are put forward that suggest a 
behavior of the opponent(s) close to the anchor compared to arguments in line with other 
strategies she/they might play when forming a belief. The reason is termed ‘selective 
accessibility’ (Mussweiler and Strack 1999): while evidence supporting the anchor is easily 
thought off (as it is more accessible), non-consistent evidence comes to mind less easily (as it 
is less accessible). This effect should cause both beliefs and choices to be biased towards the 
anchor value (cognition hypothesis).  
From an economic perspective, one would not expect effects of such private anchors as they 
should not affect the behavior of the opponent and hence neither a decision maker’s beliefs. 
To test whether the reasoning behind the reactions towards focal points is cognitive or 
strategic (or both) in nature, I conduct another set of treatments with public instead of private 
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anchors. Now, the random value is the same for the members of a group. This constitutes a 
focal point. Since Schelling (1960), “focal points” are discussed as a potential means for 
overcoming coordination failures:
5
 as coordination games include many rational strategies, 
prominence of particular equilibria and public knowledge of this prominence is an important 
property for equilibrium selection as it may serve as a coordination device. This prominence 
can, e.g., be due to the payoff structure of a specific strategy combination (e.g., safe strategy, 
equal outcomes, Pareto-dominance) or due to its representation (e.g., color or position).  
In this second set of treatments, I therefore provide participants with an anchor while making 
sure that it is public knowledge that all members of a group are provided with the same 
anchor. Here, I expect that subjects’ choices are also biased towards the anchor and, as this 
variation combines cognitive and strategic considerations, that the effect of public anchors is 
stronger than the effect of private ones (strategic hypothesis). 
In addition, to evaluate the importance of uncertainty for the effects of anchors, I investigate 
whether the extent of the reaction towards anchors depends on the degree of strategic 
uncertainty. Mussweiler and Strack (2000) show in guessing tasks that the effect of anchors is 
the stronger the more uncertain a guessing target is. In the present study, I test whether this 
finding also extends to social interaction in the sense that choices are more affected by 
anchors as strategic uncertainty increases. It seems reasonable to expect different reactions 
towards anchors in the MEG conditional on the degree of uncertainty as under low 
uncertainty decision makers should have a quite clear idea about what their opponent plans to 
do and thus act accordingly while this might change as uncertainty increases. I therefore 
expect that the reaction towards anchors gets the more pronounced the more uncertain the 
respective decision is (uncertainty hypothesis). 
                                                          
5
 See Mehta et al. (1994a) and Mehta et al. (1994b) for experimental evidence on the effects of focal points in 
coordination. Focal points are mainly discussed in the realm of pure coordination games as here focality is the 
only selection principle. Crawford et al. (2008) provide evidence that even minor asymmetries can undermine 
the effects of focality. 
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In the experiment, I find evidence for both anchoring on private as well as on public anchors 
with the effect being amplified when they are public. These results emphasize the relevance of 
strategic reasons for the effects of focal points. Still, they also indicate that part of the effect 
of focal points may actually be driven by mere prominence. I further find that anchoring gets 
more pronounced as the gains from coordination decrease and the costs of miscoordination 
increase. This finding further suggests that the extent of anchoring may indeed be affected by 
the degree of strategic uncertainty associated with a decision. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the framework which 
includes the minimum effort game and two measures of strategic uncertainty. Section 3 
presents the experimental design and summarizes the hypotheses. In Section 4, I present the 
results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Framework and measures of uncertainty 
Minimum effort game. In a symmetric minimum effort game 𝑁 = {2, 3, … , 𝑛} players form a 
group and 𝐸 = {𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑛, … , 𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑥} is a set of effort levels. Each group member simultaneously 
chooses an effort level 𝑒𝑖 ∈ 𝐸. The action profile 𝑝 = (𝑒𝑖)𝑖∈𝑁 denotes the choices of the 
members of the group, 𝑟 the marginal return from the minimum, 𝑐 the marginal cost of effort 
provision and 𝑎 is a constant. The payoff of a player 𝑖 is given by 
𝜋𝑖(𝑝) = 𝑟 min
𝑗∈𝑁
{𝑒𝑗} − 𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝑎. 
The relation 𝑟 > 𝑐 > 0 causes the additional gain from a higher minimum to be more than the 
additional cost from choosing a higher effort. This makes sure that players always have an 
incentive to choose exactly the minimum of their group. Therefore, all strategy profiles 𝑝 
where all group members choose the same effort constitute the set of pure-strategy equilibria 
of the MEG. Unilaterally decreasing one’s effort would reduce one’s payoff as the minimum 
decreases while increasing one’s effort would decrease one’s payoff as the additional effort is 
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in vain. The pure-strategy equilibria can be Pareto-ranked as everyone’s payoffs increase in 
the minimum.
6
 
Two equilibria stand out. First, the equilibrium where all players choose the highest effort is 
prominent: this equilibrium is Pareto-efficient and results in the highest individual and overall 
payoff. However, the corresponding strategy is also ‘risky’ as the actual outcome strongly 
depends on the choices of others. In fact, the least payoff is realized if one player chooses the 
highest effort while some other chooses the lowest one. Second, the equilibrium where all 
choose the lowest effort is prominent: this equilibrium features the lowest in-equilibrium 
payoffs while in turn being ‘secure’ as a player’s payoff does not depend on the choices of 
others. In the MEG, decision makers hence face a trade-off between payoff and risk. 
The discussed properties make the game an ideal setting to vary strategic uncertainty in social 
interaction and to test for anchoring effects. First, in changing the gains from coordination and 
the losses from miscoordination, it seems reasonable to suspect that the degree of uncertainty 
is affected (see discussion below) while one still provides an otherwise identical setting in 
terms of strategies and equilibrium predictions. Second, the MEG provides two opposing 
reasons to choose high or low efforts, one of which can be highlighted by a high or a low 
anchor.  
Measures of uncertainty. I propose two measures of strategic uncertainty across different 
parameterizations of the MEG. Two measures are proposed as there is no established one yet.  
First, I briefly introduce the “potential” as a proxy for uncertainty. I call the corresponding 
measure Potential-based measure. Potential games are first discussed in detail and related to 
the MEG in Monderer and Shapley (1996). Importantly, the authors show that the symmetric 
MEG is a potential game and suggest that this concept can be used as an equilibrium 
refinement for this setting. A potential game is a game that admits a potential function 𝑃 that 
                                                          
6
 The game also contains a continuum of Pareto-ranked mixed-strategy equilibria. However, experimental 
research on the MEG mainly focusses on pure strategies as the mixed-strategy equilibria have some implausible 
comparative static predictions such as that higher effort costs decrease the probability that a low effort is chosen 
(Anderson et al. 2001). 
  
- 67 - 
maps the action profiles 𝑝 into the real numbers such that all changes in the potential are 
identical to the changes in the payoffs of the deviator. Hence, 𝑃 is the potential function of the 
MEG if 𝜋𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖) − 𝜋𝑖
′(𝑒𝑖
′, 𝑒−𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒−𝑖) − 𝑃(𝑒𝑖
′, 𝑒−𝑖) for every 𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒−𝑖, 𝑒𝑖
′ ∈ 𝐸. For the 
MEG, this concept predicts that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is played for some 
parameter configurations while making no prediction or proposing the secure equilibrium for 
others.  
The potential function is a global payoff function that captures the costs and gains from 
unilateral deviations for all involved players on the group level. It in particular coincides with 
the predictions of risk-dominance in symmetric 2x2 games, an established concept that takes 
into account the tradeoff between payoffs and risks in some coordination settings (Harsanyi 
and Selten 1988; Goeree and Holt 2005). However, in contrast to risk-dominance, the 
potential can also be applied to many games with larger action spaces and more players while 
also weighting payoffs and risks.  
Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that the potential function of the MEG can be depicted as 
𝑃(𝑝) = 𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑝} − 𝑐 ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑖∈𝑁 . All equilibria of the MEG are local maximizers of this function. 
In addition to these local maxima, one can deduce a threshold benefit from coordination 
𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠 (Monderer and Shapley 1996), which depends on the costs of effort provision 𝑐 and the 
group-size 𝑁, such that the secure equilibrium is the unique maximizer of the potential 
function if 𝑟 < 𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠 and the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is the unique maximizer if 
𝑟 > 𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠. If 𝑟 = 𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠, the potential does not make a prediction with regard to equilibrium 
selection.
7
 Hence, “the Nash equilibrium that maximizes the potential in this game is sensitive 
to parameters that may actually affect behavior” (Goeree and Holt 2005, p. 352) which is also 
documented by the empirical success of the concept.
8
 
                                                          
7
 Similar to risk dominance, the potential is most often used to study behavior in repeated interaction (e.g. 
Goeree and Holt 2005; Chen and Chen 2011). Both concepts have in common that many learning processes 
converge towards the respective suggested equilibrium (Monderer and Shapley 1996; Goeree and Holt 2005). 
8
 Evidence on the predictive power of the potential in the MEG can be found in Monderer (1996), Anderson et 
al. (2001), Goeree and Holt (2001; 2005), and Chen and Chen (2011).  
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Apart from refining the set of equilibria, I suggest that the potential may also serve well as a 
proxy for strategic uncertainty. There are two reasons for this. First, the potential weights 
payoffs and risks from coordination and second, it identifies a parameterization where no 
prediction is made which can be thought off as the one involving the most uncertainty. 
Thereby, it provides an intuitively appealing structure with regard to uncertainty across 
different versions of the MEG: if the gains from coordination are low and the costs from 
miscoordination are high, the potential proposes the play of the secure equilibrium while it 
proposes the Pareto-dominant equilibrium when the gains from coordination are high and the 
costs are low. It further makes no prediction for one parameterization in between. These 
behavioral predictions of the potential are clear-cut in the sense that the theory always 
suggests the one or the other extreme equilibrium in case 𝑟 and 𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠 differ, while not 
refining the set of equilibria in case they are equal. In terms of uncertainty, I interpret this 
more loosely in assuming that it increases the closer the parameterization gets towards 
𝑟 = 𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠 which in turn means that it decreases as the difference between 𝑟 and 𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠 
increases. E.g., if the Potential-based measure was good measure of uncertainty, I would 
expect that uncertainty is low when (1) the gains from coordination are large and the losses 
from miscoordination small as decision makers should be quite sure that the opponent chooses 
a high effort and when (2) the gains from coordination are small and the losses from 
miscoordination large as decision makers should be quite sure that the opponent chooses a 
low effort while uncertainty should be high when gains and losses are similar in size. 
As a second measure of strategic uncertainty, I propose the costs of effort provision. I call this 
measure Trust-based measure. While all strategies of the game are rational, choosing the 
maximum is sometimes associated with trust (e.g., Manzini et al. 2009, Engelmann and 
Normann 2010, Cartwright et al. 2013). This suggests that in cases where trust is established, 
decision makers should always go for the Pareto-dominant equilibrium which could therefore 
be interpreted as a natural standard. That choosing the maximum might indeed be perceived 
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as such a standard is also somewhat implied by empirical evidence that shows that subjects 
often go for high effort levels in one-shots or in the beginning of repeated encounters (see, 
e.g., Van Huyck et al. 1990 and Feldhaus et al. 2015). That subjects tend to choose this 
standard under a lack of experience is further also in line with research from social 
psychology which suggests that trusting is the default state of mind (e.g., Schul et al. 2008; 
see also Légal el al. 2012).  
I hence propose that uncertainty about the other(s) actually choosing a high effort and thus the 
standard may also increase in the costs of effort provision. Following this idea, people should 
be the more affected by external cues rather than having an inherent idea about the effort to 
choose as the costs increase as this also increases the uncertainty that their opponent(s) 
actually follow the standard. This, in turn, would also leave more room for reactions toward 
anchors which either reinforce the standard or provide a reason not to choose it. E.g., if the 
Trust-based measure was a good measure of uncertainty, I would expect that people do not 
react to their anchors for low costs, as they choose the high standard anyways, while this 
inclination should get weaker as costs increase. 
In sum, the Potential-based measure suggests that uncertainty is strongest for intermediate 
costs while the Trust-based measure suggests that uncertainty increases as costs increase. As 
neither of the two measures is standard in the literature, I will look for evidence for either of 
them in the experimental data. 
 
3. Experimental design, hypotheses, and experimental procedures 
Experimental design. In the experiment, subjects play the MEG in randomly matched pairs of 
two as in Goeree and Holt (2001, 2005), Chen and Chen (2011) and Feldhaus et al. (2015). In 
contrast to the original research in Van Huyck et al. (1990), who present the MEG in tables, I 
use a representation as equation while also extending the strategy space as, e.g., also done in 
Goeree and Holt (2001). I decided to do so to make the extrema less prominent and to leave 
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more room for anchors and choices. In addition, I make use of a one-shot version of the game 
rather than repeated encounters as for the given research question the presence of strategic 
uncertainty is important and it hence should not be resolved by experience. 
In the experiment, I combine a between-subjects and a within-subject design (see Table 1). 
First, I vary the height of the anchor between subjects within one session. Second, I vary 
whether the two members of a group receive private anchors or whether they have a public, 
common anchor between sessions. Third, I vary the costs of effort provision within subjects; 
they make five decisions in total (see also Table 2).  
TABLE 1. EXPERIMENTAL VARIATIONS. 
Variation Variation-level Specifications 
Anchor value Between 110, 111, ... 170 
Kind of anchor Between Private (Individual) or Public (Common) 
Costs of effort provision (𝑐) Within 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 
 
In my MEG, subjects simultaneously choose an integer effort level 𝑒𝑖 ∈ {110, 111, … , 170}. 
However, before making their decisions, subjects have to guess the behavior of their 
opponent. Importantly, they cannot freely enter the number for their guess but have to answer 
the question whether they think that their opponent chooses at least some specific value – this 
value serves as the anchor. It is drawn from a uniform distribution 𝑢[110,170] and is also the 
default when the decision is made. The anchor is drawn individually for all decision makers in 
treatment Individual while it is drawn for each pair in Common. This is known by the 
participants. Only after their guess is entered, subjects choose their effort. The payoff of a 
subject depends on both her own effort and the effort of the person she is matched with as 
described by 𝜋𝑖(𝑝) = 𝑟 min𝑗∈𝑁{𝑒𝑗} − 𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝑎. 
In the following, I call the five variations of the MEG that subjects make decisions for Game 
1 to Game 5. Participants are confronted with the five variations in a random sequence to 
control for order effects. Across games, both the costs of effort provision 𝑐 and the constant 𝑎 
are varied. The parameter 𝑟, representing the marginal return from the minimum, is always 1. 
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A subject’s or a pair’s anchor is the same throughout the five decisions.9 They thus answer for 
each game whether their opponent will at least choose the anchor before deciding on their 
own effort. Each time, they can answer either “yes” or “no”. 
TABLE 2. PARAMETERS USED IN THE EXPERIMENT AND OUTCOMES FOR SOME HYPOTHETICAL 
CHOICES. 
Decision Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 Game 5 
Parameters c = 0.1; a = -44 c = 0.3; a = -22 c = 0.5; a = 0 c = 0.7; a = 22 c = 0.9; a = 44 
Choices Payoff in ECU 
110, 110 55, 55 55, 55 55, 55 55, 55 55, 55 
110, 140 55, 52 55, 46 55, 40 55, 34 55, 28 
110, 170 55, 49 55, 37 55, 25 55, 13 55, 1 
140, 140 82, 82 76, 76 70, 70 64, 64 58, 58 
140, 170 82, 79 76, 67 70, 55 64, 43 58, 31 
170, 170 109, 109 97, 97 85, 85 73, 73 61, 61 
 
Table 2 shows the parameters 𝑐 and 𝑎 used across the five games and also provides examples 
on how these parameters affect outcomes for some hypothetical choices of two matched 
subjects. The costs of effort provision 𝑐 increase from Game 1 to Game 5 while the constant 𝑎 
is always chosen such that the payoffs are normalized for choosing the minimum of 110. 
Subjects hence receive, regardless of the decision of their respective opponent and the game, a 
payoff of 55 ECU when choosing the minimum. Relative to this, payoffs can be increased or 
decreased when other effort levels are chosen, either by successful coordination or by 
miscoordination. When 𝑐 is low, subjects can earn a lot from coordination while losing little 
from miscoordniation. When 𝑐 is high, only little can be earned from coordination while 
subjects lose substantially from miscoordination (for examples see Table 2).  
The parameter 𝑐 is chosen such that potential game theory suggests the play of the maximum 
when 𝑐 = 0.1 and 𝑐 = 0.3, makes no prediction for 𝑐 = 0.5 and proposes the minimum for 
𝑐 = 0.7 and 𝑐 = 0.9. Hence, if the Potential-based measure was a good measure of 
uncertainty, I would expect that subjects are less uncertain about the behavior of their 
opponent for extreme costs while they should be the more uncertain the closer the costs are to 
                                                          
9
 I decided to provide subjects only with one anchor in order to avoid a multiplicity of competing anchors. 
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the intermediate value 𝑐 = 0.5. If, on the other hand, the Trust-based measure was a good 
measure of uncertainty, I would expect that decision makers get the more uncertain about 
their opponent playing a high effort the higher the costs of effort provision.  
When all decisions are made, beliefs are elicited more precisely. Here, subjects are asked to 
estimate the behavior of their respective opponent for each of the five games. To do so, they 
have to distribute 100 percentage points on the four effort intervals 110-125, 126-140, 141-
155 and 156-170. The more likely they find an interval, the more percentage points should be 
assigned to it.  
Hypotheses. In the following, I summarize the hypotheses that can be tested with this 
experimental design. They concern subjects’ reactions towards anchors and the interaction of 
anchors and the degree of strategic uncertainty.  
Hypothesis 1 (cognition): Participants’ choices are biased towards their anchor in 
Individual. 
As the presence of an anchor causes selective accessibility with regard to reasons for the 
respective anchor being a useful belief about the other’s behavior, I expect that subjects’ 
choices are biased towards their private anchor.  
Hypothesis 2 (strategic): The effect that subjects’ choices are biased towards their anchor is 
more pronounced in Common than in Individual.  
A common anchor provides a group with a focal point to coordinate on and also serves as a 
cognitive anchor. Hence, if also strategic reasons played a role in the presence of focal points, 
I would expect that the effect of the public anchor is stronger when compared to the private 
anchor.  
Hypothesis 3 (uncertainty): The effect of anchors gets more pronounced as strategic 
uncertainty increases. 
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Mussweiler and Strack (2000) find that uncertainty reinforces the effects of anchors. If this 
finding also extended to strategic interaction, I would expect more anchoring as strategic 
uncertainty increases. 
Experimental procedures. I conducted the experiment in the Cologne Laboratory for 
Economic Research (CLER) in November and December of 2015. It was programmed with 
zTree (Fischbacher 2007) and participants were invited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015). I 
conducted 4 sessions with 32 participants each, two sessions per treatment Individual and 
Common.
10
 Thus, I collected 64 observations per between-treatment. 
During the experiment, subjects received their instructions on screen.
11
 Due to the 
complicated structure of the MEG and in particular the different parameters used, the 
experiment is quite demanding. To facilitate understanding, subjects had to pass several tasks 
before the experiment was started. First, they had to enter three different cases of hypothetical 
choices of two matched participants where in one case the one chooses the higher number, in 
one case the other and in one case both choose the same number. Then they were asked to 
calculate the corresponding earnings for one specific cost parameter while being provided 
with an on-screen calculator. After that, they were to identify several outcomes for further 
pre-determined hypothetical choices of two matched players for two other cost parameters. 
From this stage onwards and then throughout the experiment, participants were provided with 
two sliders which could be used to calculate all feasible payoffs for a given game. To do so, 
they had to enter the efforts of two matched players by positioning the sliders with the 
corresponding payoffs being instantly calculated. These sliders were always adjusted to the 
relevant cost parameter of the respective decision. 
                                                          
10
 Two more sessions (one per treatment) were conducted initially. However, the respective data are not included 
in the analysis as these sessions took far longer than expected (60 minutes were announced while the sessions 
took about 90). Participants got nervous, one decided to leave early. One of the sessions was stopped before the 
belief-elicitation stage. Afterwards, I changed the announcement to 90 minutes. Including the data that could be 
collected in these initial sessions yields similar results to what is reported in the following. 
11
 See Appendix B for screenshots of the instruction screens and of some crucial decisions screens. 
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Only one of the five games was paid out. This game was randomly determined at the end of 
the experiment. Until the end of the experiment no information about the behavior of the 
opponent was given. This makes the data multiple one-shot decisions. After the experiment, 
subjects were asked to answer a structured questionnaire on demographics and an open 
question on reasons for their choices. The experimental payoffs were calculated in 
Experimental Currency Units (ECU). The exchange rate was 7.5 ECU = 1 EUR. The average 
payoff was 12.90 EUR for an experiment that took about 90 minutes. Subjects were paid 
privately in cash after the experiment. 57% were female (43% male) and they were 22 years 
on average. 
 
4. Results  
In this section, the results of the experiment are discussed. First, I investigate whether the 
effort choices are affected by the costs of effort provision and whether evidence for 
differences in strategic uncertainty across games is found. Only then, I test how anchors affect 
behavior and whether the reaction towards anchors depends on the degree of strategic 
uncertainty. 
The effect of effort costs on effort provision. As first shown in Goeree and Holt (2001), also 
my results indicate that subjects react to increasing effort costs in decreasing their effort 
choices. On average, taking all decisions into account, subjects choose a mean effort of 144. 
The corresponding value is 158 when costs are lowest (𝑐 = 0.1), with the average effort then 
decreasing to 150 (𝑐 = 0.3), 147 (𝑐 = 0.5), 135 (𝑐 = 0.7), 129 (𝑐 = 0.9) as costs increase. 
Table 3 presents the corresponding regression results. In Model 1, I find an estimated 
decrease in effort choices of about 7.30 effort units per increase in effort costs in a linear 
specification. Furthermore, I observe significant differences between all games when adding 
them as dummies (Model 2). The estimated difference between the lowest and the highest cost 
of effort provision is 29 effort units. From this, I conclude that behavior in the MEG depends 
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on the cost of effort provision even though standard theory does not predict differences 
conditional on the costs. This further suggests that the beliefs about the other’s behavior 
should vary across games with me conjecturing that also the uncertainty in beliefs may be 
affected as costs change.  
TABLE 3. EFFECTS OF EFFORT COSTS ON EFFORT CHOICES. 
Dependent var.: Effort choice (1) (2) 
Effort costs -7.30*** 
(0.57) 
-- 
Game 2 (𝑐 = 0.3) -- -7.66*** 
(1.53) 
Game 3 (𝑐 = 0.5) -- -10.71*** 
1.77 
Game 4 (𝑐 = 0.7) -- -22.48*** 
(2.10) 
Game 5 (𝑐 = 0.9) -- -29.07*** 
(2.37) 
Test: Game 2 = Game 3 (p-value) -- 0.05 
Test: Game 3 = Game 4 (p-value) -- 0.00 
Test: Game 4 = Game 5 (p-value) -- 0.00 
Observations 128/640 128/640 
R-squared overall 0.22 0.22 
Notes: Coefficients of random effects OLS regressions with ‘Effort choice’ as dependent variable. Standard 
errors clustered on the individual level in parentheses. Level of significance: ***p < 0.01.  
Result 1: Decision makers in the MEG react to increasing effort costs in decreasing their 
effort choices. 
Strategic uncertainty across games. I proposed two measures of strategic uncertainty: the 
Potential-based measure and the Trust-based measure. In order to test for empirical evidence 
on how the five games actually differ in terms of strategic uncertainty, I make use of two 
empirical proxies. The first proxy is the uncertainty in beliefs (what subjects say they think – 
Belief proxy in the following) and the second is the variability in choices (what subjects 
should think – Choice proxy in the following).12 
Participants stated their beliefs in distributing 100 percentage points for each game on the four 
intervals 110-125, 126-140, 141-155 and 156-170 (with 𝑎1, …, 𝑎4 being the percentage points 
                                                          
12
 Both measures are noisy as they are only collected after subjects are confronted with the treatment variations 
which might hence also cause the relations between the costs and the proxies. Still, despite this limitation, it 
seems reasonable to seek for empirical evidence for changes in uncertainty across games as there is no 
established way to measure it. However, one should keep this in mind when interpreting the data. 
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attributed to the first, …, fourth interval). The Belief proxy is calculated by summing up the 
absolute differences between the percentage points attributed by an individual 𝑖 to an interval 
𝑘 and 25 (as equation: 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖 = ∑ |𝑎𝑘𝑖 − 25|
4
𝑘=1 ). The resulting variable is low for 
high uncertainty and high for a low uncertainty and lies between 0 and 150. In fact, it is 0 if a 
subject expects that each interval is chosen with 25% probability while it is 150 if she is sure 
that the opponent’s choice lies in one particular interval. Hence, a low value implies a high 
degree of uncertainty as the belief suggests that it is unlikely that the opponent’s choice is in 
one particular interval whereas a high value implies a low degree of uncertainty as the 
corresponding decision maker is sure about the other’s behavior.  
TABLE 4. RELATION BETWEEN EFFORT COSTS AND THE BELIEF PROXY. 
Dependent var.: Belief proxy (1) (2) 
Effort costs 0.88 
(0.82) 
-32.36*** 
(3.73) 
Effort costs sq. -- 5.54*** 
(0.65) 
Observations 128/640 128/640 
R-squared overall 0.00 0.06 
Notes: Coefficients of random effects OLS regressions with the ‘Belief proxy’ as dependent variable. Standard 
errors clustered on the individual level in parentheses. Level of significance: ***p < 0.01.  
Analyzing this Belief proxy, I observe substantial differences across games with its value 
being 84 in Game 1 and 67, 64, 70, and 87 in Games 2-5. The corresponding regressions can 
be found in Table 4. I regress the Belief proxy on the effort costs only (in Model 1) and on the 
effort costs squared (Model 2) and find a strong effect of the non-linear specification in Model 
2. The analysis reveals the relationship between the costs of effort provision and the Belief 
proxy that I would expect from the Potential-based measure of uncertainty: decision makers 
seem quite uncertain about the behavior of their opponent for medium costs of effort 
provision while being less uncertain for both very low and very high costs. In contrast, if 
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uncertainty was described well by the Trust-based measure, uncertainty in the beliefs should 
increase as effort costs increase. However, this is not found to be significant in Model 1.
13
 
If the Potential-based measure was actually a good measure of uncertainty and potential game 
theory a good predictor for behavior in the one-shot MEG, I would expect not only more 
uncertainty in the beliefs but also more variability in behavior for medium costs while the 
respective variability should be lower for extreme costs. This is my second empirical measure 
of uncertainty – the Choice proxy. It represents how uncertain subjects should be about their 
opponent’s behavior.  
TABLE 5. RELATION BETWEEN EFFORT COSTS AND THE CHOICE PROXY. 
Dependent var.: Choice proxy (1) (2) 
Effort costs 1.35*** 
(0.34) 
1.57 
(1.30) 
Effort costs sq. -- -0.04 
(0.21) 
Observations 128/640 128/640 
R-squared overall 0.03 0.03 
Notes: Coefficients of random effects OLS regressions with the ‘Choice proxy’ as dependent variable. Standard 
errors clustered on the individual level in parentheses. Level of significance: ***p < 0.01.  
To calculate the Choice proxy, I take the absolute difference between an individual 𝑖’s effort 
choice for a given game 𝐺 and the mean of all decisions in that game as dependent variable 
(as equation: 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦𝑖 = |𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝐺 − 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝐺). This variable is on average 13 effort 
units in Game 1, 15 in Game 2, 16 in Game 3, and 18 and 19 in Game 4 and Game 5 
respectively. Using the same empirical strategy as in Table 4, regressing the Choice proxy on 
the effort costs (Model 1) and the respective squared term (Model 2), I find just the opposite 
of what was found before: while a significant linear effect is observed, no effect is found with 
regard to the non-linear specification. This is not in line with the Potential-based measure but 
                                                          
13
 The Belief proxy seems a good measure of uncertainty as it attributes reasonable values to many distributions 
of percentage points across intervals. Still, it has some flaws: e.g., cases where 50 percentage points are 
attributed to two categories each, have the same Belief proxy value as cases where one category receives 75 
points and one other 25, even though the latter decision maker seems less uncertain. However, if I replace the 
Belief proxy by the highest amount of percentage points attributed to one interval (Max proxy), which can also be 
interpreted as a proxy for belief uncertainty, the results remain similar. See Table A.1 in the Appendix for 
details. 
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suggest that uncertainty should increase in the costs of effort provision as suggested by the 
Trust-based measure. 
In sum, I find conflicting evidence with regard to the two measures of uncertainty in the Belief 
proxy and the Choice proxy. I hence conclude that both measures should be considered when 
testing whether the reactions towards anchors vary in the degree of strategic uncertainty. 
Result 2: While the Belief proxy is well in line with the Potential-based measure of strategic 
uncertainty, this does not hold for the Choice proxy which rather supports the Trust-based 
measure as a measure of strategic uncertainty. 
Anchors and their effects on choices. I now go on to measure the effect of anchors on effort 
choices. In the first step, I only look at cases where subjects choose exactly their anchor and 
test whether more subjects choose it than would be suggested by a random matching of 
‘normal’ choices and anchors absent any anchoring. In the second step, I investigate whether I 
observe a correlation between choices and anchors and test how this differs between 
Individual and Common. 
Choosing exactly the anchor. In treatment Individual subjects choose their anchor in 11.6% of 
all cases (37 out of 320) while in treatment Common the corresponding value is with 25.6% 
(82 out of 320 cases) substantially higher. Taking all five decisions on the subject level into 
account, subjects in Individual choose their anchor 0.58 times and they do so 1.28 times in 
Common. These values differ when compared with a Mann-Whitney U test (MWU, p < 0.01), 
indicating more anchoring in Common. 
In addition, I find that in Individual 29.7% of all subjects (19 of 64) choose their anchor at 
least once with this share being 57.8% (37 of 64) in Common. These values can be compared 
to the expected share of subjects whose normal choice is matched by the random anchor at 
least once across the five games. The corresponding probability is 1 − (1 − 1 61⁄ )
5
≈ 0.079, 
with the 61 being all possible anchors and 5 the games for which a decision is made. This 
corresponds to about 5.08 in 64 subjects. Rounded up, I would hence expect that 6 out of 64 
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decision makers should choose their anchor at least once even if they are not affected by it.
14
 
The corresponding null-hypothesis is that subjects choose their effort independent of their 
anchor value, i.e., in this case, one would expect that six subjects choose exactly their anchor. 
However, I find that this value differs from both the share of decision makers choosing their 
anchor at least once in Individual (6 out of 64 vs 19 out of 64, chi-squared test, p < 0.01) and 
from the share of decision makers doing so in Common (6 out of 64 vs 37 out of 64, chi-
squared test, p < 0.01). Also, the treatments Individual and Common differ in this respect (19 
out of 64 vs 37 out of 64, chi-squared test, p < 0.01). These results lend strong support to both 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. 
Result 3: Subjects’ choices are affected by both private and public anchors when it comes to 
exactly choosing the anchor. The effect is amplified when anchors are public. 
TABLE 6. EFFECTS OF PRIVATE VS PUBLIC ANCHORS ON EFFORT CHOICES. 
Dependent var.: Effort choice (1) (2) (3) 
Anchor 0.26*** 
(0.07) 
0.38*** 
(0.08) 
0.19** 
(0.09) 
Anchor x Individual -- -0.28** 
(0.13) 
-0.20 
(0.14) 
Individual -- 37.01** 
(18.08) 
24.40 
(18.81) 
Observations 128/640 128/640 123/521 
R-squared overall 0.05 0.07 0.02 
Notes: Coefficients of random effects OLS regressions with ‘Effort choice’ as dependent variable. Standard 
errors clustered on the individual level in parentheses. Levels of significance: **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
Correlation of choices and anchors. I next observe whether these findings translate into a 
correlation of anchors and choices. Table 6 presents the corresponding regression results. In 
Model 1, the effort choice is regressed on the anchor only. I find a highly significant 
correlation between the anchor and the corresponding effort choice. This effect is not only 
statistically significant but also economically large – the model implies that for every increase 
in the anchor by 1, the effort choice increases by 0.26. Model 2 further shows that this effect 
                                                          
14
 This is a very conservative measure as decision makers may want to choose same values several times as, for 
example, suggested by potential game theory. If this would be taken into account, the probability that the random 
anchor matches the normal choice at least once can only be lower. 
  
- 80 - 
differs between treatments, being weaker in case of an individual anchor.
15
 Finally, in Model 
3, I only make use of observations that do not exactly choose their anchor. Again, I find a 
significant effect (only in case of a common anchor) of the anchor on the corresponding 
choice.
16
 This suggests that also in cases where subjects do not exactly choose their anchor, 
they seem influenced by its value when making their choice.  
Result 4: Higher anchors imply higher choices. This effect is stronger for public than for 
private anchors and it is also found for subjects not exactly choosing their anchor in case it is 
public. 
Anchoring and the degree of strategic uncertainty. Finally, I test for evidence concerning 
Hypothesis 3 which claims that anchoring depends on the degree of strategic uncertainty. 
Whereas the Potential-based measure suggests that uncertainty is high for intermediate costs 
of effort provision and low for extreme costs, the Trust-based measure suggests that 
uncertainty increases in the costs. I again investigate first the cases where decision makers 
choose exactly their anchor and then the correlation between anchors and choices. 
The share of subjects exactly choosing their anchor is similar across games. In Game 1, 
14.1% (18 out of 128) choose exactly their anchor, with the corresponding values being 
21.1% (27 out of 128), 18.8% (24 out of 128), 19.5% (25 out of 128), and 19.5% (25 out of 
128) in Games 2 – 5. These values suggest no systematic differences across the costs of effort 
provision in a subject’s propensity to choose exactly the anchor.17 
I finally test whether I find evidence for differences conditional on the degree of strategic 
uncertainty when investigating the correlation of anchors and choices. I generate a variable 
reflecting strategic uncertainty as suggested by the Potential-based measure. This variable 
                                                          
15
 In fact, when running the regression for both treatments separately, I only find a significant correlation in 
Common. See Table A.2 in the Appendix.  
16
 Given the finding that subjects react to their private anchors when it comes to exactly choosing it, this 
somewhat suggests that they consider it only when it is close to their normal choice.  
17
 This can be substantiated using LPM models. In Table A.3 in the Appendix, I provide models estimating the 
probability that decision makers choose exactly their anchor. No systematic differences are found across costs of 
effort provision and neither Model 1 nor Model 2 is significant as a whole. 
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(PG uncertainty) is 0 for Game 1 and Game 5 as subjects should be least uncertain about the 
behavior of their opponent and hence not react strongly to the anchor, it is 1 for Game 2 and 
Game 4 as intermediate uncertainty would be suggested by the Potential-based measure and it 
is 2 for Game 3 as uncertainty should be highest in this case. Concerning the Trust-based 
measure of uncertainty, I would expect that uncertainty increases in the costs of effort 
provision (which is reflected in the variable Trust uncertainty which is identical to the linear 
effort cost variable). The results of the regressions are shown in Table 7. 
TABLE 7. EFFECTS OF ANCHORS ON EFFORT CHOICES CONDITIONAL ON THE DEGREE OF 
STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY. 
Dependent var.: Effort choice (1) (2) 
Anchor 0.28*** 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
PG uncertainty 5.65 
(5.67) 
-- 
Anchor x PG uncertainty -0.03 
(0.04) 
-- 
Trust uncertainty -- -17.00*** 
(4.06) 
Anchor x Trust uncertainty -- 0.07** 
(0.03) 
Observations 128/640 128/640 
R-squared overall 0.05 0.27 
Notes: Coefficients of random effects OLS regressions with ‘Effort choice’ as dependent variable. Standard 
errors clustered on the individual level in parentheses. Levels of significance: **p<0.05; ***p < 0.01.  
In Model 1, I interact the anchor value with the PG uncertainty variable. While I still observe 
a substantial effect of the anchor per se, no evidence is found that anchoring gets more 
pronounced as uncertainty according to the Potential-based measure increases. To test 
whether uncertainty as suggested by the Trust-based measure affects anchoring, I conduct the 
same analysis substituting the PG uncertainty with the Trust uncertainty variable. The 
respective results are shown in Model 2. I observe first, that the direct effect of the anchor 
vanishes and second, a negative effect of the Trust uncertainty variable which confirms that 
decision makers choose lower effort levels as the costs of effort provision increase. 
Importantly, the analysis further reveals an interaction between the anchor and Trust 
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uncertainty. This shows that subjects react the more to their anchor the higher the degree of 
strategic uncertainty as suggested by the Trust-based measure. 
Result 5: Decision makers react the more to their anchors the higher the costs of effort 
provision and hence the Trust-based measure of uncertainty.  
 
5. Conclusion  
The present paper investigates the relevance of private vs public anchors in social interaction. 
To approach this realm, I set up a laboratory minimum effort game experiment varying the 
height of the anchor, whether they are private or public and the costs of effort provision. In 
doing so, I am able to disentangle cognitive and strategic reasons for reactions towards 
focality in coordination and to investigate how anchoring is related to the gains and risks from 
(mis)coordination and hence the degree of strategic uncertainty. 
The experimental results provide evidence for both cognitive and strategic reasons causing 
subjects’ reactions towards public anchors. Thereby, this research suggests that not only 
strategic considerations play a role when decision makers are confronted with focal points but 
that also cognition might be relevant for the respective findings. In addition, I observe 
empirical evidence that the extent of such effects increases as strategic uncertainty increases.
18
 
In this paper, I propose different measures of strategic uncertainty for the MEG. As there is no 
established way to measure it, I provide arguments as well as empirical evidence for two 
measures which are both defined in terms of the gains and risks from (mis)coordination. 
However, the current study seems not conclusive in this respect and further research is needed 
to get a better understanding about how strategic uncertainty can be measured in general and 
in the MEG in particular. E.g., the fact that uncertainty in beliefs seems well in line with the 
                                                          
18
 As I only find a difference in anchoring conditional on the degree of strategic uncertainty when analyzing the 
correlation but not when looking at the cases where exactly the anchor is chosen, the respective evidence seems 
somewhat limited. However, it might well be that the amount of data is not sufficient to identify the respective 
effect or the degree of uncertainty might be more important in cases where the ‘normal’ choice is not close to the 
anchor. 
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Potential-based measure of uncertainty is an interesting finding to start research concerning 
this question.  
With this in mind, it remains unclear why subjects react stronger to anchors when uncertainty 
increases according to the Trust-based measure while this is not found for the Potential-based 
measure. This is in particular relevant as I find empirical evidence in favor of the latter 
measure that seems to indicate that uncertainty in beliefs is described well by the Potential-
based measure. These results hence somewhat suggest that decision makers in the MEG often 
decide heuristically while, in case they are explicitely asked to state and think about their 
beliefs, they know under which circumstances they should be more or less uncertain. To 
provide a clearer picture regarding the relationship of uncertainty and beliefs vs behavior 
might be a fruitful topic for future research. 
In sum, this paper can only serve as a first step towards the study of anchoring in belief-
formation in the MEG. However, it seems a promising endeavor to further investigate how 
non-rational cognitive effects of, e.g., different types of information-processing, emotions, or 
frames affect beliefs and choices in social interaction (see, e.g., Cohn et al. 2014, 2015; 
LeCoq et al. 2015; Berger et al. 2015; Bolton et al. forthcoming for examples from the 
economic literature). 
  
  
- 84 - 
Reference list 
Anderson, S., J. K. Goeree, and C. Holt (2001). Minimum-effort coordination games: 
Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior, 34(2), 177-199. 
Ariely, D., G. Loewenstein, and D. Prelec (2003). Coherent arbitrariness: stable demand 
curves without stable preferences. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 73-105. 
Beggs, A., and K. Graddy (2009). Anchoring Effects: Evidence from Art Auctions. American 
Economic Review, 99(3), 1027-1039. 
Berger, S., C. Feldhaus, and A. Ockenfels (2015). Group identity as a lubricant for social 
learning. Working Paper. 
Beugnot, J., Z. Gürgüç, F. R. Øvlisen, and M. M. W. Roos (2012). Coordination failure 
caused by sunspots. Economics Bulletin, 32(4), 2860-2869. 
Blume, A., and A. Ortmann (2007). The effects of costless pre-play communication: 
Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 132, 274-290. 
Bolton, G., C. Feldhaus, and A. Ockenfels (forthcoming). Social interaction promotes risk 
taking in a stag hunt game. German Economic Review. 
Brandts, J., and D. J. Cooper (2006). A Change Would Do You Good… An Experimental 
Study on How To Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations. American Economic 
Review, 96(3), 669-693. 
Brandts, J., and W. B. Macleod (1995). Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Games with 
Recommended Play. Games and Economic Behavior, 11(1), 36-63. 
Camerer et al. (2016). Evaluating replicability of laboratory experiments in economics. 
Science, 351, 1433-1436. 
Cartwright, E., J. Gillet, and M. Van Vugt (2013). Leadership by Example in the Weak-Link 
Game. Economic Inquiry, 51, 2028-2043. 
Cason, T. N., A. C. Savikhin, and R. M. Sheremeta (2012). Behavioral spillovers in 
coordination games. European Economic Review, 56(2), 233-245. 
Cason, T. N., and T. Sharma (2007). Recommended Play and Correlated Equilibria. An 
Experimental Study. Economic Theory, 33, 11-27. 
Charness, G. (2000). Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test of Aumann’s Conjecture. Games and 
Economic Behavior, 33(2), 177-194. 
Chaudhuri, A., and T. Paichayontvijit (2010). Recommended play and performance bonuses 
in the minimum effort coordination game. Experimental Economics, 13, 346-363. 
  
- 85 - 
Chaudhuri, A., A. Schotter, and B. Sopher (2009). Talking ourselves to efficiency: 
coordination in intergenerational minimum effort games with private, almost common and 
common knowledge of advice. Economic Journal, 119, 91-122. 
Chen, R., and Y. Chen (2011). The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection. 
American Economic Review, 101, 2562-2589. 
Cohn, A., J. Engelmann, E. Fehr, and M. Maréchal (2015). Evidence for Countercyclical Risk 
Aversion: An Experiment with Financial Professionals. American Economic Review, 105(2), 
860-885. 
Cohn, A., E. Fehr, and M. Maréchal (2014). Business culture and dishonesty in the banking 
industry. Nature, 516, 86-89. 
Crawford, V. P., U. Gneezy, and Y. Rottenstreich (2008). The Power of Focal Points is 
Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failure. American 
Economic Review, 98(4), 1443-1458. 
Devetag, G. (2005). Precedent transfer in coordination games: An experiment. Economics 
Letters, 89, 227-232. 
Devetag, G., and A. Ortmann (2007). When and why? A critical survey on coordination 
failure in the laboratory. Experimental Economics, 10, 331-344. 
Devetag, G., H. Hosni, and G. Sillari (2012). You better play 7: mutual versus common 
knowledge of advice in a weak-link experiment. Synthese, 190(8), 1351-1381. 
Diamond, D. W., and P. H. Dybvig (1983). Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. 
Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 401-419. 
Duffy, J., and N. Feltovich (2002). Do Actions Speak Louder Than Words? An Experimental 
Comparison of Observation and Cheap Talk. Games and Economic Behavior, 39(1), 1-27. 
Duffy, J., and N. Feltovich (2010). Correlated Equilibria, Good and Bad: An Experimental 
Study. International Economic Review, 51(3), 701-721. 
Dugar, S. (2010). Nonmonetary sanctions and rewards in an experimental coordination game. 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 73(3), 377-386. 
Engelmann, D., and H.-T. Normann (2010). Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game. 
Experimental Economics, 13, 249-259. 
Feldhaus, C., B. Rockenbach, and C. Zeppenfeld (2015). The Effect of Payoff Equality on 
Equilibrium Selection. Working Paper. 
Feri, F., B. Irlenbusch, and M. Sutter (2010). Efficiency gains from team-based coordination – 
Large scale experimental evidence. American Economic Review, 100, 1892-1912. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007). Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-Made Economic Experiments. 
Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171-178. 
  
- 86 - 
Furnham, A., and H. C. Boo (2011). A literature review of the anchoring effect. The Journal 
of Socio-Economics, 40(1), 35-42. 
Galbiati, R., K. H. Schlag, and J. J. van der Weele (2013). Sanctions that signal: An 
experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 94, 34-51. 
Galinsky, A. D., and T. Mussweiler (2001). First offers as anchors: The role of perspective-
taking and negotiator focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(4), 657-669. 
Goeree, J. K., and C. A. Holt (2001). Ten little treasures of games theory and ten intuitive 
contradictions. American Economic Review, 91, 1402-1422. 
Goeree, J. K., and C. A. Holt (2005). An experimental study of costly coordination. Games 
and Economic Behavior, 51, 349-364. 
Greiner, B. (2015). Subject Pool Recruitment Procedures: Organizing Experiments with 
ORSEE. Journal of the Economic Science Association, 1(1), 114-125. 
Harrison, G. W., and J. Hirshleifer (1989). An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best 
Shot Models of Public Goods. Journal of Political Economy, 97, 201-225. 
Harsanyi, J. C., and R. Selten (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kuang, J. X., R. A. Weber, and J. Dana (2007). How Effective is Advice from Interested 
Parties? An Experimental Test Using a Pure Coordination Game. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 62(4), 591-604. 
LeCoq, C., J. Tremewan, and A. K. Wagner (2015). On the Effects of Group Identity in 
Strategic Environments. European Economic Review, 76, 239-252. 
Légal, R. B., J. Chappé, V. Coiffard, and A. Villard-Forest (2012). Don’t you know that you 
want to trust me? Subliminal goal priming and persuasion. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 48, 358-360. 
Manzini, P., A. Sadrieh, and N. J. Vriend (2009). On Smiles, Winks and Handshakes as 
Coordination Devices. Economic Journal, 119(537), 826-854. 
Mehta, J., C. Starmer, and R. Sugden (1994a). Focal Points in Pure Coordination Games: An 
Experimental Investigation. Theory and Decision, 36(2), 163-185. 
Mehta, J., C. Starmer, and R. Sugden (1994b). The Nature of Salience: An Experimental 
Investigation of Pure Coordination Games. American Economic Review, 84(3), 658-673. 
Monderer, D., and L. S. Shapley (1996). Potential Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 
14(1), 124-143. 
Mussweiler, T., and F. Strack (1999). Hypothesis-consistent testing and semantic priming in 
the anchoring paradigm: A selective accessibility model. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 35, 136-164. 
  
- 87 - 
Mussweiler, T., and F. Strack (2000). Numeric judgment under uncertainty: The role of 
knowledge in anchoring. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 36, 495-518. 
Mussweiler, T., and F. Strack (2001). The semantics of anchoring. Organizational Behavior 
and Human Decision Processes, 86, 234-255. 
Ochs, J. (1995). Coordination Problems. In: The Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. J. 
H. Kagel, and A. E. Roth, 195-251, Princton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Riedl, A., I. M. T. Rohde, and M. Strobel (forthcoming). Efficient Coordination in Weakest-
Link Games. Review of Economic Studies.  
Schelling, T. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Schul, Y., R. Mayo, and E. Burnstein (2008). The value of distrust. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 44, 1293-1302. 
Strack, F., and T. Mussweiler (1997). Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: Mechanisms 
of selective accessibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 437-446. 
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman (1974). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. 
Science, 185, 1124-1131. 
Van Huyck, J. B., R. C. Battalio, and R. O. Beil (1990). Tacit coordination games, strategic 
uncertainty, and coordination failure. American Economic Review, 80(1), 234-248. 
Van Huyck, J. B., A. B. Gilette, and R. C. Battalio (1992). Credible assignments in 
coordination games. Games and Economic Behavior, 4(4), 606-626. 
Weber, R. A. (2006). Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups. 
American Economic Review, 96, 114-126.  
  
- 88 - 
Appendix 
 
A. Additional analyses 
 
TABLE A.1. RELATION BETWEEN EFFORT COSTS AND THE MAX PROXY. 
Dependent var.: Max proxy (1) (2) 
Effort costs 0.42 
(0.43) 
-18.14*** 
(2.15) 
Effort costs sq. -- 3.09*** 
(0.37) 
Observations 128/640 128/640 
R-squared overall 0.00 0.06 
Notes: Coefficients of random effects OLS regressions with the ‘Max proxy’ as dependent variable. Standard 
errors clustered on the individual level in parentheses. Level of significance: ***p < 0.01. Average maximum 
number of percentage points attributed to one category (Max proxy) in Games 1-5: 64, 54, 53, 56, 66. 
TABLE A.2. EFFECTS OF ANCHORS ON EFFORT CHOICES BY TREATMENT: MODEL 1 REGARDS 
INDIVIDUAL ANCHORS AND MODEL 2 COMMON ANCHORS. 
Dependent var.: Effort choice (1) (2) 
Anchor 0.09 
(0.11) 
0.38*** 
(0.08) 
Observations 64/320 64/320 
R-squared overall 0.00 0.13 
Notes: Coefficients of random effects OLS regressions with ‘Effort choice’ as dependent variable. Standard 
errors clustered on the individual level in parentheses. Level of significance: ***p < 0.01.  
TABLE A.3. EFFECTS OF EFFORT COSTS ON THE PROBABILITY TO CHOOSE EXACTLY THE ANCHOR. 
Dependent var.: Chooses anchor (1) (2) 
Effort costs 0.01 
(0.01) 
-- 
Game 2 (𝑐 = 0.3) -- 0.07** 
(0.04) 
Game 3 (𝑐 = 0.5) -- 0.05 
(0.03) 
Game 4 (𝑐 = 0.7) -- 0.05 
(0.04) 
Game 5 (𝑐 = 0.9) -- 0.05 
(0.04) 
Observations 128/640 128/640 
R-squared overall 0.00 0.00 
Notes: Coefficients of random effects LPM regressions with ‘Chooses anchor’ as dependent variable. Standard 
errors clustered on the individual level in parentheses. Level of significance: **p < 0.05. Overall p-value Model 
2: 0.34. 
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B. Screenshots: Instructions and experimental design (relevant translations are below 
the respective screenshot) 
Screenshot 1. General instructions  
 
Standard screen welcoming the participants and explaining general rules such as prohibition 
of communication. 
Screenshot 2. Instructions explaining the setting 
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Instructions (translation) 
In this experiment, you are randomly assigned to another participant (your counterpart). 
You and your counterpart choose in 5 scenarios integer numbers between 110 and 170. These 
numbers are called “inputs”. The payoffs of both participants are dependent on the inputs of 
both participants as described by the following equation: 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 (𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝐶𝑈)
= 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠
− 𝐾%𝑥𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡(+ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
Hence, payoffs are first determined by the smaller input of both participants. Furthermore, the 
payoffs depend on your own input as your input costs you K% of your input. The cost 
parameter K is different in each scenario. However, the compensation is always chosen such 
that your payoff is 55 ECU when choosing 110. 
At the end of the experiment one scenario is randomly chosen for payoff. Only then, you get 
to know the input of your counterpart. 
If you have any question, please raise your hand. On the next screens, you can test your 
understanding in several examples. 
Screenshot 3. Treatment variation private vs public 
 
This screen describes how participants have to guess the choices of their counterpart (see 
section 3). Importantly, in one treatment (Individual), they get to know that their random 
value is determined independently of their counterpart’s value whereas in the other treatment 
(Common), they get to know that the random value is the same for both participants. 
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Screenshot 4. Choice stage and decision support (on the right). 
 
 
Screenshot 5. Belief elicitation and decision support (on the right). 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Social interaction promotes risk taking in  
a stag hunt game* 
 
Co-authors: Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels 
 
 
Abstract 
We demonstrate that people are more willing to take risks in a stag hunt game when the agent 
of uncertainty is another person, thereby promoting cooperation. Recent social cognition 
research suggests an explanation for this pattern, which is based on the idea that games that 
align interests between subjects activate a trust mindset. 
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1. Introduction 
It is risky to rely on others. Yet voluntary cooperation requires individuals to take the chance. 
Voluntary cooperation requires an individual investment of resources that pays only if others 
choose to invest as well. What makes people more or less likely to accept the ‘strategic 
uncertainty’ – risk based in the uncertainty about the actions of others – is a central issue in all 
the games commonly used to study economic cooperation, including the prisoner’s dilemma, 
trust games and coordination games. In these games, the success or failure of the cooperative 
venture hinges critically on expectations that others will participate.  
Recent laboratory studies of trust games find that the human factor inherent in strategic 
uncertainty is an important element in people’s choice to cooperate or not (Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser 2004; Bohnet et al. 2008; Bohnet et al. 2010; Aimone and Houser 2011; Aimone 
and Houser 2012; Fetchenhauer and Dunning 2012; Aimone and Houser 2013; Butler and 
Miller 2015). The trust game has two players. The first player decides whether to invest in 
cooperation. Doing so increases the size of the social pie. The second player decides 
(assuming the first player invests) how to divide the pie between the players. Whether and 
how much the first player profits from her investment thus depends on the second player’s 
trustworthiness. The finding in previous research is that the first player is less likely to invest 
in cooperation when he or she knows that the risk is generated from (strategic) uncertainty 
about the choice of the second player than from ‘ordinary risk’, in this case risk is generated 
by a mechanical device choosing on behalf of the second player, even though the objective 
probability of cooperating is the same in the two cases. This diminishment of trust in the face 
of social risk is termed ‘betrayal aversion’ (Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004).  
Betrayal aversion has potentially important implications for the nature of human cooperative 
behavior and for the degree of institutional intrusion necessary for cooperation to succeed. 
The nature of these implications, however, depends critically on the underlying behavioral 
mechanisms. In the present research we investigate whether, in addition to betrayal aversion 
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as studied before, behavior in trust-related contexts might also be affected by the cognitive 
process they trigger. Here we consider two hypotheses, both consistent with the 
aforementioned observation in the trust game.  
One mechanism is motivational in nature: betrayal aversion is triggered by disappointment 
about untrustworthiness. This disappointment has two dimensions. One is disappointment 
about the other’s choice to selfishly increase his or her payoff. The other one is 
disappointment about the other’s failure to meet one’s own expected payoffs. (While 
untrustworthiness in the trust game implies both kinds of disappointment, this is not the case 
in the coordination game as we will see below.) This line of reasoning implies that strategic 
uncertainty per se, doubt about the action the other player will choose (Van Huyck et al. 
1990), hinders the propensity to cooperate, which is our Hypothesis 1 (H1).
1  
A second potential behavioral mechanism is cognitive in nature: recent social cognition 
research shows that human information processing differs substantially under a ‘trust state of 
mind’ compared to a ‘distrust state of mind’. Specifically, starting with a seminal paper by 
Schul et al. (2004), it has been consistently shown that “the cognitive system reacts to distrust 
by automatically inducing the consideration of incongruent associations — it seems designed 
to ask ‘and what if the information were false?’” (p. 668).2 Though this literature has not yet 
been applied to behavioral economics research paradigms, it strongly suggests that games that 
pose a conflict of interest (where there is reason to distrust another person) induce a distrust 
state of mind and thus a different kind of information processing than games that align 
interests (where there is reason to trust another person). From this perspective, (part of) the 
                                                          
1
 In a somewhat related study, Butler and Miller (2015) emphasize the role of intentions in social risk taking. In 
particular, they show that the inability to intentionally betray (as the agent does not know which of the two 
options is ‘betray’ and ‘not betray’) makes subjects take even more risks as compared to a mere risky decision in 
a social context.  
2
 The processing difference for trust vs. distrust manifests on different levels of information processing. Even at 
the most basic level of semantic activation, distrust seems to entail non-routine effects: Under distrust, 
participants activate incongruent and remote associations (Mayer and Mussweiler 2011; Schul et al. 2004). At 
higher levels of information processing, distrust increases cognitive flexibility, creativity (Mayer and Mussweiler 
2011), sensitivity to non-routine contingencies (Schul et al. 2008), information interpretation in multiple frames 
(Schul et al. 1996), and multiple category activation (Friesen and Sinclair 2010). Furthermore, distrust reduces 
stereotyping (Posten and Mussweiler 2013). 
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reason why people trust less in a trust game when the agent of uncertainty is another person is 
that this variant of cooperation games, the trust game, poses a conflict of interests and thus a 
different, more ‘skeptical’ processing of the probability about the other’s trustworthiness 
compared to an otherwise identical game where the agent of uncertainty is a lottery and thus 
no conflict of interests is involved (H2).
3 Our experiment provides a test for these two 
hypotheses. 
While little attention has been paid to the influence of cognition on coordination game 
behavior, a number of investigations have focused on the influence of structural elements in 
coordination games with Pareto-rankable equilibria (Devetag and Ortmann 2007; Weber 
2008) and on the measurement of strategic uncertainty in coordination games (Heinemann et 
al. 2009). With regard to the stag hunt game, the structural elements known to influence 
whether there is cooperation or not include communication (Cooper et al. 1992; Clark et al. 
2001), knowledge of the past play or truthfulness of the other player (Duffy and Feltovich 
2002; Duffy and Feltovich 2006), credible strategy assignments (Bangun et al. 2006), 
avoidance of loss payoffs (Rydval and Ortmann 2005; Feltovich et al. 2012), the pecuniary 
incentives to play best response (Battalio et al. 2001; Dubois et al. 2011), whether the game is 
one shot or repeated (Clark and Sefton 2001), conventions (Rankin et al. 2000), the 
opportunity to learn (Stahl and Van Huyck 2002), and group decision-making (Charness and 
Jackson 2009; Feltovich and Grossman 2014).
4
 
 
                                                          
3 
The processing of probabilities has previously been shown to depend on context (Windschitl and Weber 1999; 
see also Cohn et al. 2015). We note that, instead of differences in the processing of given probabilities, another 
mechanism that could explain the predicted pattern is that the social context might affect risk attitudes which, in 
turn, may affect behavior. However, it has been shown that the decision to trust is hardly related to risk attitudes 
(Eckel and Wilson 2004; Houser et al. 2010).  
4 
Structural elements have also been studied in the closely related minimum effort game. As examples: the 
advice from other players (Chaudhuri et al. 2009), recommendations (Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit 2010), 
rewards and sanctions (Dugar 2010; Galbiati et al. 2013), the history of play (Al-Ubaydli 2011; Cason et al. 
2012), as well as group decisions (Feri et al. 2010) and a common identity (Chen and Chen 2011) were found to 
influence behavior. 
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2. The experiment 
To separate the two sources of betrayal aversion, we conducted an experiment with human 
subjects and monetary incentives using the stag hunt coordination game. Stag hunt, as the 
name implies, was originally framed in terms of cooperative hunting (Rousseau 1984/1755). 
Figure 1 illustrates the normal-form representation of the stag hunt game investigated in this 
research. In the game, players (simultaneously) choose between a safe option that pays a fixed 
but moderate payoff and a risky one that pays more if the other player also goes for the risky 
option but less if she goes for the safe one. In terms of hunting, they can either elect to hunt 
stag – risky because it requires the cooperation of the other player in order to be effective – or 
they can choose to hunt hare – an activity that can be done as effectively alone as in a group. 
Whether a player selects hunting stag or hare depends critically on his or her expected 
probability that the other player will choose to cooperate. In fact, both players hunting stag 
and both players hunting hare each constitute a Nash equilibrium, the former case 
representing mutually optimistic expectations for cooperative effort, the latter case 
representing mutually pessimistic expectations. While the former equilibrium is payoff 
dominant, the latter is risk dominant (Harsanyi and Selten 1988; Van Huyck et al. 1990). The 
stag hunt serves as a prototype for many kinds of social contracts. It also serves as a reduced 
form representation of repeated games where cooperation can be exploited, such as the 
indefinite horizon repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which players can choose either to play tit-
for-tat or not to cooperate (Skyrms 2004).  
Importantly, a player in the stag hunt game cannot be exploited for individual gain: while the 
failure to cooperate imposes a loss on the cooperator, it provides no gain for the non-
cooperator (in fact, in terms of lost opportunity, the non-cooperator also incurs a loss). That is, 
the stag hunt game perfectly aligns players’ interests, and according to our second hypothesis 
may thus induce a different kind of information processing as compared to the trust game, 
where the interests of players are conflicting.  
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Y/Lottery chooses 
  
Option Y1/L1 Option Y2/L2 
X chooses 
Option X1 X gets 11 € Y gets 11 € X gets 1 € Y gets 7 € 
Option X2 X gets 7 € Y gets 1 € X gets 7 € Y gets 7 € 
FIGURE 1. LABORATORY NORMAL FORM GAMES. 
Returning to the structure of the game and the parameters used in our experiment (Figure 1). 
The row players are X and the column players are Y. X chooses between the two options X1 
and X2. While option X1 results either in a payoff of 11 or 1 €, depending on the decision of 
Y, option X2 guarantees a payoff of 7 €.5 Thus, X takes a decision for either a risky or a safe 
option, with another participant being the source of the risk. The game is fully symmetric, 
meaning Y chooses between the same options (Y1 and Y2).  
The test pivots on the behavior of the X players. We use the technique pioneered by Bohnet 
and Zeckhauser (2004) to separate actions due to strategic risk from those due to ordinary risk 
or social context. We implement three treatments (T1, T2 and T3). In each of these treatments 
the X players play a variation of the coordination game shown in Figure 1, such that they take 
their decision with the risk being due to another person (T1), due to a lottery but still in the 
social context of a human Y player (T2), and due to a lottery but absent social context (T3). 
The test allows us to investigate how uncertainty due to human behavior compares to an 
otherwise identical risky decision (comparing T1 and T2), and how such a risky decision 
compares to an equally risky decision without social context (comparing T2 and T3). 
Specifically:  
Treatment 1 (T1 – strategic uncertainty): In T1, we initially ask the 16 Y players whether they 
prefer the risky option Y1 or the safe option Y2. We call the share of Y players choosing the 
                                                          
5
 Given our parameters a risk neutral decision maker plays stag for any p > 60% that the other person also goes 
for stag. The corresponding value in Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) is p > 29%. The reason we deviated from the 
latter value is that, in stag hunt games, the potential gain from coordination is typically relatively small and the 
potential loss from a coordination failure is relatively large (see, e.g., Cooper et al. 1992). 
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risky option p*, which can take one of the values 0/16, 1/16, 2/16, ... 16/16. Subsequently, X 
players are asked to state, conditional on each possible p*, whether they prefer X1 or X2.
6
 
Then, all participants get to know the actual share of players Y choosing option Y1, the actual 
decision of their respective opponent, and their payoff. 
Treatment 2 (T2 – lottery in a social context): There are human Y players in these sessions as 
in T1, but they do not choose between the risky and the safe option. Instead, a lottery chooses 
option L1, equivalent to option Y1 in Figure 1, with probability p* which again can take the 
value of either 0/16, 1/16, 2/16, ... or 16/16. To determine p*, we put 17 envelopes into an 
urn. Each of them contains a number stating a possible probability that the lottery chooses 
option L1. Then, one envelope is randomly drawn from the urn and stuck to a blackboard in 
the lab until it is opened after all decisions are made, so that everybody can verify that p* was 
chosen prior to X players making their decisions. Then, as in T1, X players choose, 
conditional on each possible p*, whether they prefer option X1 or X2. When all decisions are 
made, p* is announced, the lottery is resolved and the participants get to know the decision of 
their respective opponent and their payoffs.  
Treatment 3 (T3 – lottery absent social context): T3 is identical to T2, save that there is no 
human player Y, which is known to X players.  
 
Hypotheses: According to H1, if a personal disappointment caused by the other’s intention to 
exploit X for his or her own benefit causes the betrayal aversion effect, we would expect 
player X’s willingness to play the risky option to be similar across all three treatments 
because this kind of exploitation is not possible in the stag hunt game. Alternatively, if 
disappointment arises when one’s expectations regarding one’s own payoffs are not met due 
to the opponent’s (intentional) choice, we would expect player X’s willingness to play the 
                                                          
6
 We decided to ask subjects for each given probability whether they want to play X1 or X2 in order to facilitate 
decision making. 
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risky option to be smaller in T1 compared to T2 and T3 because (similar to the trust game) 
only the safe choice guarantees that one’s expectations cannot be betrayed.  
If, on the other hand, different modes of information processing under trust and distrust 
mindsets (H2) were relevant, we would expect the opposite pattern compared to what has 
been observed in trust game experiments, namely that players X will exhibit a larger 
willingness to accept risk in T1 than in T2 and T3. The reason is that T1 aligns interests and 
thus induces a trust mindset, which — as suggested by social cognition research — results in 
more ‘confident’ information processing of a given probability about the other’s willingness 
to coordinate efficiently compared to an otherwise identical game where the agent of 
uncertainty is a lottery and thus no interpersonal trust is involved.  
The experiment took place between April and June of 2012 in the Cologne Laboratory for 
Economic Research (CLER), participants were invited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and it 
was programmed with zTree (Fischbacher 2007). In each treatment, all participants received 
identical instructions and all of them had to answer some quiz questions to make sure that 
they understood the rules of the experiment. Only after that, the player roles, X and Y, were 
randomly determined. Pairs of X and Y were then randomly matched.  In total, we collected 
48 independent decisions made by X per treatment (and 48 observations of Y in T1 and T2).  
Each session lasted about 40 minutes and participants were asked to fill a questionnaire on 
demographics after they got to know their payoffs. Most participants studied economics, 
business or related fields. 121 were female and 119 were male. The average payoff was 9.26 € 
including a show-up fee of 2.50 €, with a standard deviation of 3.75 €. 
 
3.  Results 
In all treatments, each X player makes 17 decisions, conditional on p*, for either the safe or 
the risky option. We analyze the “minimal acceptable probability” (MAP) for the opponent, or 
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the lottery, to select the risky strategy, that is needed to induce risk taking. The lower a 
player’s MAP, the more she is willing to take risks.7  
In T1, the average MAP is 64 %, in T2 it is 75 %, and in T3 it is 80 %. Using a non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis-tests, we find that the distributions of MAPs differ significantly 
across treatments (Kruskal-Wallis-test, P < 0.01, two-tailed). Looking more closely at the 
data, we find that the distributions differ between T1 and T2 (Mann-Whitney test, P < 0.01, 
two-tailed), while they do not differ between T2 and T3 (Mann-Whitney-test, P = 0.30, two-
tailed).
8
 The higher willingness to take risks and go for the risky option is hence not driven by 
a player X’s desire to reach the efficient outcome in a social context per se, but is rather 
consistent with H2: people process information differently — more trustfully — under a trust 
mindset and are thus more risk seeking when the uncertainty is caused by the social 
interaction context.  
Figure 2 shows the share of players X choosing the risky option per possible probability p* 
that their opponent (either human or computer) also chooses to do so. It illustrates the large 
differences between T1 and T2/3 across the whole distribution of probabilities. Moreover, 
these differences are particularly strong in the range of the distribution which reflects 
‘reasonable beliefs’ about the probability that the opponent in this setting chooses the risky 
option. Across our three sessions of T1, 32 out of 48 players Y choose the risky strategy, the 
lowest share being 9/16 and the highest 12/16. The lowest and the highest share are shown as 
                                                          
7 
A consistent participant has exactly one switching point from the safe to the risky option when her MAP is 
reached. More than 90 % of the subjects in our sample have such a unique switching point, while those who 
deviate exhibit no particular pattern. In T1, five players always choose the risky strategy, even when the 
probability that Y1 is chosen is 0, while two players never choose it even when it is 1. In T2, one player always 
chooses the risky strategy and one player switches more than once between the safe and the risky option. In T3, 
two participants switch more than once between the options while two switch once but the wrong way (from the 
risky to the safe). The analysis we present here is confined to these unique switchers that first go for the safe and 
then for the risky option. Proceeding this way simplifies the exposition, although we emphasize that our results 
and conclusions do not change if we include all individual data by replacing the MAP by the sum of risky 
decisions. 
8 
We seem to observe somewhat less risk taking in our sample compared to what has been observed in previous 
studies on the trust game. One potential reason is the very low payoff that results from a coordination failure. 
Table A.1 in the Appendix uses OLS regressions to corroborate the main result controlling also for personal 
characteristics of subjects.  
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vertical lines in Figure 2 with the range between these two values representing reasonable 
beliefs in our setting.  
 
FIGURE 2. CHOICE DATA BY TREATMENT. 
Notes: Cumulated share of players X choosing the risky option X1 per probability that Y1/L1 is chosen across 
treatments. The vertical lines illustrate the lowest and the highest probability found across our coordination-
treatment sessions that a randomly chosen player Y goes for the risky option. 
In this part of the distribution, the shares of players X choosing the risky strategy indeed differ 
very substantially between treatments. While in T1 44 % of players X choose the risky option 
when the actual probability is 9/16, in the natural risk treatments this share is considerably 
lower (17 % in T2 and 5 % in T3). When the probability is 12/16, which is the highest found 
across our sessions, 73 % of players X choose the risky strategy while the respective values 
are with 46 % in T2 and 41 % in T3 again considerably lower. For both actual probabilities, 
these shares differ significantly between T1 and T2 and between T1 and T3 (P < 0.01, all 
pairwise comparisons, two-tailed).
9. Furthermore, they differ weakly between T2 and T3 in 
the former case (P < 0.10, two-tailed) but not in the latter (P = 0.65, two-tailed). In fact, the 
shares of X players choosing the risky option are significantly higher in T1 than in T2 and T3 
(P < 0.10, all pairwise comparisons, two-tailed) for all actual probabilities from 8/16 to 13/16. 
                                                          
9 
Here and in the following we use the chi-squared test if there are at least 5 observations per cell while we use 
Fisher’s exact test in all other cases. 
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We conclude that the differences in risk taking, when the risky outcome is determined either 
by another human or by nature, are large and in particular so in an area of reasonable beliefs 
of X players about the probability p* that the opponent in the coordination game goes for the 
risky strategy. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We find that the stag hunt coordination game where the source of uncertainty is another 
player, promotes risk taking and social efficiency compared to an otherwise identical decision 
where risk is determined by nature. This is the opposite pattern in terms of risk taking and 
efficiency compared to the same treatment variation previously found in the trust game. Our 
results suggest that, in line with recent social cognition research, one underlying source of the 
betrayal aversion effect is at least partly due to different information processing modes in 
games with conflict of interests (such as the trust game) versus alignment of interests (such as 
the stag hunt game). There are plausible reasons why people behave this way. To give one: 
Humans might have developed behavioral and cognitive heuristics (Mussweiler and 
Ockenfels 2013) that allow to better overcome coordination problems in games with aligned 
interests while at the same time protect against exploitation in games with conflicting 
interests.  
From a general economics perspective, our finding suggests a conceptualization of “games as 
frames”: Not only does the way of presenting strategies and outcomes of a given game affect 
the construction of beliefs and preferences (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Dufwenberg et al. 
2011; Ellingsen et al. 2012), but the game itself can provoke different construction processes. 
We believe that the underlying hypothesis, namely that the nature of social interaction 
inherent to a game affects beliefs and preference formation, is a promising research topic, and 
that betrayal aversion as well as our finding provide a good starting point for further efforts 
along those lines.  
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Appendix 
A. Additional analysis 
TABLE A.1. OLS REGRESSIONS ON MAP. 
 (1) (2) 
T2 - lottery in a social context 1.85*** 
(0.66) 
1.88*** 
(0.66) 
T3 - lottery absent social context 2.62*** 
(0.59) 
2.60*** 
(0.61) 
Female -- 0.22 
(0.09) 
T2 = T3 P = 0.23 P = 0.20 
Observations 131 131 
R-squared 0.14 0.14 
Notes: The dependent variable is the minimal acceptable probability (MAP). T1 – strategic uncertainty serves as 
the reference category. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *** denotes 1% significance-level. 
 
B. Instructions 
T1 – strategic uncertainty 
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. You are participating in a study in 
which you will earn some money. At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be added 
to a show-up fee of 2.50 €, and you will be paid in cash.  
Experiment. The study is conducted anonymously. Participants will neither get to know with 
whom they interact in the course of the experiment nor the identities of the other participants. 
Communication between participants is not permitted throughout the experiment. If you have 
any question after reading these instructions, please raise your hand. The experimenter will 
then come to you in order to answer your question. 
In this experiment there are two types of participants, person X (16 participants) and person Y 
(16 participants). You will learn in the experiment which type you are. In this experiment one 
person X and one person Y are matched randomly. Person X has to decide between option X1 
and option X2. Person Y chooses either option Y1 or option Y2.  
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The payoffs depend on the decisions of both as follows:  
 
 
Person Y chooses 
  
Option Y1 Option Y2 
Person X 
chooses 
Option X1 X gets 11 € Y gets 11 € X gets 1 € Y gets 7 € 
Option X2 X gets 7 € Y gets 1 € X gets 7 € Y gets 7 € 
 
The payoff table reads as follows: 
 If X chooses option X1 and Y option Y1, X gets 11 € and Y 11 €. 
 If X chooses option X1 and Y option Y2, X gets 1 € and Y 7 €. 
 If X chooses option X2 and Y option Y1, X gets 7 € and Y 1 €. 
 If X chooses option X2 and Y option Y2, X gets 7 € and Y 7 €. 
 
Decision pattern. 
The experiment consists of four stages. 
Stage 1: Person Y either chooses Option Y1 or Option Y2. 
Stage 2: Person X can make her decision depending on the probability p that the person Y 
with whom she is randomly matched chooses option Y1. Therefore, the share of the 16 
persons Y that chose option Y1 in stage 1 is determined. This share equals the probability p. 
The probability p can take 17 values, one for each possible share 0/16, 1/16, 2/16, …, 16/16. 
As the actual value for p is not known in stage 2, person X decides for each possible outcome 
by answering questions of the following form. 
“If the probability that the person Y I am matched with chooses option Y1 is p, I choose … 
Option X1 or Option X2.” 
She does so for each possible probability 0/16, 1/16, 2/16, …, 16/16 (Thus, person X has to 
make 17 decisions). 
Stage 3: The actual value of p is announced. It is determined by the share of persons Y 
choosing option Y1 in stage 1. It hence equals the probability that a randomly chosen person 
Y chooses option Y1. 
Stage 4: The payoffs of person X and person Y are determined depending on the decision of 
person X for the actual probability p and the decision of the person Y with whom she is 
matched. 
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Before the experiment begins you are asked to answer some questions of understanding. 
When the experiment is over, you can see your payoffs, the decision of your opponent as well 
as her payoffs on the screen. While your payoffs are prepared, we ask you to fill out a short 
questionnaire. 
T2 – lottery in a social context  
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. You are participating in a study in 
which you will earn some money. At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be added 
to a show-up fee of 2.50 €, and you will be paid in cash.  
Experiment. The study is conducted anonymously. Participants will neither get to know with 
whom they interact in the course of the experiment nor the identities of the other participants. 
Communication between participants is not permitted throughout the experiment. If you have 
any question after reading these instructions, please raise your hand. The experimenter will 
then come to you in order to answer your question. 
In this experiment there are two types of participants, person X (16 participants) and person Y 
(16 participants). You will learn in the experiment which type you are. In this experiment one 
person X and one person Y are matched randomly. Person X has to decide between option X1 
and option X2. Person Y does not have to make a decision in this experiment.  
The payoffs of person X and person Y depend on the decision of person X and the result of a 
lottery that chooses option L1 with some probability and option L2 with the reverse 
probability.  
The payoffs depend on the decision of player X as well as on the result of a lottery that 
chooses option L1 with some probability p and option L2 with the inverse probability 1-p. 
 
 
Lottery chooses 
  
Option L1 Option L2 
Person X 
chooses 
Option X1 X gets 11 € Y gets 11 € X gets 1 € Y gets 7 € 
Option X2 X gets 1 € Y gets 7 € X gets 7 € Y gets 7 € 
 
The payoff table reads as follows: 
 If X chooses Option X1 and the lottery chooses Option L1, X gets 11 € and Y 11 €. 
 If X chooses Option X1 and the lottery chooses Option L2, X gets 1 € and Y 7 €. 
 If X chooses Option X2 and the lottery chooses Option L1, X gets 7 € and Y 1 €. 
 If X chooses Option X2 and the lottery chooses Option L2, X gets 7 € and Y 7 €. 
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Decision pattern. 
The experiment consists of four stages. 
Stage 1: The probability that the lottery chooses option L1 is determined. This probability p 
can take 17 different values, which are 0/16, 1/16, 2/16, …, 16/16. We put 17 envelopes into 
an urn, one for each possible probability. Then one envelope is randomly drawn from the urn. 
It determines the actual probability p that the lottery chooses option L1. It is announced at the 
beginning of stage 3.  
Stage 2: Person X can make her decision depending on the probability p that the lottery 
chooses option L1. It was determined in stage 1. The probability p can take the values 0/16, 
1/16, 2/16, …, 16/16. 
As the actual value for p is not known in stage 2, person X decides for each possible outcome 
by answering questions of the following form. 
“If the probability that the lottery chooses option L1 is p, I choose … Option X1 or Option 
X2.” 
She does so for each possible probability 0/16, 1/16, 2/16, …, 16/16 (Thus, person X has to 
make 17 decisions). 
Stage 3: The actual value of p is announced. It was determined in stage 1. Subsequently white 
and orange balls are put into an urn whereby the share of white balls is equal to p. Then one 
ball is randomly drawn. If it is white the lottery chooses option L1. Otherwise it chooses 
option L2. 
Stage 4: The payoffs of person X and person Y are determined depending on the decision of 
person x for the actual probability p and the result of the lottery. 
Before the experiment begins you are asked to answer some questions of understanding. 
When the experiment is over, you can see your payoffs, the decision of your opponent as well 
as her payoffs on the screen. While your payoffs are prepared, we ask you to fill out a short 
questionnaire. 
T3 – lottery absent social context 
The instructions for T3 differ from T2 only in the absence of a person y and that person X is 
called ‘you’. 
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Questionnaire 
T1 – strategic uncertainty 
 How is determined which of the 17 decisions by person X is the one relevant for the 
payoffs? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 The share of decisions for option Y1 may be 6/16. For this probability that the person 
she is matched with chooses option Y1, person X may choose option X2. The person 
Y she is matched with may choose option Y1. 
o What is person X’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
o What is person Y’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
 The share of decisions for option Y1 may be 14/16. For this probability that the person 
she is matched with chooses option Y1, person X may choose option X1. The person 
Y she is matched with may choose option Y1. 
o What is person X’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
o What is person Y’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
 The share of decisions for option Y1 may be 10/16. For this probability that the person 
she is matched with chooses option Y1, person X may choose option X2. The person 
Y she is matched with may choose option Y2. 
o What is person X’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
o What is person Y’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
 The share of decisions for option Y1 may be 3/16. For this probability that the person 
she is matched with chooses option Y1, person X may choose option X1. The person 
Y she is matched with may choose option Y2. 
o What is person X’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
o What is person Y’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
 T2 – lottery in a social context  
 How is determined which of the 17 decisions by person X is the one relevant for the 
payoffs? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 How is the result of the lottery (Option L1 of Option L2) determined? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 What is the probability that the lottery chooses option L1? How is this probability 
determined? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 The probability that the lottery chooses option L1 may be 6/16. For this probability 
person X may choose option X2. The lottery may choose option L1. 
o What is person X’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
o What is person Y’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
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 The probability that the lottery chooses option L1 may be 14/16. For this probability 
person X may choose option X1. The lottery may choose option L1. 
o What is person X’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
o What is person Y’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
 The probability that the lottery chooses option L1 may be 10/16. For this probability 
person X may choose option X2. The lottery may choose option L2. 
o What is person X’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
o What is person Y’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
 The probability that the lottery chooses option L1 may be 3/16. For this probability 
person X may choose option X2. The lottery may choose option L2. 
o What is person X’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
o What is person Y’s payoff? ____ Euro. 
T3 – lottery absent social context 
The questions for T3 differ from T2 only in the absence of a person y. 
 
C.  Experimental procedure 
 
In each treatment players X first choose for all probabilities from 0/16
th
 to 16/16
th
 whether to 
choose the risky thing or the sure option. Subsequently, they get to see one screen with all 
decisions where they can change their decisions if wanted. If they switch from the sure to the 
risky option and back they are asked to note that they do so when they click to continue and 
can then either choose to proceed or to change their choices. Only then, all decisions are 
locked in. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Norm uncertainty and voluntary payments  
in the field* 
 
Co-authors: Tassilo Sobotta and Peter Werner 
 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the behavioral reactions towards exogenous changes of implicit norm-relevant 
information in a natural field setting. Customers who are exposed to subtle information cues 
implying a higher norm increase their voluntary payments for a service by about 25%. 
Moreover, consistent with the conjecture that this effect is predominantly driven by customers 
who are uncertain about the actual payment norm, this effect vanishes when explicit norm-
relevant information is provided. Additional analyses suggest that customers tend to pay more 
when the probability of being observed by others increases. 
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1. Introduction 
The present paper investigates how economic decisions respond to an exogenous shift in a 
perceived norm. Our central hypothesis is that subjects who are willing to adhere to norms 
respond to subtle variations in the environment when the relevant norm is unclear. In a setting 
where subjects can freely decide if and how much to pay for a service, we find that payments 
increase substantially when customers are exposed to information that implies a higher norm. 
This effect vanishes when explicit norm-relevant information is provided. Thereby, our study 
provides field evidence that subjects exhibit a preference for norm conformity and, if the 
norm is uncertain, actively search for norm-relevant information. 
Previous studies have established the importance of norms for economic behavior. For 
example, Sliwka (2007) and Fischer and Huddart (2008) study theoretically how a preference 
to adhere to norms affects the interaction between principals and agents in companies. 
Examples from the laboratory that establish the influence of norms on behavior include 
dictator games (Andreoni and Bernheim 2009; Krupka and Weber 2009 and 2013; Chang et 
al. 2015; Gächter et al. 2015; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov forthcoming), public goods 
games (Xiao and Houser 2011; Kessler and Leider 2012; Reuben and Riedl 2013; Kimbrough 
and Vostroknutov forthcoming), Bertrand competition (Kessler and Leider 2012) and 
principal-agent relationships (Danilov and Sliwka forthcoming). 
As norms are often ambiguous and vary from case to case, behavior may depend heavily on 
the specific context, and subjects who are willing to adhere to norms may face substantial 
uncertainty about what the relevant norm is. Importantly, when confronted with uncertainty 
about the norm, the construction of beliefs about appropriate behavior might be fragile and 
easily accessible by subtle psychological techniques that exogenously alter information 
available to the subjects, such as anchoring or priming (Ariely et al. 2003; Mussweiler and 
Ockenfels 2013; Cohn et al. 2015; Feldhaus 2016). This is suggested for example by 
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Mussweiler and Strack (2000) who find that anchoring effects are the stronger the more 
uncertain the target in a guessing task is.  
Our study builds upon these insights and investigates the effect of norm uncertainty and 
behavioral reactions towards exogenous changes of norm-relevant information in a natural 
field setting. Our approach to exogenously vary information follows research in social 
psychology suggesting that responses to survey questions are sensitive to the particular values 
shown in answer scales (Schwarz et al. 1985; Schwarz 1999). Importantly, survey respondents 
seem to use the value categories of answer scales as reference values that represent ‘common’ 
or ‘normal’ opinions or behaviors.1 In our experiment, we use the information provided by 
such answer scales as our treatment manipulation. We ask customers about their opinions 
regarding appropriate payments by presenting them two different answer scales ‒ a scale with 
a lower midpoint and a scale with a higher midpoint, implying a lower and a higher payment 
norm, respectively. Our hypothesis is that voluntary payments increase in response to a scale 
with a higher midpoint due to the customers’ preference to adhere to the norm.  
As our study focuses on payments that are made voluntarily, it is related to research on the 
impact of norm-relevant information on charitable giving. For instance, donations are strongly 
influenced by information about the behavior of others (Frey and Meier 2004; Alpizar et al. 
2008; Shang and Croson 2009; Agerström et al. 2016) as well as by direct suggestions (Adena 
et al. 2014; Charness and Cheung 2013; Edwards and List 2014). Martin and Randal (2008) 
observe that behavior can also be affected by more indirect cues, as donations in a gallery 
respond to the content of a transparent donation box.
2
 Also, in applied psychology and 
marketing science, several studies have investigated how reference scales in the context of 
door-to-door solicitation or personalized mailings have to be designed in order to increase 
                                                          
1
 Schwarz et al. (1985) ask participants how much time they invest into watching TV per day and find that 
respondents’ estimations differ significantly conditional on the scale used in the survey. Schwarz (1999) 
provides a survey regarding such scale effects. 
2
 Our study is also somewhat related to theoretical and empirical research on tipping that shows the importance 
of norm-relevant information (Azar 2004, 2007). 
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charitable donations (Weyant and Smith 1987; Doob and McLaughlin 1989; Schibrowsky and 
Peltier 1995; Desment and Feinberg 2003; De Bruyn and Prokopec 2011).
3
 
Since subjects in our natural field environment are free what to pay, the decision situation also 
shares important features with dictator games and related decision situations. In the context of 
dictator games, Ockenfels and Werner (2014) test the effect of varying response scales for 
belief elicitation questions on dictator transfers in a classroom experiment. Before making 
their decisions, dictators are asked to provide a guess either about the average transfer of 
dictators or the average expectation of recipients. Here, dictators who are unfamiliar with the 
game transfer more to recipients after observing a scale with a high midpoint when guessing 
the recipients’ expectations, in line with guilt aversion (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007). The 
observation that only participants are affected who do not know the dictator game suggests 
that the presence of uncertainty might indeed be important for the effect of scale variations on 
behavior.
4
 
Finally, a number of economic studies have investigated behavior in ‘pay-what-you-want’ 
schemes. These schemes offer customers the choice if and how much to pay for a particular 
good or service. Similar to dictator games, profit maximizing behavior implies paying nothing 
or the minimum possible amount. Yet, studies both from the laboratory and the field have 
shown that customers are willing to pay non-negligible prices under pay-what-you-want 
schemes, and that this behavior can be attributed, among other things, to social preferences. 
Regner and Barria (2009) analyze data of an internet platform that sells music under a pay-
what-you-want scheme and find that the average payment is substantially higher than the 
minimal amount, which is explained by reciprocal preferences of customers. Gneezy et al. 
(2010) and Gneezy et al. (2012) investigate pay-what-you-want schemes in field experiments. 
                                                          
3
 In these studies, potential donors are directly approached, and the scale’s values are presented as choice sets 
where subjects can mark the amount they are willing to give while also being allowed to donate some other 
amount. 
4
 Likewise, Schwarz and Bienias (1990) found in survey studies that the effect of scale variations becomes 
weaker when more relevant information is accessible to respondents.  
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The former study shows that combining a pay-what-you-want scheme with a charitable 
donation substantially increases revenues as compared to a fixed price with a charity 
component. Results from the latter study suggest that concerns for self-image are important 
drivers for customer behavior: Here, more customers decide not to buy a product if they can 
choose the price compared to a case where the same goods are sold at a low fixed price, 
suggesting some of them want to avoid paying ‘inappropriately’ low prices. Schröder et al. 
(2015) find that a pay-what-you-want scheme results in higher revenues compared to a 
mechanism that asks customers to freely reduce a price, indicating the importance of framing 
effects and the volatility of payments in such contexts. Schmidt et al. (2015) investigate 
underlying reasons for positive payments under pay-what-you-want schemes in a laboratory 
market environment and conclude that these payments can be partly attributed to outcome-
based social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000).
5
 Finally, 
using restaurant data over a two-year period, Riener and Traxler (2012) observe persistent 
positive payments under a pay-what-you-want pricing scheme and, importantly, the patterns 
in the data are in line with customers’ focus on norms, as payments converge over time.6  
In contrast to most previous economic studies about the impact of norms on behavior, the 
focus of our experiment is on the effect of a subtle and implicit norm variation in a natural 
field setting. Importantly, our experimental design has the advantage that it allows us to 
exogenously shift the perceived norm regarding appropriate payments and test whether 
subjects adjust their behavior in response to this variation. Unlike former studies that directly 
communicate reference payments (such as average prices, recommendations or explicit 
requests), subjects in our main experiment neither get actual information about others’ 
                                                          
5
 However, strategic concerns by customers are also found to be important for behavior - some customers seem 
to pay predominantly in the beginning to keep the firm with the pay-what-you-want scheme in the market, and 
that the choice of a pay-what-you-want scheme is not a successful strategy when competition among firms is 
introduced. 
6
 In addition, studies from marketing science also indicate that behavior under pay-what-you-want schemes is 
sensitive to reference values: Kim et al. (2009), Wiggins Johnson and Peng Cui (2013), Armstrong Soule and 
Madrigal (2015) and Kim et al. (2014) provide survey and field evidence that external reference prices can have 
a positive impact on actual prices. 
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behavior nor an explicit suggestion. Instead, they infer the norm-relevant information from 
the environment, in our case from the announcement of a survey about customers’ opinions 
with regard to appropriate payments. Hence, subjects process this information only indirectly 
because the variation of the scales in our setting is not directly tied to payment decisions. 
Furthermore, to test the impact of norm uncertainty in our setting, we implement our 
experimental variation both in absence and in presence of explicit norm information. 
We find that consumers are highly sensitive to an exogenous shift in the perceived norm: 
Customers who are confronted with a high reference scale pay on average about 25% more 
for the service than customers who are shown a low reference scale. This is evidence that, 
under uncertainty, a minor and subtle intervention can cause a shift in customers’ beliefs 
about appropriate behavior and a corresponding substantial increase in payments, suggesting 
that norm-guided behavior in the field is very sensitive to changes in the context of the 
decision environment. Moreover, consistent with our conjecture that this effect is 
predominantly driven by customers who are uncertain about what to pay, the reference scale 
effect vanishes in a control experiment where customers additionally receive information 
about average payments.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the setting and 
discusses the experimental design. In Section 3 we discuss the results of the main and the 
control experiment. Section 4 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Setting and experimental design 
We conducted our experiment on a Saturday in April 2014 in the “Neumarkt Galerie”, a 
shopping mall in Cologne, Germany. The mall has a public restroom where guests can freely 
choose how much they want to pay for usage. Payment for the service is expected but not 
enforced so that customers can also refuse to pay. Moreover, there is no clear reference price 
for the service which allows us to study behavior under uncertainty about the payment norm. 
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All guests pass a counter where they can place their payment on a plate. During the time of 
our experiment, an experimenter was seated right behind the counter who collected the 
payments by the customers and the data and changed the signs associated with our 
experimental treatments at specific times (see below).
7
 The experimenter put all customer 
payments immediately into a drawer in the counter to ensure that the plate was filled with the 
same amount of money as change – four coins of 20 cents and two coins of 10 cents.8 Also, he 
collected data about the amount given and basic demographic characteristics (gender and 
estimated age) of each guest as well as situational factors that might have an influence on 
payments (for example, whether the customer arrived in a group or alone).
9
 The experimenter 
noted the relevant information on sheets of paper hidden in a second drawer.  
The experimental variation of norm-relevant information was implemented with the help of 
printed signs that were placed in the restrooms and on the counter close to the plate for 
payments. The signs announced a survey that asked the customers to state their opinion 
regarding an ‘appropriate payment’ for the usage of the restroom, suggesting altogether five 
categories for possible answers (see Table 1 for the text printed on the signs).
10
 If customers 
wanted to participate in the survey, they were asked to contact the experimenter at the counter 
who would provide them with a questionnaire form. However, customers’ interest in the 
survey was only low - 9 customers actually completed the questionnaire form which accounts 
for a participation rate of 2.2%.
11
 However, as we will describe in Section 3 below, the 
information provided on the signs had a significant impact on the behavior of customers. 
                                                          
7
 This experimenter was the same across all treatments and experiments. As the facilities are cleaned during the 
day, members of the cleaning team were also present during the time of our experiment. However, the aim of the 
study was not revealed to them. 
8
 It was not always possible to put the money into the drawer right after the payment, for example, in cases when 
a large number of customers left the restroom at the same time. Therefore, in the later analysis we also control 
for the sum of money left on the plate (see Section 3). 
9
 For a description of the dataset see Table A.1 in the Appendix.  
10
 During the time of the experiment, a barrier was installed in the restroom that can, if enabled, only be passed 
after inserting coins as payment. However, it was not yet in use when we conducted the experiment. Thus, it 
seems plausible that customers took the survey seriously and interpreted it as a trial of the shopping center 
management to elicit their willingness to pay before putting the barrier into operation. 
11
 4 persons participated in the low and 5 persons in the high scale treatment. 
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TABLE 1. WORDING AND SCALES SHOWN IN THE MAIN EXPERIMENT. 
Treatment 1: LOW Treatment 2: HIGH 
 
Survey: Which amount do you think is appropriate as the payment for the usage of our service? 
  
☐ 0 cent ☐ up to 30 cents 
☐ 10 cents ☐ 40 cents 
☐ 20 cents ☐ 50 cents 
☐ 30 cents ☐ 60 cents 
☐ more than 30 cents ☐ more than 60 cents 
  
Please contact us!  
 
We implemented two treatments – the low scale treatment (LOW) and the high scale treatment 
(HIGH) – which were identical except for the numeric scale shown on the signs that provided 
a range of potential answers to the question regarding appropriate payments. In a related 
experiment conducted in the same week we found that in the absence of an intervention 
customers paid on average 30 cents for the service. Therefore, we used this value as the 
switching point between the two scales. In treatment LOW, the scale started with the category 
‘0 cents’ and increased in 10-cent increments to ‘more than 30 cents’ while in treatment 
HIGH the scale started with the category ‘up to 30 cents’, going up in 10-cent increments to 
‘more than 60 cents’. By this variation, we expect to move the average perception of 
appropriate payments into the direction of the midpoint of the respective scale (Schwarz et al. 
1985), thereby affecting the corresponding actual payments of people who are willing to 
conform to norms. To ensure that there would be no confound due to the fact that different 
groups of customers might visit the shopping center at different times, we further switched 
between treatments at specific times during the day: we conducted the low scale treatment 
from 11:30am-1:00pm and from 3:30pm-5:00pm while we conducted the high scale treatment 
from 1:15pm-2:45pm and from 5:15pm-6:45pm  
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3. Results  
Descriptive results. We collected data on the payment decisions of altogether 403 customers – 
199 participants in the low scale treatment and 204 people in the high scale treatment. 
Customers in LOW pay on average 30.33 cents and are therefore very close to the customer 
payments without interventions (see previous section). In contrast, the mean payment in 
HIGH is with 37.80 cents 24.6% higher than in the low scale treatment. The respective 
distributions of payments are different as indicated by a Mann-Whitney U test (MWU, p < 
0.01, two-tailed). This shows that customers react to the implicit norm variation as predicted 
by our main hypothesis. Since payments substantially increase in the high scale treatment, 
many customers seem to adjust their own payment to the increase in the ‘appropriate 
payment’ suggested by the higher midpoint (see Figure 1 that visualizes the distribution of 
payments across the two treatments). 
 
FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENT DECISIONS (P) IN THE LOW AND HIGH TREATMENT 
(PAYMENT-INTERVALS IN EURO-CENTS). 
 
Moreover, we find that the share of decision makers that gives more than the switching point 
of 30 cents is with 61.3% in the high scale treatment substantially higher compared to the low 
scale treatment (47.7%). These shares differ significantly between treatments as indicated by 
a two-sample test of proportions (p < 0.01, two-tailed). Also, we find a similar effect 
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concerning the prominent center of the scales. While the share of payments of exactly 20 
cents is higher in the low scale treatment (6.5% of the cases in LOW vs 2.5% of the cases in 
HIGH, two sample test of proportions, p < 0.05, two-tailed), payments of 50 cents are more 
frequently chosen in the high scale treatment (32.7% in LOW vs 42.2% in HIGH, two sample 
test of proportions, p < 0.05, two-tailed). Summarizing, we find significant differences in 
payments conditional on the scale shown to the customers.  
Control experiment. Our conjecture is that the variation of scales affects people’s beliefs 
about appropriate behavior in particular under norm uncertainty. To test this conjecture, we 
conducted a control experiment in the same setting in June 2014 and provided customers with 
explicit norm-relevant information, using exactly the same procedures, time slots and the 
schedule for treatment variations as in our first experiment.  
In the second experiment, we added the average payment by customers without intervention 
to the description of the reference scales that were otherwise identical to the main experiment 
(see Table 2). If the effect of the scale variation is driven by norm uncertainty, it should 
become weaker once norm-relevant information is revealed.
12
 
TABLE 2. WORDING AND SCALES SHOWN IN THE CONTROL EXPERIMENT. 
Treatment 1: LOW30 Treatment 2: HIGH30 
 
Survey: On average our guests pay 30 cents. 
Which amount do you think is appropriate as the payment for the usage of our service? 
  
☐ 0 cent ☐ up to 30 cents 
☐ 10 cents ☐ 40 cents 
☐ 20 cents ☐ 50 cents 
☐ 30 cents ☐ 60 cents 
☐ more than 30 cents ☐ more than 60 cents 
  
Please contact us!  
 
                                                          
12 
We acknowledge that customers might perceive a difference between the descriptive norm (the behavior by 
others) and the appropriate payment. If this was the case, responses to the scale variation should be less affected 
by the provision of additional norm information in the control experiment. 
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In the second experiment, we collected data for altogether 632 customers - 311 (321) for the 
LOW30 (HIGH30) treatment.
13
 Importantly, and in contrast to our main experiment, average 
customer behavior is very similar across treatments: In the LOW30 treatment customers pay 
30.58 cents on average while the corresponding value is 30.09 cents in the HIGH30 treatment. 
The corresponding distributions of payments do not differ (MWU, p = 0.89, two-tailed). 
Testing for a difference between the treatments in customers’ propensity to pay more than the 
cutoff value of 30 cents neither yields differences between the treatments (42.1% in the 
LOW30 treatment vs 45.8% in the HIGH30 treatment, two-sample test of proportions, p = 
0.35, two-tailed).
14
 This result is in line with our conjecture that the scale variation effect 
relies on the absence of explicit norm-relevant information. 
One would expect a shift towards the actual mean payment in our control condition. Indeed, 
the share of customers who give exactly 30 cents is substantially higher, with 13.0% in the 
control experiment compared to 7.7% in the main experiment (two-sample tests of 
proportions, p < 0.01, two-tailed). 
Summarizing, we find that voluntary payments are significantly affected by the variation in 
reference scales only when norm uncertainty is present.  
In the next step, in order to control for additional factors that might influence customer 
behavior in our setting, we analyze the determinants of payments with the help of Tobit 
models. Here, we make use of both the data from the main experiment and the control 
                                                          
13 
Due to constructional changes in the shopping mall and because of time constraints we conducted this 
experiment within the week (Wednesday) rather than on another Saturday. During our initial experiment, some 
of the shops in the center were not yet opened. However, at the time of the second experiment these shops were 
opened which led to a substantial increase of the customer volume in the center. For the second experiment, we 
were able to collect payment information from altogether 632 out of 641 customers. For 9 customers (1.4%) it 
was not possible to track payments. Our results do not change if we drop these customers from the analyses or 
when assuming that they all gave nothing. In the remainder of the paper, we drop these data points from the 
analysis. 
14
 With respect to the midpoints of the scales, the probabilities to pay exactly 20 cents (7.7% in the LOW30 
treatment vs 6.5% in the HIGH30 treatment, two-sample test of proportions, p = 0.57, two-tailed) or to give 
exactly 50 cents do neither differ (28.3% in the LOW30 treatment vs 32.1% in the HIGH30 treatment, two-
sample test of proportions, p = 0.30, two-tailed). 
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experiment. We also test for further evidence corroborating our assumption that behavior in 
our setting is driven by a desire of customers to adhere to social norms.  
We also collected data on the demographics of customers. These variables include gender and 
estimated age
15
 of each customer, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if customers 
arrived in a group
16
, and a dummy variable equal to one if people belonged to the staff of the 
shopping mall.
17
 Moreover, we collected variables to control for situational factors that might 
have an influence on payments if behavior is guided by norms. First, we control for an effect 
of the observability of payments with the variables ‘Observable by member of the team’ and 
‘Observable by customer’. These variables are dummies that indicate whether a member of 
the cleaning team or another customer was close to the counter when a customer had to decide 
if and what to pay for the service. Second, to capture an effect of potentially competing 
reference values for payments, we control for the amount of money on the plate when a 
particular customer made her decision (see Footnote 8). 
Model 1 in Table 3 includes only the dummy variables for the treatment variations (LOW and 
HIGH of the main experiment and LOW30 and HIGH30 of the control experiment; the LOW 
treatment of our main experiment serves as the reference category). Model 2 additionally 
controls for demographic characteristics of the customers and dummies for time intervals (the 
phases before 2pm, between 2pm and 4pm, and after 4pm) to control for daytime effects
18
. 
Model 3 further includes contextual effects described above.
19
 
 
                                                          
15 A person’s age was estimated in intervals of 5 years starting with an age of 10 years.  
16 
Groups are defined as people who jointly arrived in the restroom and obviously belonged together (for 
example, couples, families or friends). In cases when customers contributed as a group, every person was 
attributed the total payment of the group divided by sum of people who belonged to the group. This was done 
because if customers arrived in groups, they typically left only one payment at the counter. As customers, we 
consider only adults and adolescents older than 10 years.  
17 
We assign people who work for one of the shops in the shopping center and construction workers from a 
building lot in the mall to this category. Due to their work clothes they could be easily identified. 
18 
These time intervals overlap with the time slots for the experimental treatments. 
19 
In Table A.2 in the Appendix we report additional Probit regressions with a dummy variable equal to one if the 
payment by a customer exceeds the threshold value of the scales (30 cents). These models support our main 
conclusion and also show the significant treatment effect. In these models, the signs of the additional control 
variables are similar to the specifications reported in Table 3, but the significance levels vary in some cases. For 
example, the dummy for male customers is always significantly negative.  
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TABLE 3. DETERMINANTS OF CUSTOMER PAYMENTS (EURO CENTS). 
Dependent var.: Payment (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment HIGH 9.238*** 
(3.289) 
10.906*** 
(3.172) 
10.980*** 
(3.170) 
Treatment LOW30 2.384 
(3.000) 
3.890 
(2.829) 
2.948 
(2.839) 
Treatment HIGH30 0.508 
(2.992) 
3.501 
(2.888) 
2.001 
(2.906) 
Male -- -3.467 
(2.221) 
-3.909* 
(2.217) 
Age -- 0.484*** 
(0.069) 
0.497*** 
(0.069) 
Staff -- -71.092*** 
(7.831) 
-69.772 
(7.768) 
Group -- -- -3.578* 
2.038 
Observable by team member -- -- 3.390* 
(2.035) 
Observable by customer -- -- 6.763** 
(2.639) 
Money on plate (Euro cents) -- -- 0.092* 
(0.049) 
Time dummies No Yes Yes 
Observations 1035 1031 1030 
Log likelihood -4068 -3958 -3946 
Notes: Tobit models are calculated to account for the share of observations with zero transfers. The dependent 
variable is the payment of a customer in Euro cents. Standard errors are given in parantheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively. 
 
Across all models we find a positive and highly significant effect of the HIGH dummy on 
decision makers’ payments. This result confirms that subjects in the high scale treatment of 
the main experiment are indeed more generous than in the low scale treatment when 
uncertainty about the norm is present. As before, we find no difference between the 
treatments of the control experiment (Wald-tests, Models 1 to 3, p > 0.10), suggesting that 
customers do not react to the scale variation when they also receive information about average 
payments. Furthermore, the high scale treatment of the main experiment does not only differ 
from the respective low scale treatment but the values of the coefficients also exceed those of 
both treatments of the control experiment (Wald-tests, Models 1 to 3, p < 0.05, all pairwise 
comparisons). In line with the descriptive statistics, the coefficients LOW30 and HIGH30 for 
the control experiment are positive but not significant, indicating no substantial difference 
compared to LOW. With respect to the demographic variables, we find a positive effect of age 
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suggesting that older people tend to pay more and a negative effect of the ‘Staff’-variable, 
implying that people who work in the shopping mall pay less for the service. Moreover, the 
dummy variable for groups is negative and marginally significant, indicating that the 
individual payment becomes lower if customers arrive as a group. In Model 3, the dummy for 
male customers is negative and weakly significant. 
Model 3 provides further indications that customers’ willingness to adhere to norms is a 
relevant driver of behavior in our setting. In line with the notion that customers are more 
likely to follow norms when they are observed by others, we find that guests pay (weakly) 
significantly more when either a member of the cleaning team or another guest is close by and 
able to observe the payment. This observation is related to the formal arguments by Bernheim 
(1994) that subjects conform to norms due to their desire for social esteem and by Andreoni 
and Bernheim (2009) that the observability of one’s action is an important prerequisite for 
inducing fair behavior. Also, it is related to empirical evidence on the impact of social 
pressure on giving behavior (see, for example, Andreoni and Bernheim 2009; DellaVigna et 
al. 2012). Finally, in line with the literature on the effect of seed money in the context of 
charitable giving (List and Lucking-Reiley 2002), customers tend to give more the more 
money is on the plate; yet, this effect is only marginally significant.  
In a last step, we investigate the conjecture that the effect of the scale variation in our main 
experiment and hence the customers’ tendency to adhere to the higher payment norm is 
related to the degree of observability. Therefore, we calculate additional Tobit models similar 
to those reported in Table 3 that control for different possible audience effects.  
Model 4 and 5 exclude all cases where decision makers could be observed by a member of the 
cleaning team (Model 4) or by another customer (Model 5) when choosing their payment, 
whereas in the final step, Model 6 excludes both cases.  
In Models 4 and 5, we find that the treatment effect in HIGH is still significant although the 
coefficients and significance levels seem to get somewhat smaller compared to the model 
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including all observations (see Table 3). In Model 5, the difference between the coefficients 
of the two high scale treatments is not significant anymore (Wald-test, p > 0.10). Finally, in 
Model 6, the effect of the high scale treatment in our main experiment seems indeed 
substantially mitigated: Although the coefficient of HIGH is still positive, it is neither 
significant (Wald-test, p = 0.142) nor different from HIGH30 (Wald test, p = 0.220) in this 
specification. This is an indication that the willingness to conform to the perceived payment 
norm in our field setting might be sensitive to the observability of actions.  
TABLE 4. DETERMINANTS OF CUSTOMER PAYMENTS (EURO CENTS) – ROBUSTNESS CHECKS. 
Dependent var.: Payment (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment HIGH 9.009** 
(4.166) 
7.75** 
(3.467) 
6.694 
(4.554) 
Treatment LOW30 5.497 
(4.062) 
2.010 
(3.090) 
4.101 
(4.487) 
Treatment HIGH30 0.877 
(4.082) 
2.637 
(3.235) 
1.836 
(4.495) 
Male 1.167 
(3.094) 
-3.053 
(2.485) 
1.765 
(3.418) 
Age 0.592*** 
(0.094) 
0.540*** 
(0.077) 
0.675*** 
(0.102) 
Staff -69.036 
(9.894) 
-68.172*** 
(8.114) 
-67.766 
(10.216) 
Group -4.388 
(2.742) 
-3.980* 
(2.275) 
-4.605 
(3.014) 
Observable by team member -- 3.161 
(2.290) 
-- 
Observable by customer 5.368 
(3.780) 
-- -- 
Money on plate (Euro cents) 0.087 
(0.064) 
0.150 
(0.065) 
0.164 
(0.082) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Not observed by 
team member 
Not observed by 
customer 
Not observed by 
team member or 
customer 
Observations 613 867 528 
Log likelihood -4068 -3958 -3946 
Notes: Tobit models are calculated to account for the share of observations with zero transfers. The dependent 
variable is the payment of a customer in Euro cents. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level, respectively. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In the present study we investigate whether subtle changes in norm-relevant information 
affect payment decisions in a natural field setting where the actual payment norm is unclear. 
  
- 130 - 
With the help of different reference scales for ‘appropriate payments’, we exogenously induce 
shifts in the perceived payment norm and find non-negligible effects on customers’ choices: 
When observing a scale with high values, customers pay on average some 25% more than 
customers who see a scale with low values. Remarkably, this effect is found although 
customers only passively process the information from the scales. Our interpretation of the 
treatment effect is that people adjust their behavior in the direction of the values provided by 
the scales when they are uncertain about the relevant payment norm. This interpretation is 
supported in a control experiment in which between-treatment differences vanish as soon as 
customers receive explicit norm-relevant information (the mean amount paid by customers). 
Also, additional analyses suggest that customers tend to give more when being observed by 
others, and that the estimated effect of the scale variation becomes somewhat weaker when it 
is less likely that others see what the customer pays for the service. 
A potential alternative explanation for the scale effect independent of norms is that the mere 
exposure to the numerical values of the different scales is enough to shift behavior under 
uncertainty. This could be caused by the fact that the scales make particular values more 
salient. To test for this possibility, we conducted a third experiment in the same setting and in 
exactly the same way as in the previous experiments. Here, the only difference to the main 
experiment was that the question for customers was unrelated to the service: In particular, the 
question displayed to customers was “What do you think does a one-minute phone-call from 
Germany to England cost on average?” (The scales were identical to those displayed in Tables 
1 and 2). In this experiment, we find no effects of the scale variations, with average payments 
in the low scale (high scale) treatment of 27.39 cents (30.54 cents; MWU, p = 0.98, two-
tailed).
20
 Hence, it seems that it is indeed the perception of being confronted with norm-
relevant information (due to the request to think about ‘appropriate’ behavior) that makes 
                                                          
20 
This experiment was also conducted in June 2014; in total, we were able to observe the payment decisions of 
681 subjects. 
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customers more susceptible to use this information which, in turn, leads to shifts in payments 
in the direction of the ‘suggested’ appropriate payment.21  
Our natural field setting does not allow us to isolate the underlying mechanisms through 
which the experimental information variation influences behavior of the customers. First, the 
effects of our intervention might be related to the particular characteristic of the norm that is 
made salient through the announcement of the survey. Bicchieri (2011) distinguishes between 
‘normative expectations’ (what ought to be done) and ‘empirical expectations’ (what others 
do) as central elements of norms. The intervention in our experiment (focusing on the 
‘appropriate payment’) potentially includes both aspects of the norm, and so we cannot 
determine which element of the norm predominantly triggers the response to the scale 
variation. It might therefore be interesting to investigate whether the impact of scale 
variations in the field is sensitive to which elements of a norm are highlighted.
22
 
Also, we cannot disentangle between different motivations that may drive the scale variation 
effect. For example, a customer might have an inherent preference not to deviate from a given 
norm, as outlined by Kimbrough and Vostroknutov (forthcoming). Alternatively, a customer 
might interpret the information provided by the scale as expectations of the members of the 
shopping mall team concerning the payment for their services. Guilt aversion, the preference 
to avoid disutility caused by disappointing expectations of others (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 
2007), might then motivate customers to increase their payments in response to the higher 
reference scale.
23
 First evidence in line with the latter notion is provided by the dictator game 
                                                          
21 
Interestingly, we find that customers are less likely to pay for the service in the third experiment compared to 
the other conditions: while the probability of paying is 73.0% in the main experiment and 76.7% in the control 
experiment, it is only 63.1% in the experiment using the unrelated question, and the differences to the former 
experiments are significant (two-sample tests of proportions, p < 0.01, two-tailed, both pairwise comparisons). 
This suggests that increasing the saliency of potential payments for the service has a significant impact on 
customers’ propensity to give. 
22
 Armstrong Soule and Madrigal (2015) conclude from an experiment using hypothetical pay-what-you-want 
scenarios that descriptive norms - information about what other customers pay - influence price choices more 
than explicit price recommendations. 
23
 Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) provide the framework for capturing the idea that beliefs directly enter a 
subject’s utility function. Empirical evidence in line with guilt aversion is provided, for example, by the 
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experiment by Ockenfels and Werner (2014) where the effect of scale variations is only 
significant when the attention of the dictators is directed to recipients’ expectations. 
Overall, our study shows that in the presence of uncertainty about what is expected, 
customers’ payment decisions might be rather volatile and easily affected by minor changes in 
the environment. In our setting, it takes only very subtle exogenous variations in the context 
to substantially increase payments made by customers. To better understand the effects of the 
context (in particular with respect to norm-relevant information) on voluntary payments is a 
promising avenue for further research and also an important prerequisite for the adequate 
design of pay-as-you-want pricing schemes and campaigns for charitable donations in 
practice.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
experimental studies of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, 2011), Dufwenberg et al. (2011), Bellemare et al. 
(2015), Khalmetski et al. (2015) and Khalmetski (2016). 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS. 
  Frequency Percent 
treatment     
LOW 199 19.06 
HIGH 204 19.54 
LOW30 314 30.08 
HIGH30 327 31.32 
observable by member of the team     
no 618 59.59 
yes 419 40.41 
observable by customer     
no 880 84.29 
yes 164 15.71 
gender     
female 754 72.22 
male 290 27.78 
group     
no 576 55.17 
yes 468 44.83 
staff     
no 998 95.59 
yes 46 4.41 
time     
before 2pm 385 36.88 
from 2pm to 4pm 215 20.59 
after 4pm 444 42.53 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variable    
payment (Euro cent) 31.80 25.35 
money on plate (Euro cent) 104.29 19.16 
estimated age (years) 35.80 14.53 
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TABLE A.2. CUSTOMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO GIVE MORE THAN 30 EURO CENTS – PROBIT MODELS. 
Dependent var.: More than 30 (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment HIGH 0.343*** 
(0.125) 
0.483*** 
(0.136) 
0.505*** 
(0.137) 
Treatment LOW30 -0.142 
(0.114) 
-0.096 
(0.119) 
-0.109 
(0.121) 
Treatment HIGH30 -0.049 
(0.113) 
0.084 
(0.121) 
0.051 
(0.123) 
Male -- -0.232** 
(0.095) 
-0.251*** 
(0.095) 
Age -- 0.018*** 
(0.003) 
0.019*** 
(0.003) 
Staff -- -2.306*** 
(0.439) 
-2.268*** 
(0.434) 
Group -- -0.230*** 
(0.086) 
-0.234*** 
(0.086) 
Observable by team member -- -- 0.186** 
(0.088) 
Observable by customer -- -- 0.139 
(0.114) 
Money on plate (Euro cents) -- -- 0.002 
(0.002) 
Time dummies No Yes Yes 
Observations 1035 1031 1030 
Log likelihood -707 -640 -636 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the customer paid more than 30 Euro cents. Standard 
errors are given in parentheses. *** and ** denote significance at the 1%- and 5%-level, respectively. 
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vorgelegten Dissertation stehen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher weder im In- noch im Ausland in 
gleicher oder ähnlicher Form einer anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt. Ich versichere, dass 
ich nach bestem Wissen die reine Wahrheit gesagt und nichts verschwiegen habe. 
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